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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of foreign sovereign immunity constitutes a well-
known tale' in which autonomy and privilege yielded substantial
ground to accountability and democratic ideals.2 Although inter-
national law conferred absolute immunity on foreign states until
the end of the nineteenth century,3 two World Wars and the rise of
communism produced a vast expansion in the economic activities
of foreign states and, thus, their influence on daily human exis-
tence.4 These historical forces in turn generated demands for
states to become more accountable and to tolerate corresponding
encroachments on the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.'
In addition, the spread of democratic ideals fortified the popular
resistance to anything that smacked of privilege.6 Thus, by the
middle of the twentieth century, absolute sovereign immunity gave
way to "restricted" immunity, which preserves immunity for the
sovereign activities of foreign states but withholds immunity for
their non-governmental activities.7  During the last twenty-five
1. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT 81 (1994) ("There has been a prodigious amount of well-informed writ-
ing on all aspects of the topic of [foreign sovereign] immunity."). See also Michael Singer,
Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Ne-
cessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 53 (1995) (observing that "[tlhe law of jurisdic-
tional immunity of states in the municipal courts of other states is now fairly well under-
stood").
2. Cf. C. WILFRED JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES at xxxv (1961) (noting the
"general tendency of legal thought, national and international ... to eliminate or restrict
all forms of immunity").
3. See HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 79. See also Robert P. Lewis, Note, Sovereign Immu-
nity and International Organizations: Broadbent v. OAS, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 675, 688
(1979) (stating that, prior to World War II, "the policy of granting sovereigns absolute
immunity in national courts was almost universal").
4. See HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 79 (describing the "widespread contracting for trade by
socialist governments" during the post-war period); John C. Griffith, Jr., Note, Restricting
the Immunity of International Organizations in Labor Disputes: Reforming an Obsolete
Shibboleth, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 1007, 1009 n.10 (1985) (explaining how state involvement in
economic activities first grew during World War I, when states nationalized industries, and
again after World War II due to the expansion of communism).
5. See HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 79; Gordon H. Glenn et al., Immunities of International
Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 247, 251 (1982); Antoinette A. Farrugia, Comment,
Boimah v. United Nations General Assembly: International Organizations Immunity Is
Absolutely Not Restrictive, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 497, 500 (1989); Griffith, supra note 4, at
1009; Frances Wright Henderson, Casenote, How Much Immunity for International Or-
ganizations?: Mendaro v. World Bank, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 487, 490 (1985);
Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE L.J. 1167,
1173 (1982).
6. See JENKS, supra note 2, at 111 (describing the "contemporary tendency to curtail
immunities which savour of personal privilege").
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years, the world's major legal systems also concluded that munici-
pal courts provide the appropriate forum ,for adjudicating ques-
tions of diplomatic immunity, consular immunity, and foreign sov-
ereign immunity.8
Many writers contend that the immunities of international or-
ganizations and their personnel (international immunities) 9 have
7. See HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 79; Glenn et al., supra note 5. at 252; Farrugia, supra
note 5, at 501; Henderson, supra note 5, at 490-91; Lewis, supra note 3, at 677.
8. With respect to diplomatic immunity, a former Vice President of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) recently observed that "[t]he case-law ... contains a strong current
of decisions indicating that the domestic courts of the host State have strongly and success-
fully asserted their authority to determine these questions.* Difference Relating to Im-
munity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
1999 I.C.J. -, - (Apr. 29) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry at 2).
With regard to foreign sovereign immunity, it is well known that Congress intended the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) to transfer the competence for immu-
nity determinations from the Executive branch to the Judicial branch. See Glenn, supra
note 5, at 255; Farrugia, supra note 5, at 505; Henderson, supra note 5, at 492; Lewis, supra
note 3, at 677. According to the House Report, this step brought U.S. law into conformity
with "the practice in virtually every other country." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6606.
In transmitting a draft version of the FSIA to the Senate, the State Department and the
Justice Department proposed that the United States submit to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ for disputes involving foreign sovereign immunity, thus vesting the rmal deci-
sion-making authority for foreign sovereign immunity determinations at the international
level. See Letter from William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, to the President of the Sen-
ate (Jan. 22, 1973), reprinted in 12 IL.M. 118, 121-22 (1973) (predicting that adjudication
by the ICJ "would have the beneficial effect of assuring that the law and practice of this
and other countries conform with international law"). Although the United States ulti-
mately passed the FSIA, it never filed a declaration submitting foreign sovereign immu-
nity disputes to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
9. For the purposes of this article, the phrase "international immunities" means the
privileges and immunities enjoyed by international organizations and their personnel un-
der international law. Breaking this explanation into its component parts, this article de-
fines international organizations to include "an organization that is created by an interna-
tional agreement and has a membership consisting entirely or principally of states.'
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 221 (1987). Obviously, this definition excludes NGOs.
This article defines the personnel of international organizations to include both full-time
staff members and individuals, such as peacekeepers or special rapporteurs, who perform
specific missions on behalf of international organizations. See Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, arts. V (providing for the im-
munities of United Nations "officials"), VI (providing for the immunities of "experts on
missions for the United Nations"), 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter General
Convention].
This article does not define the personnel of international organizations to include rep-
resentatives of member states. While representatives of member states are entitled to
immunities, they reflect the immunities of the sending states and not those of the organiza-
tions. See id., art. IV (providing for the immunities of the "representatives of members,"
but recognizing the power of member states to waive the immunities of their representa-
tives).
2000]
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followed a darker and more mysterious path."0 Like states, inter-
national organizations have proliferated since World War IIIn and
have matured into institutions that exercise political, economic and
social influence of "massive importance. "12 While international
organizations have obvious and important responsibilities for hu-
man rights, peace, security, trade, and the environment, they also
have become a major force in global markets. In fact, interna-
tional organizations resemble large multinational corporations that
While writers often discuss the "privileges" and "immunities" of international organiza-
tions, it is impossible to distinguish between the two. PETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL
POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 97 (1994). Although treaties and
customary law may provide international organizations with a variety of privileges and
immunities from municipal regulation, immunity from the jurisdiction of municipal courts
lies at the heart of international immunities. See Yuen-Li Liang, The Legal Status of the
United Nations in the United States, 2 INT'L L.Q. 577, 584 (1948-49) (referring to jurisdic-
tional immunity as "[o]ne of the first and most fundamental requirements" of interna-
tional organizations); Henderson, supra note 5, at 492 (explaining that jurisdictional im-
munity "lies at the core" of international immunities). Except as otherwise noted, this
article only addresses the jurisdictional immunities of international organizations under
international law. It does not address the jurisdictional immunities of international organi-
zations under municipal statutes, such as the International Organizations Immunity Act
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288k (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
10. In contrast to the developed body of literature on foreign sovereign immunity,
leading writers frequently refer to a serious gap in our understanding of international im-
munities. See Sir Robert Y. Jennings, Foreword to BEKKER, supra note 9, at vii (intro-
ducing a recent work on international immunities and stating that "the gap in our juridical
understanding of international organization is a serious weakness of modern international
law"). See also Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (describing the immunity of international organizations from judicial process as a
"little-known" immunity); KULJIT AHLUWALIA, THE LEGAL STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CERTAIN
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 208 (1964) (identifying a "dire need" for in-
creased understanding of international immunities); HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 94 (con-
cluding that "[m]ore attention should be paid to the immunities of international organiza-
tions"); JOHN KERRY KING, INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION 10 (1952)
(complaining that writers have devoted "scant attention" to the problems of international
immunities); Green H. Hackworth, Foreword to CAROL MCCORMICK CROSSWELL.
PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL ABROAD at iii (1952) (observing that
"much less is generally known" about international immunities than is known about dip-
lomatic immunity); Elmer Plischke, Foreword to DAVID B. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES at xiii (1971) (noting that the subject of international im-
munities "has only recently been broached in an occasional professional journal article,
and touched upon briefly in a few basic international law texts").
11. See LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY 577-78 (1999). As of 1994, there were over 350 international organizations.
See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 4. By the year 2000, the number of international organiza-
tions may reach 450. See FREY & FREY, supra, at 578.
12. Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United States Courts:
Absolute or Restrictive?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 690 (1991) (quoting Thomas J.
O'Toole, Sovereign Immunity Redivivus: Suits Against International Organizations, 4
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 1 (1980)).
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operate in hundreds of locations, 3 own or lease large stocks of real
property, 4 employ tens of thousands of individuals, 5 manage large
quantities of assets, 6 and conduct billions of dollars worth of
transactions. 17 Under the circumstances, one would expect inter-
national immunities to encounter the pressures and restrictions al-
ready experienced by the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.' 8
Consistent with these expectations, the international legal com-
munity embraced the functional necessity doctrine (i.e., the princi-
ple that international organizations should possess the minimum
immunities necessary to perform their functions) as a theoretical
limitation on international immunities.1 9
Contrary to such expectations, however, most immunities con-
ventions and headquarters agreements provide that "international
organizations cannot be judged by any [municipal] court ... unless
they expressly waive that privilege."20 Because complete jurisdic-
tional immunity may seem "excessive" in light of the functional
13. See Paul C. Szasz, The United Nations Legislates to Limit Its Liability, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 739, 740 (1987) (describing the United Nations as a large multinational enterprise
that operates in well over a hundred countries). See also JOHN KERRY KING, THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS at xii (1949) (ex-
plaining that the operations of international organizations are "literally world-wide').
14. See C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
at xxxvi (1962); A.S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST
STATES 151 (1995).
15. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 573 (estimating that, in 1980,200 international
organizations employed approximately 90,000 individuals); Szasz, supra note 13, at 740
(observing that the United Nations alone employs "tens of thousands of staff members').
16. See MULLER, supra note 14, at 151 (noting, for example, that the United Nations
has accumulated large pension funds that operate on international securities markets).
17. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 1005 (1995) (describing, for example, the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency's large-scale purchase and movement of supplies to shelter and feed hun-
dreds of thousands of persons in the Middle East); Szasz, supra note 13, at 740 (explaining
that the United Nations alone "carr[ies] out many types of transactions involving money
or goods valued at some billions of dollars'). See also JENKS, supra note 14, at xxxvi (de-
scribing the vast range of commercial activities performed by international organizations).
18. See D.W. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 362 (4th ed.
1982); MULLER, supra note 14, at 151-52; Singer, supra note 1, at 56, 141; Griffith, supra
note 4, at 1007; Lewis, supra note 3, at 689; Note, The Status of International Organizations
Under the Law of the United States, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1312 (1958).
19. See, eg., BEKKER, supra note 9, at 111 (stating that the functional necessity doc-
trine seems "universally accepted" as the justification for international immunities); Jo-
seph L. Kunz, Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AMs. J. INT'L L
828, 847 (1947) (stating that the principle of functional necessity has become almost 'uni-
versally recognized" as the basis for international immunities).
20. Leonardo Dfaz GonzAlez (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on Relations Be-
tveen States and International Organizations, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/424, reprinted in [19891 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 153, 161, U.N. Doc. AICNAISEIRAI1989IAdd.1.
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necessity doctrine,21 writers mistakenly assert that international
immunities have expanded' to the point where their implementing
treaties resemble the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.23
These writers attack the perceived expansion of international im-
munities on the normative grounds that most international organi-
zations do not require immunities24 and that immunities encourage
international organizations to behave irresponsibly.' Inevitably,
these sentiments provoked calls for reform.
Generally speaking, reform proposals fall into two categories,
both of which draw on analogies to restricted sovereign immunity
and, therefore, assume that municipal courts will play a key role in
making immunity determinations. First, a number of writers have
suggested that municipal courts should apply the doctrine of re-
stricted sovereign immunity en bloc to international organizations
and their personnel.26 Despite its popularity, this view generated
21. Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 reporters' note 4 (constru-
ing Section 2 of the General Convention to confer absolute immunity on the United Na-
tions and questioning the justification for absolute immunity under the functional neces-
sity doctrine).
22. See Singer, supra note 1, at 56 (arguing that "as jurisdictional immunity has waned
for states, it has waxed for international organizations"); Daniel Hammerschlag, Com-
ment, Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 16 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 279, 282 (1992) (describing "a long line of rulings that have expanded
immunity for international organizations"). Cf. O'Toole, supra note 12, at 1 (asserting
that "[wihile the nation states have been drastically curtailing their assertion of sovereign
immunity, the international organizations have been boldly laying claim to the inheritance
of that same wounded doctrine").
23. See, e.g., Boimah v. United Nations Gen. Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (describing the General Convention as creating "absolute" immunity); THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1140 (Bruno Simma ed. 1994) (explaining that the
General Convention creates a form of "absolute immunity"); FELICE MORGENSTERN,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 6 (1986) (referring to the "ab-
solute" immunity of international organizations); Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the
Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 93, 128 (1996)
(stating that the General Convention "creates a system of absolute immunity for the prop-
erty, funds, and assets of the United Nations"); Farrugia, supra note 5, at 513 (stating that
"international organizations still have absolute immunity, although foreign government
immunity is now restricted"); Griffith, supra note 4, at 1007 (criticizing the "absolute im-
munity" granted to international organizations); Henderson, supra note 5, at 487 n.6 (as-
serting that the United Nations Charter grants the United Nations "complete immunity"
from all legal process); Lewis, supra note 3, at 686 (noting that most international organi-
zations "define their immunities from legal process as absolute," and stating that the lan-
guage of the United Nations Charter "was intended . . . to confer absolute immunity").
But see SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 351 (emphasizing that international
immunities are a form of functional - not absolute - immunity).
24. See infra notes 121,166-73 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 173, 366-70 and accompanying text.
26. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 158 (observing that several writers and courts have
attempted to apply the doctrine of restricted foreign sovereign immunity to international
[Vol. 41:1
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substantial criticism. Leading writers have rejected the wholesale
application of sovereign immunity concepts to international or-
ganizations, which do not possess the traditional attributes of
states.27
Second, while recognizing that the application of state-immunity
principles to international organizations en bloc may be untenable,
other writers support limited comparisons to foreign sovereign
immunity.' For example, one writer observes that restricted sov-
ereign immunity rests in part on the functional necessity doctrine. 9
Because international immunities likewise rest on the functional
necessity doctrine, he argues that restricted sovereign immunity
still provides a model for the development of international immu-
nities.30 In particular, he suggests that if foreign states can function
with restricted immunity, municipal courts should require interna-
tional organizations to do the same.31
Thus, the proponents of reform share a general commitment to
the expansion of municipal court jurisdiction for questions involv-
organizations). See also BOWETr, supra note 18, at 362 (predicting that as international
organizations expanded, there would be greater justification for applying the doctrine of
restricted sovereign immunity to their activities); Letter from Roberts B. Owen, Legal
Adviser to the Department of State, to Leroy D. Clark, General Counsel to the EEOC
(June 24, 1980), reprinted in Marian L Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L 917, 918 (1980) [hereinafter Owen Let-
ter] (concluding that international organizations enjoy the same restricted immunity as
foreign states); O'Toole, supra note 12, at 14-16 (arguing that international organizations,
like foreign states, should not enjoy immunity for commercial activities); Griffith, supra
note 4, at 1033 (suggesting that restrictive sovereign immunity principles could be applied
to international organizations); Note, The Status of International Organizations Under the
Law of the United States, supra note 18, at 1312 (advocating the application of restricted
sovereign immunity concepts to international organizations).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 cmt. d; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 83 cmt. e (1965);
C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 376 (1996); BEKKER, supra note 9, at 155-56; HIGGINS, supra note 1, at
93; MULLER, supra note 14, at 152-53; MALCOLI N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 924
(4th ed. 1997); Singer, supra note 1, at 62-63.
28. See Singer, supra note 1, at 65 (proposing to draw on foreign sovereign immunity
concepts in defining the scope of international immunities); Note, Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1191-92 (proposing limited re-
strictions that would harmonize international immunities with developments in the law of
foreign sovereign immunity); Kenneth R. Lee, Recent Developments, 20 VA. J. INT'L L
913, 922-23 (1980) (proposing a cautious restriction of international immunities in confor-
mity with trends in state-immunity law). See also BEKKER, supra note 9, at 163 (proposing
to draw a modest analogy to foreign sovereign immunity by distinguishing between the
nature of activities performed by international organizations).
29. Singer, supra note 1, at 65.
30. Id. at 56-57, 65,135.
31. Id. at 135.
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ing international immunities. Surprisingly, they have not explored
the likely costs of expanded jurisdiction. Given their premises that
international immunities are unnecessary and encourage irrespon-
sible behavior, writers seem to have assumed that the expansion of
municipal court jurisdiction would produce (1) few institutional
costs, and (2) substantial benefits in the form of greater account-
ability.
This article challenges the premises of proposals to expand mu-
nicipal court jurisdiction. To this end, it first argues that history
reflects not an expansion-but the substantial contraction-of in-
ternational immunities. Second, the provisions of immunities
agreements do not resemble the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity. To the contrary, those treaties adhere to the functional
necessity doctrine, but give international officials the primary
authority for making immunity determinations. Third, this article
draws on a recent decision of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to explain why the expansion of municipal court jurisdiction
would create significant institutional costs. It could, in fact, en-
danger the capacity of international organizations to perform their
obligations with respect to peace, security, the promotion of hu-
man rights, and other controversial issues. Finally, the expansion
of municipal court jurisdiction is unlikely to make international
organizations significantly more accountable because international
law already requires international organizations to minimize their
reliance on immunity and to provide claimants with alternatives to
municipal court litigation.
In short, this article recognizes that international immunities op-
erate within a world that requires their minimization. Contrary to
a misguided strain in U.S. academic discourse, however, it con-
cludes that international organizations have taken adequate steps
to balance the need for autonomy with the interests of account-
ability.
II. INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Several publicists describe international immunities as a recent
phenomenon 32 and trace their development to the end of World
War 11. 33 Others portray their development as an exception to the
32. See AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 48; AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 369;
BEKKER, supra note 9, at 3; Farrugia, supra note 5, at 502.
33. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 370-74 (tracing the conventional law of in-
ternational immunities to the 1940s); Glenn et al., supra note 5, at 276 (asserting that the
[Vol. 41:1
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modem preference for limiting immunities of every kind.34 This
Part explains that international immunities first appeared during
the nineteenth century and that their evolution conforms to the
general trend towards limited immunity. This Part also introduces
a cautionary tale about the problems created by early attempts to
apply state-immunity concepts to international organizations. 35
While their proliferation may be a post-war phenomenon, 3 in-
ternational organizations have existed since the middle of the nine-
teenth century.37 Many of these early organizations, such as the
Universal Telegraphic Union and the General Postal Union,
regulated non-political and technical activities for member states.
Because politics did not intrude on the work of these organiza-
tions, member states entrusted their administration to the civil
services of their host states.38 As a result, these "administrative
unions" and their personnel did not require-and did not re-
ceive-immunities of any kind.39
During the same period, however, states created a small number
of international organizations to manage international problems
having political dimensions. To ensure that these organizations
would not fall under the control of any particular state, member
jurisdictional immunities of international organizations first gained widespread acceptance
following ratification of the United Nations Charter).
34. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
35. While recognizing the differences between foreign sovereign immunity and diplo-
matic immunity, this Part refers to both doctrines as a form of "state immunity* in the
sense that they both grow out of the rights, duties, and needs of states. See SHAW, supra
note 27, at 523 ("The special privileges and immunities related to diplomatic personnel ...
grew up partly as a consequence of sovereign immunity.... Since [diplomats] represent
their states in various ways, they thus benefit from the legal principle of state sover-
eignty.").
36. See O'Toole, supra note 12, at 1 (identifying a "confusing proliferation of interna-
tional organizations" since the close of World War II); Note, The Status of International
Organizations Under the Law of the United States, supra note 18, at 1300 (asserting that
the "period following World War II has been marked by a proliferation" of international
organizations).
37. See FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR
LEGAL SET1TING 5-6 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the nineteenth-century antecedents of mod-
em international organizations).
38. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 327.
39. See KING, supra note 13, at 57; Norman L Hill, Diplomatic Privileges and Immu-
nities in International Organizations, 20 GEO. LU. 44, 46-47 (1931); Lawrence Preuss,
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities ofAgents Invested with Functions of an International
Interest, 25 AM. J. INT'L L 694, 698-99 (1930); Jacques Secretan, The Independence
Granted to Agents of the International Community in Their Relations with National Public
Authorities, 1935 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 56, 64; Hugh McKinnon Wood, Legal Relations Be-
tween Individuals and a World Organization of States, 30 GROTIUS SOc'Y TRANSACrIONS
FOR THE YEAR 1944, at 141, 142 n.2 (1945).
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states endowed them with jurisdictional immunities.4" One exam-
ple involved the International Commission for the Cape Spartel
Light, which was created in 1865 and which placed a lighthouse
near the Straits of Gibraltar under international administration.4
Other examples include the conferral of diplomatic immunities on
the Danube, Congo, and Central Rhine River Commissions in
1878, 1885, and 1922, respectively;4" international judicial bodies;43
and the institutions created to implement peace treaties following
World War I.' Because they offered a convenient model, it be-
40. See MICHAELS, supra note 10, at xvi (explaining that, prior to the establishment of
the League of Nations, the drafters of constituent agreements endeavored to vest interna-
tional organizations and their personnel with the immunities enjoyed by the nineteenth-
century diplomatic corps). See also KING, supra note 13, at 25 (stating that the "granting
of privileges and immunities to international organizations ... has always had the same ba-
sic reason and purpose; that is, to secure for them both [the] legal and practical independ-
ence" necessary to pursue the common interests of member states); Kunz, supra note 19,
at 836 (reaching a similar conclusion).
41. See David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personal-
ity and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 280-87, 362-63 (1996) (de-
scribing the Commission's establishment and stating that the Commission received "im-
munity from jurisdiction by any ... sovereign"). The International Commission for the
Cape Spartel Light operated from 1865 to 1958 on the approach to the Straits of Gibraltar
and was the first international organization joined by the United Sates. Id. at 276.
42. See KING, supra note 13, at 39, 44-45, 53-54 (providing an account of the conces-
sion of immunities to the Danube, Congo and Central Rhine River Commissions); Preuss,
supra note 39, at 696-97 (referring to the grant of immunities to the Danube and Central
Rhine River Commissions); Secretan, supra note 39, at 60-62 (describing the concession of
immunities to the Danube and Central Rhine River Commissions). See also Serguei
Tarassenko & Ralph Zacklin, Independence of International Civil Servants, in
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, at 111.1, 2 (Chris de Cooker ed., 1990) (recounting
the French government's decision, in 1922, to confer diplomatic immunities on representa-
tives and agents of the Central Rhine Commission).
43. See KING, supra note 13, at 237 (identifying the Hague Conventions for the Peace-
ful Settlement of Disputes of 1899 and 1907 (Hague Conventions) as the first examples in
which diplomatic privileges and immunities were extended to judges of international tri-
bunals); Sir Cecil J.B. Hurst, Diplomatic Immunities-Modern Developments, 1929 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 6-8 (describing the diplomatic immunities conferred by the Hague Con-
ventions and concluding that the granting of diplomatic immunities to members of interna-
tional tribunals had become a feature of customary international law); Preuss, supra note
39, at 699 (asserting that the Hague Conventions first conferred diplomatic immunities on
international tribunals, and that a 1907 treaty also gave diplomatic immunities to members
of the short-lived Central American Court of Justice); Secretan, supra note 39, at 63 (re-
ferring to the diplomatic immunities conferred by the Hague Conventions, as well as the
1923 Convention creating an International Central American Tribunal); Wood, supra note
39, at 142 n.2 (noting that the Hague Conventions conferred diplomatic immunities on ar-
bitrators appointed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
44. See Preuss, supra note 39, at 697-98.
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came a common practice to grant diplomatic privileges and immu-
nities to international organizations having a political character!'
The Covenant of the League of Nations continued this practice
by providing that "officials of the League when engaged on the
business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and im-
munities."'  At first glance, the phrase "when engaged on the
business of the League" suggests that the League's personnel were
entitled to immunity only for their official activities - not for pri-
vate behavior.47 This interpretation, however, never gained fa-
vor.48 To the contrary, writers uniformly concluded that the Cove-
nant granted League officials the full range of diplomatic
immunities, but limited their application to the period of an offi-
cial's appointment.49
As is typical for the constituent documents of international or-
ganizations, 50 the Covenant did not define the content of "diplo-
matic privileges and immunities" and left its elaboration to subse-
quent agreements."' To achieve a more concrete framework for
the League's relations with its host state, the Secretary-General
reached a preliminary agreement with Swiss authorities in 1921
and a final Modus Vivendi in 1926.51 In substance, these docu-
ments extended to the League and its officials the same immuni-
ties enjoyed by accredited diplomatic missions and their personnel
45. See KING, supra note 10, at 10 (describing the initial inclination to use diplomatic
privileges and immunities as a model when addressing the problem of international immu-
nities); KING, supra note 13, at 26 (appreciating reliance on diplomatic privileges and im-
munities given the clarity of those principles under international law); Kunz, supra note
19, at 836-37 (recognizing the advantages of diplomatic immunities as a template for inter-
national immunities and stating that diplomatic immunities became the favorite standard
"[f]rom the beginning of the 19th century onward"). See also AHLUWALIA, supra note 10,
at 105 (noting that many states granted diplomatic privileges and immunities to interna-
tional officials prior to World War II).
46. LEAGUE OFNATIONS COVENANT art. 7, para. 4; Hurst, supra note 43, at 8.
47. See MARTIN HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS
11 (1947); KING, supra note 10, at 39; KING, supra note 13, at 78; Liang, supra note 9, at
589; Preuss, supra note 39, at 706-07; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 3.
48. See id.
49. See i&
50. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 129; BowElT, supra note 18, at 346; Hans Aufricht,
The Expansion of the Concept of Sovereign Immunity: With Special Reference to Interna-
tional Organizations, 46 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L 85,91 (1952).
51. See KING, supra note 13, at 81; EGON F. RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, THE
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 265 (1945).
52. See HILL, supra note 47, at 15-16, 19-20; KING, supra note 13, at 80; RANSHOFEN-
WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 265; Preuss, supra note 39, at 701-03; Wood, supra note
39, at 142. See also Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 3 (noting that the 1921
agreement provided detailed arrangements regarding the immunities of the League and of
its officials).
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under Swiss law.53 Thus, the League enjoyed complete immunity
from suit except to the extent that it waived its immunity. 4
In accordance with Switzerland's restrictive treatment of diplo-
matic personnel, however, League officials were divided into two
categories.55  Non-Swiss officials of the "first category" received
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of Swiss courts. 6 These
officials included members of the League's higher administrative
and research staff.5 7 By contrast, non-Swiss officials of the "second
category" received jurisdictional immunity only for their official
acts.5 8 The second category included the League's lower adminis-
trative staff and clerical workers.5 9 Thus, during the height of its
activities, roughly one-third of the League's officials fell within the
first category, while the remaining two-thirds fell within the second
category.60 It is important to remember, however, that all League
officials enjoyed "diplomatic immunities." The distinction be-
53. See HILL, supra note 47, at 15; KING, supra note 10, at 42; KING, supra note 13, at
88; Preuss, supra note 39, at 703; Secretan, supra note 39, at 67.
54. See Wood, supra note 39, at 143.
55. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 549; HILL, supra note 47, at 15-16; KING, su-
pra note 10, at 42; KING, supra note 13, at 87; Preuss, supra note 39, at 701, 703; Taras-
senko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 3-4.
56. See HILL, supra note 47, at 27; KING, supra note 10, at 43; KING, supra note 13, at
93; RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 265; Hill, supra note 39, at 51; Preuss,
supra note 39, at 706; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 4; Wood, supra note 39, at
146; Note, The United Nations Under American Municipal Law: A Preliminary Assess-
ment, 55 YALE L.J. 778,781 n.11 (1946).
57. See HILL, supra note 47, at 16; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 4. See also
RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 272 (suggesting that interpreters and
translators also belonged to the first category); Preuss, supra note 39, at 701-02 (asserting
that the first category also included officials of the intermediate class).
58. See HILL, supra note 47, at 30, 36-37; KING, supra note 10, at 45; KING, supra note
13, at 103; CHESTER PURVES, THE INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
SECRETARIAT 52-53 (1945); RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 265; Hill, su-
pra note 39, at 51; Preuss, supra note 39, at 706; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 4-
5; Wood, supra note 39, at 146; Note, The United Nations Under American Municipal Law:
A Preliminary Assessment, supra note 56, at 781 n.11.
59. See HILL, supra note 47, at 16; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 4. See also
Preuss, supra note 39, at 702 (explaining that the second category was composed of "tech-
nical or manual personnel").
60. See Preuss, supra note 39, at 702 n.35 (stating that, as of 1930, 225 persons fell
within the first category of League officials). See also RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra
note 51, at 242 (stating that, as of October 15, 1930, the League employed some 658 offi-
cials). In earlier years, the percentage of first-category officials was much higher. For ex-
ample, in the period from 1925 to 1926, 350 out of 488 staff members were officials of the
first category. See KING, supra note 13, at 89 (stating that from 1925 to 1926 "some 350
officers were listed in the first category"). See also RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra
note 51, at 241 (stating that, as of December 1, 1925, the League employed 488 officials).
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tween the two categories of officials arose from Switzerland's re-
strictive approach towards diplomatic personnel.61
Thus, by the 1930s, the concession of diplomatic privileges and
immunities to international political organizations and their per-
sonnel arguably evolved into a rule of customary international
law.62 Unfortunately, the application of diplomatic immunities to a
growing body of international officials created unforeseen prob-
lems. For example, the introduction of a large privileged class cre-
ated public relations problems for host states.' More importantly,
the adoption of diplomatic privileges and immunities prompted
member states to deny immunity to officials serving in their home
jurisdictions. Under traditional diplomatic law, this policy made
sense. Diplomatic agents typically do not enjoy immunity from the
jurisdiction of their home states64 because agents do not require
immunity from their principals.6
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See generally KING, supra note 13, at 86-
87, 90 (explaining that diplomatic practices vary from state to state and recognizing that
the application of diplomatic immunities to international organizations may have the un-
desirable effect of exposing their personnel to the 'fluctuations of national practice*).
62. See Preuss, supra note 39, at 695-96 (writing in 1930, recognizing that international
organizations had already begun to claim diplomatic prerogatives in the absence of ex-
press treaty provisions and acknowledging that the concession of diplomatic immunities to
international organizations had become the rule); Secretan, supra note 39, at 64 (writing in
1935, and observing that it had become the practice under international law to grant
"diplomatic privileges and immunities.., to those agents who are engaged in the per-
formance of duties involved in the maintenance of peace or in some public international
service such as ensuring freedom of navigation on rivers"). See also Wood, supra note 39,
at 142 n.2 (identifying several cases in which international organizations received diplo-
matic immunities after the League's formation).
Given the United States' long-standing resistance to the concession of diplomatic im-
munities to international organizations, one must approach these assertions with a meas-
ure of caution. See, eg., CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at vi (observing that "[o]nly the
United States, until 1941, assumed the position that representatives ... of international
organizations should not have privileges and immunities"). At the same time, the views of
the United States may have reflected the eccentricities of its domestic law and its decision
not to join the League of Nations. See KING, supra note 13, at 68-69, 142 (attributing the
United States' reluctance to a provision of the United States Code, which permitted the
grant of diplomatic prerogatives only to "ambassadors or foreign ministers of any foreign
prince or state, authorized and received as sudz by the President") (emphasis added);
Note, Privileges and Immunities Accorded by the United States to the United Nations Or-
ganization, Its Property, and Its Personnel, 34 MINN. L REV. 445, 445-56 (1950) (attribut-
ing the United States's reluctance to grant diplomatic privileges to international organiza-
tions to its failure to join the League of Nations).
63. See Preuss, supra note 39, at 694-95 (characterizing the extension of diplomatic
privileges to large and growing classes of persons as "a problem of serious proportions").
64. See JENKS, supra note 2, at xxvii; KING, supra note 13, at 118; Kunz, supra note
19, at 845; Preuss, supra note 39, at 708-09; Secretan. supra note 39, at 65.
65. See MICHAELS, supra note 10, at 22,25.
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The retention of jurisdiction by a diplomat's home state also
serves the important theoretical purpose of ensuring that diplo-
mats do not abuse their immunities for private purposes. While
serving abroad, diplomats enjoy immunity from local jurisdiction
for official acts and most private acts. By denying immunity to
their own diplomatic personnel, however, sending states preserve a
forum in which diplomats must answer for private acts.66 While
the practical significance of that forum may be overrated, 67 writers
argued that the extension of diplomatic immunities to interna-
tional officials in their home states would render them completely
unaccountable for private acts. 68 Arguably, this situation could re-
sult in the denial of justice.69
In its negotiations with the League, Switzerland therefore
claimed that it had no obligation to extend diplomatic immunities
to officials of Swiss nationality.70 While recognizing that the
Covenant granted "diplomatic privileges and immunities" to all
League officials, Switzerland argued that "diplomatic privileges
and immunities" did not exist between individuals and their home
state.71 The League's Secretariat vigorously disagreed.72 Accord-
ing to the Secretariat, jurisdictional immunities protected interna-
tional officials from improper influence or attacks by member
66. See Secretan, supra note 39, at 70 (identifying this as "a necessary complement" to
the immunity of diplomatic personnel from the jurisdiction of the receiving state's courts).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 464 reporters' note 9 (explaining that
the jurisdiction of the sending state "assure[s] a competent forum for hearing cases against
members of... diplomatic missions").
67. See Lawrence Preuss, Immunity of Officers and Employees of the United Nations
for Official Acts: The Ranallo Case, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, 567 & n.35 (1947) (discounting
the likelihood that sending states would exercise jurisdiction over their nationals for
wrongful acts committed abroad, but recognizing an exceptional case in which a Roma-
nian court convicted a Romanian diplomat for offering and accepting bribes in Italy).
68. See JENKS, supra note 2, at xxxvii (recognizing that if international officials were to
enjoy immunity in their home states, it would become necessary to create an equivalent
type of jurisdiction at the international level); Secretan, supra note 39, at 69 (questioning
what jurisdiction would apply to international officials if not their home jurisdiction).
69. See Secretan, supra note 39, at 74 (describing the views of writers who espoused
this principle).
70. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 550.
71. See HILL, supra note 47, at 17 (describing the Swiss position).
72. See KING, supra note 10, at 46 (recounting the "considerable difficulty and dis-
agreement" between Swiss authorities and the League of Nations regarding the status of
Swiss officials); KING, supra note 13, at 83 (referring to the "open disagreement and pro-
tracted negotiations" between the League of Nations and Switzerland); Wood, supra note




states.73 Furthermore, international officials required immunity in
their home jurisdictions because inappropriate pressures were as
likely to emanate from there as from anywhere else.74 In fact, in-
ternational officials require special protection from their home
states because international officials are most susceptible to their
influence.75
Ultimately, the League of Nations and Switzerland reached an
expedient compromise, whereby Swiss officials of the first and
second categories received immunity for acts performed in their
official capacities. 76 Switzerland made this concession on the the-
ory that, as a juridical person, the League acted only through its
personnel. Therefore, Swiss officials did not bear responsibility for
official acts taken on behalf of the League.7" To the contrary,
those acts were deemed to be acts performed by the organization
itself and, therefore, subject to the League's own immunity.78
In some respects, this compromise represented a victory for the
League because it provided some protection to its Swiss personnel.
However, in reaching this solution, Switzerland yielded no ground
on the principle that - like diplomats - international officials enjoy
no personal immunities in their home states. This, moreover, es-
tablished the troublesome precedent that, in granting immunity to
73. See 'Wood, supra note 39, at 146-47. See also CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 19
(explaining that international officials act in the interests of all member states and, in dis-
charging their functions, require jurisdictional immunities to prevent improper influence
by any particular state); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 235 (stating that in-
ternational organizations need privileges and immunities as protection against undue in-
terference by member states).
74. See HILL, supra note 47, at 9 (quoting a June 11. 1925 letter from the League of
Nations' Secretary-General to Swiss authorities, which explained that "an official might
find diplomatic privileges and immunities particularly necessary as far as his own Govern-
ment was concerned") (emphasis added); Secretan, supra note 39, at 65 (noting that inter-
national officials need protection not only against foreign states, but also against their
home states).
75. See BowErr, supra note 18, at 345 (explaining that international immunities may
be "most important" in the case of relations between an official and the official's state of
nationality); JENKS, supra note 2, at xxxvii (observing that international immunities may
be "specially important" with respect to an official's home state); KING, supra note 10, at
51 (accepting the possibility that international officials serving in their home states "may
require even greater jurisdictional immunities than their foreign colleagues").
76. See HILL, supra note 47, at 46; KING, supra note 10, at 47; Hill, supra note 39, at 51;
Preuss, supra note 39, at 706; Secretan, supra note 39, at 68; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra
note 42, at 4-5.
77. See Secretan, supra note 39, at 72.
78. See KING, supra note 13, at 103; Preuss, supra note 39, at 706. See also Preuss, su-
pra note 67, at 569-70 (questioning whether a League official would enjoy full diplomatic
immunity in his home state, but concluding that he would have immunity for official acts
performed in his home state because that immunity belongs to the organization).
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international civil servants, states could discriminate against their
own nationals.79 Thus, the application of diplomatic immunities to
international organizations had the perverse effect of conferring
the least protection where it was needed the most.80
In short, the application of diplomatic privileges and immunities
to international officials created unanticipated doctrinal prob-
lems.81 On the one hand, their extension to relations between in-
ternational officials and their home states threatened to under-
mine the accountability of international officials for private acts.
On the other hand, the application of traditional diplomatic law
compromised the integrity of international officials by exposing
them to the influence of their home states.
The emergence of this unforeseen dilemma suggests the need
for caution when applying state-immunity concepts to interna-
tional organizations. Borrowing from the law of state immunity
may be convenient and instructive in some cases,82 but interna-
tional organizations and states are very different institutions. The
most significant difference between states and international or-
ganizations lies in the fact that states possess the totality of inter-
national rights and duties, while international organizations pos-
sess only those rights and duties that are established by treaty,
functionally necessary, or developed by practice.83 More specifi-
cally, with a very few exceptions, international organizations lack
territorial sovereignty.84 Compared to states, international organi-
79. See KING, supra note 13, at 27 (observing that the assimilation of League personnel
to the diplomatic corps resulted in discrimination against Swiss staff members).
80. See KING, supra note 10, at 51.
81. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 542 (finding it ironic that theorists applied
diplomatic privileges and immunities to international organizations for the purpose of
clarity only to find that their application "obfuscated" the doctrine of international immu-
nities); KING, supra note 10, at 19 (explaining that the application of diplomatic privileges
and immunities to international officials resulted in considerable confusion); KING, supra
note 13, at 26-27 (reaching a similar conclusion).
82. See Singer, supra note 1, at 57 (asserting that comparisons and analogies may be
drawn between state immunity and international immunities). See also AMERASINGHE,
supra note 27, at 370 (recognizing that international immunities "are not always analogous
to those of States," but stating that they are "comparable" in some cases); BOWETr, supra
note 18, at 345 (observing that the analogy between diplomatic immunities and interna-
tional immunities "suggests itself" but also acknowledging that "major differences exist").
But see KING, supra note 10, at 49 (concluding that "[tihe 'natural and easy solution' for
granting [international] officials diplomatic privileges ... did not prove to be natural, easy
or a solution").
83. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 180, 182 (Apr. 11); AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 48-49.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 83 cmt. b; BEKKER, supra note 9, at
59; Alice Ehrenfeld, United Nations Immunity Distinguished from Sovereign Immunity, 52
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zations also have a more limited capacity to engage in the tit-for-
tat self-help measures that are vital to the enforcement of legal
rights in international relations.5 At the same time, international
organizations necessarily perform tasks that states cannot accom-
plish by themselves.8 Thus, international organizations have to do
"more" with "less," while at the same time overcoming collective-
action problems. Therefore, we should not be surprised that they
require different kinds of immunity than states do. For the same
reasons, we should be suspicious of analogies between interna-
tional immunities and various forms of state immunity.'
By the 1940s, the problems of applying state-immunity concepts
to international organizations became obvious. Therefore, the
drafters of the United Nations Charter (Charter) avoided any ref-
erence to diplomatic immunities and adopted a new standard that
gave the United Nations and its personnel the minimum immuni-
ties necessary to secure their independence and effective func-
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 88, 92 (1958) (arguing that international organizations require
.complete immunity"); Finn Seyersted, Jurisdiction over Organs and Officials of States, the
Holy See and Intergovernmental Organisations, 14 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 31, 49 (1965);
Lewis, supra note 3, at 685. The few exceptions include the limited territorial jurisdiction
of international river commissions over navigation; the jurisdiction of the League of Na-
tions over the Saar until 1935; and the authority of the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency to issue regulations having the force of law within their re-
spective headquarters districts. Seyersted, supra, at 49.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 83 cmt. b; Bower, supra note
18, at 345; MICHAELS, supra note 10, at 21; Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 92- Lewis, supra
note 3, at 685. See also JENKS, supra note 2, at xxxvii (noting that, with respect to their
immunities, international organizations cannot effectively employ the sanctions of reci-
procity and retaliation).
86. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 47,99-100.
87. In a milestone decision rendered in 1949, the ICJ explained that the United Na-
tions possesses international legal personality, but that it is not a state. See Reparation,
1949 I.C.J. at 179. In addition, the ICJ rejected several arguments based on comparisons
between the United Nations and its member states. See id. at 182 (upholding the right of
the Organization to espouse a claim for damage to its agents, but rejecting analogies to
state practice regarding the diplomatic protection of nationals and dual nationals). Fifty
years later, the ICI continues to reject arguments that attempt to establish the Organiza-
tion's rights and duties by analogy to those of states. See infra discussion at notes 244-45,
273-86 and accompanying text.
This body of precedent supports the conclusion that state-immunity concepts constitute
a poor guide for international immunities. See MULLER, supra note 14, at 176 (noting that
improper comparisons between state immunity and international immunities have often
been made); Glenn et al., supra note 5, at 266 (concluding that the fundamental differ-
ences between state immunity and international immunities militate against comparisons
between the two). But see Singer, supra note 1, at 65 (insisting that state immunity and
international immunities "have a good deal in common').
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tioning.8 Their efforts evolved into Article 105 of the Charter,
which provides that
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of
its Members such privileges and immunities as are neces-
sary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. [O]fficials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection
with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations
with a view to determining the details of the application
of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose con-
ventions to the Members of the United Nations for this
purpose.
Thus, Article 105 gave birth to a more limited breed of interna-
tional immunities based on the functional necessity doctrine.89
The functional necessity doctrine's underlying premise is simple
and flows from reciprocal notions of good faith." On the one
hand, international organizations should not request immunities
88. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 557-58 (indicating that the drafting committee
"explicitly rejected" the traditional formulation of diplomatic privileges and immunities
and adopted, instead, a "functional" approach); KING, supra note 10, at 10 (describing the
Charter as a repudiation of diplomatic immunities and a conceptual turn towards a "func-
tional approach"); KING, supra note 13, at 156 (explaining that the drafters of the Charter
sought to avoid any reference to "diplomatic" privileges and immunities); Liang, supra
note 9, at 588 (observing that the United Nations Charter made no reference to diplomatic
privileges and immunities); Lawrence Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities
Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332, 341 (1946) (explaining that Article 105 of the Charter was
drafted "in a spirit of extreme caution, in order to... avoid any commitment to concede to
officers of the United Nations the diplomatic privileges and immunities"); Note, Privileges
and Immunities Accorded by the United States to the United Nations Organization, supra
note 62, at 454 (explaining that the drafters chose to "avoid" any reference to "diplo-
matic" immunities). See also HILL, supra note 47, at 101 (noting the post-war tendency
not to grant diplomatic privileges and immunities to international organizations).
89. See CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 1139 (stating that Arti-
cle 105 "established the principle of the functional necessity"); JENKS, supra note 2, at 18
(observing that the functional necessity language of Article 105 "has become a matter of
common form for the constitutions of international organisations"); HANS KELSEN, THE
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 338 (1950) (examining the Charter's fundamental shift
from diplomatic immunities to the doctrine of functional necessity); Kunz, supra note 19,
at 839 (identifying Article 105 as the source of a new standard for international immunities
based on functional necessity); Singer, supra note 1, at 65 (tracing the functional necessity
doctrine to Article 105 of the Charter).
90. See BOWETr, supra note 18, at 348; HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 91.
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that they do not need to achieve their institutional goals.91 On the
other hand, if states create an international organization for par-
ticular purposes, they must be deemed to provide it with the im-
munities necessary to accomplish its goals.92 In other words, states
cannot simultaneously create an organization and fail to provide it
with the tools for its success.
This compelling logic has made the functional necessity doctrine
the touchstone for international immunities in the post-war era.Y
In fact, most writers agree that the functional necessity doctrine
has become a rule of customary international law." Therefore, in
the absence of contrary treaty provisions, "major" international
organizations possess the "necessary" immunities in both member
91. See CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 40; FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 557;
SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 1004; 13 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1968); Liang, supra note 9, at 600.
92. See BOwETT, supra note 18, at 348; HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 91; Note, The United
Nations Under American Municipal Law, supra note 56, at 781.
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at §§ 223 amt b., 467(1). 469 cmt. a
(identifying the functional necessity doctrine as the basis for international immunities);
AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 370 (recognizing the functional necessity doctrine as the
foundation of international immunities); BEKKER, supra note 9, at 111 (stating that the
functional necessity doctrine seems to be "universally accepted" as the justification for
international immunities); CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 1139
(explaining that the functional necessity doctrine has been *introduced into all major
status conventions and has ... become a fundamental rule of the whole system of interna-
tional ... immunities"); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 235 (describing func-
tional necessity as the raison d'etre of international immunities); SHAW, supra note 27, at
924 (identifying functional necessity as the "true basis" for international immunities);
Kunz, supra note 19, at 847 (stating that the principle of functional necessity seems "uni-
versally recognized" as the basis for international immunities); Oroole, supra note 12, at
3 ("There seems to be general agreement that granting an international organization im-
munity ... can be justified only in terms of functional necessity.'); Sharp, supra note 23, at
127 (asserting that the "principle of functional necessity has become a fundamental rule
and is reflected throughout the international system of privileges and immunities'); Farru-
gia, supra note 5, at 502 (identifying the functional necessity doctrine as the "core" of in-
ternational immunities); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organiza-
tions, supra note 5, at 1181 (stating that "[i]n the period after World War II ... the
consensus was that functional necessity entailed jurisdictional immunity").
While the functional necessity doctrine provides the justification for international im-
munities, the ICJ has recognized that it also provides a general basis for the implied rights
and duties of international organizations. For example, in one case, the ICJ decided that
the United Nations had the implied right to espouse a claim on behalf of agents injured
the course of performing their missions. In reaching this conclusion, the ICJ held that the
functions of the Organization gave it both the right and the duty to provide its agents with
adequate protection. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Na-
tions, 1949 I.CJ. 174, 182-84 (Apr. 11). See also BEKKER, supra note 9, at 48-50 (describ-
ing the functional necessity doctrine as a source of implied powers and obligations).
94. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 83 & cmrts. b. c HIGGINS,
supra note 1, at 90-91.
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states and non-member states.95 Likewise, smaller international
organizations enjoy the "necessary" immunities with respect to
member states and (non-member) host states.96
Because the United States had not previously recognized the
claims of international organizations to jurisdictional immunities,7
the Charter might be seen as leading to the creation of immunities
where none previously existed.98 Viewed from this perspective,
one can understand the claims of some U.S. writers that interna-
tional immunities have expanded during the twentieth century. 9
When placed in a broader context, however, it becomes clear that
the Charter marks an historical shift towards the diminution of in-
ternational immunities. When diplomatic immunities provided the
baseline for international immunities, the League of Nations and
non-Swiss officials of the first category enjoyed complete inviola-
bility (while non-Swiss officials of the second category and all
Swiss officials enjoyed immunity for official acts). By contrast,
when the functional necessity doctrine became the baseline for in-
ternational immunities, the United Nations and all its personnel
received the minimum immunities necessary for the exercise of of-
ficial functions. Thus, the history of international immunities is
not one of growth. To the contrary, it is a tale of substantial con-
traction that fits comfortably within the modern preference for
limiting immunities of all kinds.1"
95. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 & cmt. a; HIGGINS, supra
note 1, at 91.
96. See HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 91.
97. See supra note 62.
98. See WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 38 (asserting that the adoption of the United Na-
tions Charter arrested in the United States a possible tendency to limit diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities).
99. Cf. supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
100. See BOWETr, supra note 18, at 346 (concluding that the trend towards diminution
of immunities "ha[s] been reflected in the greater emphasis placed upon the functional
basis for international ... immunities"); JENKS, supra note 2, at 169 (observing that the
scope of international immunities has "substantially contracted... particularly as regards
immunity from jurisdiction"); KING, supra note 10, at 185 (identifying the reduction of
immunities under the Charter as part of a broader reduction of international immunities);
KING, supra note 13, at 253 (recognizing that the Charter fits within the "current tendency
... to reduce privileges and immunities to a minimum"); Liang, supra note 9, at 600 (ex-
plaining that modern immunities agreements provide less protection than the agreements
establishing the immunities of the League of Nations).
One might argue that international immunities have expanded in the sense that the pro-
liferation of international organizations means that a greater number of organizations en-
joy some form of immunity. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 593; Singer, supra note 1,
at 56. This phenomenon, however, is consistent with the restriction of foreign sovereign
immunity. Over the past century, the number of states enjoying some form of immunity
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III. INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES IN THEIR STRUCTURAL
CONTEXT
Because this article contends that international immunities have
experienced a significant diminution over the past century, it must
respond to popular assertions that immunities conventions and
headquarters agreements implement the functional necessity doc-
trine through provisions that resemble the doctrine of absolute
state immunity. This Part recognizes why some writers make such
arguments, but explains that they are mistaken. Structurally
speaking, the relevant treaties adhere to the functional necessity
doctrine, but concentrate decision-making authority in the hands
of international organizations and tribunals.
While mandating a shift from diplomatic immunities to the func-
tional necessity doctrine, Article 105 of the Charter never defined
the immunities that the United Nations would require.' Instead,
the Charter contemplated two possible avenues for the elaboration
of specific rules. First, it suggested that member states could de-
velop rules through consistent practice. Most commentators as-
sumed that this would leave municipal authorities with substantial
discretion to identify the privileges and immunities the Organiza-
tion requires in any situation.102 For obvious reasons, the United
Nations did not favor that approach. 03
As an alternative to the piecemeal development of the func-
tional necessity doctrine, Article 105(3) gave the General Assem-
bly the authority to make recommendations or to propose conven-
has grown dramatically. But because their immunities have declined in a qualitative sense,
we still refer to the "restriction" of foreign sovereign immunity.
101. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 371 (observing that Article 105 defines the
scope of international immunities "in a very general way').
102. See KELSEN, supra note 89, at 342; KING, supra note 10, at 63-64; KING, supra note
13, at 161. Cf RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 267 (explaining that the lack
of specific immunity rules in the Covenant of the League of Nations left most member
states with a broad discretion "to interpret and implement.., the general principles they
had accepted in ratifying the Covenant"). As explained below, however, the ICI recently
suggested that Article 105 of the Charter may require municipal authorities to give nearly
conclusive weight to the Secretary-General's immunity decisions. See infra note 275.
103. See Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 92 (representing the UN Office of Legal Affairs
and stating that "United Nations immunity from suit cannot... be determined in each
case by any national authority, judicial or executive"). See also The Practice of the United
Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning
Their Status, Privileges and Immunities: A Study Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.41L118 and Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [1967] 2 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n 154, 265
[hereinafter ILC Study (1967)] (recounting the Secretariat's position that the immunity of
U.N. personnel for official acts "arises directly under Article 105 of the Charter and con-
stitutes an essential condition for the conduct of all United Nations activities").
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tions to define the scope of international immunities. 104 This, in ef-
fect, gave member states the opportunity to make collective deci-
sions without "risking litigation to determine whether each meas-
ure was 'necessary' to the United Nations as required by the
Charter. '" 105
In 1946, the General Assembly exercised this right by adopting
and proposing for signature the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations (General Convention). 6 Since
then, over 130 countries have become states parties to the General
Convention." 7 In substance, the General Convention's provisions
on jurisdictional immunity have been applied to other organiza-
tions and non-member states through the development of similar
treaties and customary international law. For example, most of
the "major" international organizations adopted the General Con-
vention as a model for their own treaties, which provide for juris-
dictional immunity on substantially the same terms. 10 8 Further-
104. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 686 (noting that Article 105(3) gives the General As-
sembly the power to recommend methods for implementing Article 105(1), (2)).
105. Note, The United Nations Under American Municipal Law, supra note 56, at 783.
106. See General Convention, supra note 9; Lewis, supra note 3, at 686. See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 cmt. b (explaining that the General Con-
vention gives "specific content" to Article 105 of the Charter); AMERASINGHE, supra note
27, at 373 (stating that the General Convention "implements" Article 105 of the Charter);
KING, supra note 13, at 164 (describing the General Convention as "a codification of the
privileges and immunities which the [General] Assembly consider[ed] necessary to the...
implementation of... Articles 104 and 105"); HILL, supra note 47, at 109 (referring to the
General Convention as an attempt to "codify" the privileges and immunities required by
international officials); Sharp, supra note 23, at 127-28 (describing the General Conven-
tion as an attempt to "detail" the protections afforded by Article 105).
107. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. -, at para. 10 (Apr. 29) (quoting Re-
quest for Advisory Opinion at para. 1).
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 cmt. b (describing the General
Convention's provisions and stating that "[ejssentially the same privileges and immunities
are enjoyed by the other major international organizations"); BEKKER, supra note 9, at
131-32 (explaining that the General Convention has served as a model for subsequent
agreements made by other international organizations); BOWErr, supra note 18, at 346-47
(stating that the General Convention and the similar Specialized Agencies Convention
have served as a model for later agreements made by other organizations); HIGGINS, su-
pra note 1, at 90 (stating that the Specialized Agencies Convention's provisions on juris-
dictional immunities are "very similar" to those set forth in the General Convention, and
that the "position is broadly similar in respect of those international organizations which
are not [S]pecialized [Aigencies of the United Nations"); JENKS, supra note 2, at 37 (list-
ing a number of immunities and headquarters agreements which contain provisions that
are identical or equivalent to the General Convention's grant of immunity); Lewis, supra
note 3, at 681, 687 (noting that Article 2 of the OAS Convention is almost identical to Sec-
tion 2 of the General Convention, and that the immunities agreements of most interna-
tional organizations provide for jurisdictional immunity in similar terms).
[Vol. 41:1
INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES
more, some influential writers and courts argue that the General
Convention and its progeny have matured into rules of customary
international law. For instance, the United Nations Legal Counsel
asserts that the General Convention constitutes part of the cus-
tomary law governing relations between the United Nations and
all member states. 0 9 Other writers assert that the General Con-
vention reflects a customary law that presumptively applies to a
broader range of international organizations.Y0 The Netherlands's
109. See Statement by the U.N. Legal Counsel (Dec. 6, 1967), 1967 U.N. Jurid. Y.B.
311,314, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.C/5 (asserting that the terms of the General Convention
had become part of the customary law governing the relations between the United Na-
tions and member states).
110. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 400 (indicating that the General Convention
and the similar Specialized Agencies Convention reflect customary international law, and
that there is at least a "presumption that many of the privileges and immunities incorpo-
rated in the two general conventions are generally what are required for this purpose");
Sharp, supra note 23, at 128 (asserting that the provisions of the General Convention
"have reached such universal acceptance that they are now considered customary interna-
tional law'). See also Singer, supra note 1, at 98-99 (conceding that modern immunities
agreements are substantially identical to the General Convention and that the prolifera-
tion of these norms arguably meets the ICJ's criteria for identifying the development of
customary international law, but arguing against the conferral of international immunities
as a matter of customary international law).
The author agrees that the General Convention's provisions on jurisdictional immuni-
ties are declarative of customary international law. Cf KING, supra note 10, at 189 (as-
serting, in 1952, that the principle of jurisdictional immunity of international civil servants
for official acts appeared in the constitutions of most international organizations and,
moreover, had become declaratory of customary international law). The author recog-
nizes, however, that the General Convention's treatment of subsidiary privileges may not
have attained the status of customary international law.
Admittedly, one can identify variations in the jurisdictional immunities of the interna-
tional financial institutions and discrepancies regarding subsidiary courtesies enjoyed by
international organizations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 cmt. b
(observing that the charters of some international financial institutions provide exceptions
to immunity for suits by some creditors under certain circumstances); JFNKS, supra note 2,
at 111 (recognizing a measure of diversity with respect to subsidiary courtesies). But the
fact remains that most contemporary agreements on international immunities share a
common core of "responsible... opinion" regarding jurisdictional immunities. Id. See
also BEKKER, supra note 9, at 148, 150 (recognizing that all international immunities
agreements contain very similar provisions and acknowledging that they may be declara-
tive of international law, but concluding that the "precise scope" of customary interna-
tional law may be uncertain); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 685 (4th ed. 1990) (describing the immunity of international civil servants for their
official acts as the "minimum' principle established by customary international law);
SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 1007 (observing that treaties provide most
international organizations with immunity from every form of legal process before mu-
nicipal courts); SHAW, supra note 27, at 928 (noting that the immunities granted by
agreements and implementing legislation usually include immunity from jurisdiction);
Edwin H. Fedder, The Functional Basis of International Privileges and Immunities: A New
Concept in International Law and Organization, 9 AM. U. L REV. 60,63-64 (1960) (stating
that "[a]ll of the documents pertinent to this area provide ... international organizations...
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supreme court seems to have adopted this view in Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal v. A.S. by assuming that customary interna-
tional law provides small international organizations with the same
jurisdictional immunities as are generally provided by treaty."'
Thus, while this article concentrates on the General Convention
and the United Nations, its reasoning applies to a larger commu-
nity of international organizations.
With respect to the United Nations, Section 2 of the General
Convention provides that
[t]he [Organization], its property and assets wherever lo-
cated and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity
from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall ex-
tend to any measure of execution. 1 2
In addition, the General Convention provides "officials""' 3 and
'experts on missions' I14 with immunity from "legal process" of
[with immunity] from suit.., in the absence of waiver"); Liang, supra note 9, at 584 (de-
scribing jurisdictional immunity as "[o]ne of the first and most fundamental requirements"
of international organizations).
111. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal v. AS, 94 I.L.R. 320, 329 (Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden 1985). Because the General Convention provides the model for treaty
norms, this decision suggests that the General Convention and its progeny reflect custom-
ary international law, at least with respect to the immunities that smaller international or-
ganizations possess in member states and in non-member, host states.
112. General Convention, supra note 9, at § 2.
113. Id., § 18. While the General Convention does not itself define the term "official,"
it authorizes the Secretary-General to designate the categories of staff that will be deemed
to be "officials" for purposes of the Convention. Id., § 17. This gives the Secretary-
General an important decision-making power to define the scope of functional necessity.
Subject to approval by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General may identify the
staff members who require immunity for their official acts.
The Secretary-General exercised that right in 1946 and defined "officials" to include all
staff members, with the exception of locally recruited employees assigned to hourly rates.
Statement made by the U.N. Legal Counsel (Dec. 1, 1981), 1981 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 159, 161-
62, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/19; CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at
1142; CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 43; KING, supra note 10, at 89; Kunz, supra note 19, at
859; Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 42, at 7. Since locally-recruited staff (including
clerks, secretaries and drivers) are paid according to established salary or wage scales, the
term "official" applies to virtually every UN employee. See Statement of the U.N. Legal
Counsel (Dec. 1, 1981), supra, at 161-62; FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 560; KING, supra
note 10, at 90.
The Secretary-General's broad definition of "officials" makes sense. The official acts
of United Nations personnel constitute acts of the Organization itself. Therefore, the Or-
ganization's own immunity attaches to such acts as a matter of law. See, e.g., Kunz, supra
note 19, at 855 (explaining that international civil servants must enjoy immunity for official
acts because they constitute the acts of the organization). Consequently, the Preparatory
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every kind for words spoken or written and all acts performed in
their official capacities.
Unfortunately, these provisions create an artificial distinction
between the immunities of the United Nations and the immunities
of its personnel."5 Because juridical persons act only through their
agents, it is an elementary principle that their immunities auto-
matically extend to the official acts of their agents.1 6 If this were
not the case, a juridical person could never claim immunity for its
Commission for the United Nations stated that it "clearly' would be necessary for all offi-
cials of whatever rank or nationality to possess immunity for acts performed in their offi-
cial capacities. CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 40-41.
114. General Convention, supra note 9, at § 22. The General Convention neither de-
fines the term "experts on missions" nor specifically authorizes the Organization to desig-
nate categories of agents as "experts on missions." The ICJ, nonetheless, has construed
the term broadly to include persons who do not have the status of an official of the Or-
ganization, but to whom the Organization has entrusted a mission. Applicability of Arti-
cle VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions, 1989 I.C.J. 177,194 (Dec. 15). Such experts may or may not have a contract with the
Organization. Id. They may be paid or receive no compensation. Id. Finally, they may
be entrusted with tasks requiring work over a long period or a very short time. Id. In
practice, the Organization has called on such experts to mediate disputes; prepare reports
and studies; conduct investigations or fact-finding missions; participate in peacekeeping
forces; perform technical assistance work; and to sit on a variety of committees in their
personal capacities. Id.
The grant of immunities to experts on mission raises special concerns. Because experts
on mission often serve part-time and do not fall within the Organization's regular discipli-
nary system, they may be more likely to abuse their immunities. See JENKS, supra note 2,
at 141. On the other hand, because they serve the United Nations only part-time, they
may be even more susceptible to governmental influence and, therefore, require more
protection than full-time staff.
While it is possible to distinguish between "officials" and "experts on mission* based on
their respective accountability and vulnerability, they share one important attribute: they
are agents of the Organization. As such, the Organization's immunity should attach
equally to their official acts. Therefore, it is not surprising that the General Convention
endows them with a virtually identical immunity from legal process for acts performed in
their official capacities. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 469 amt. b (de-
scribing the jurisdictional immunities of international 'officials" and stating that "[t]he
immunities set forth in this section are enjoyed also by experts performing missions for an
international organization"). See also ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 285 (recogniz-
ing the similarities between the immunities accorded to officials and experts on mission
and concluding that precedent regarding the former can be applied by analogy to the lat-
ter). When discussing their jurisdictional immunities, this article refers to "officials" and
"experts on mission" collectively as "agents,* "officials," or "personnel" of the Organiza-
tion.
115. See BOWETr, supra note 18, at 353.
116. See KELSEN, supra note 89, at 339; KING, supra note 10, at 79;, KING, supra note
13, at 103, 182. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 469 cmts. a, b (ex-
plaining that the immunity of an international organization may also apply to the official
acts of staff members); FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 560 (indicating that the immunity
of international civil servants for official acts is not a personal immunity but comes into
existence because the acts are "authorized acts of an agent of an immune organization").
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activities." 7 Thus, while Switzerland maintained that Swiss staff
members were not entitled to diplomatic immunities, it recognized
that the League's own immunity extended to their official acts."'
Likewise, the official acts of United Nations personnel constitute
acts of the Organization itself. 19 Therefore, the immunity of
United Nations personnel for official acts constitutes a manifesta-
tion of the Organization's immunity, which is established by Sec-
tion 2 of the General Convention.120
At first glance, there seems to be a fundamental tension be-
tween the Charter's commitment to the functional necessity doc-
117. See AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 106 (quoting JENKS, THE HEADQUARTERS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 40 (1945)); Note, The United Nations Under American
Municipal Law, supra note 56, at 787.
118. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
119. See Relations Between States and International Organizations (Second Part of the
Topic), [1985] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 145, 171, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.383 and Add. 1-3
[hereinafter ILC Study (1985)]; Memorandum from the General Counsel of UNRWA
(May 15, 1968), 1968 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 212, 213, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.C/6;
AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 106; KELSEN, supra note 89, at 339; KING, supra note 13,
at xiii, 182; Kunz, supra note 19, at 855.
The United Nations takes very seriously the unity of its immunity and the immunity of
UN personnel for official acts. When a member state proposed to ratify the General Con-
vention subject to a reservation regarding the immunity of its own citizens, the Office of
Legal Affairs responded in an uncharacteristically direct manner: "It follows that your
country reserved the right to prosecute United Nations officials of its nationality for words
spoken or written or for any acts performed by them in their official capacity, indeed for
actions which are in effect the acts of the Organization itself." WHITEMAN, supra note 91,
at 152 (quoting Aide-M6moire to the Permanent Representative of a Member State (Oct.
22, 1963), 1963 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 188, 189, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.C1) (emphasis added).
Consistent with these views, the United Nations has asserted that it would never accept a
ratification of the General Convention that included a reservation regarding the immunity
of UN personnel for official acts. Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Per-
manent Representative of a Member State (May 5, 1965), 1965 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 234, 235,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C3.
120. See Statement made by the U.N. Legal Counsel (Dec. 1, 1981), supra note 113, at
161 (explaining that the immunity of UN officials belongs to the Organization and that
infringements upon their immunity violate the Organization's rights); FREY & FREY, su-
pra note 11, at 540 (explaining that "the privileges and immunities of officials stem directly
from the immunity of the international organization"); KELSEN, supra note 89, at 317, 339-
40 (explaining that the "exemption of the United Nations from ... jurisdiction ... coin-
cides with exemption of individuals from ... jurisdiction ... with respect to acts performed
... in their capacity as organs of the United Nations"); KING, supra note 13, at 182 (ex-
plaining that "immunity [for official acts] devolves upon all agents of an entity which itself
possesses immunity from jurisdiction"); Kunz, supra note 19, at 855 (explaining that inter-
national officials must enjoy immunity for official acts because they are imputed to the
organizations). See also The Status, Immunities, and Other Facilities to Be Accorded to the
International Labour Organisation by Governments, 27 INT'L LAB. OFF. OFFICIAL BULL.
197, 214 (1945) [hereinafter ILO Memorandum] (asserting that the immunity of Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) staff members for official acts "is a necessary corollary of
the immunity from suit accorded to the [ILO] itself").
INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIEs
trine and its implementation through the General Convention. On
the one hand, the Charter limits international immunities to the
bare minimum. On the other hand, the General Convention im-
plements the functional necessity doctrine by granting the Organi-
zation immunity from "every form of legal process" and vesting its
personnel with immunity from "legal process of every kind" for
their official acts. Yet, writers frequently question whether the
Organization requires immunity from every suit brought by unpaid
suppliers or victims of traffic accidents. 21
Viewed in these terms, one can appreciate concerns that the
General Convention implements the functional necessity doctrine
through provisions that resemble the doctrine of absolute state
immunity. 2 While such claims enjoy a superficial plausibility,
they do not reflect a complete understanding of the General Con-
vention. Specifically, they do not account for the countervailing
role played by the duty of waiver, which reincorporates the func-
tional necessity doctrine by requiring the Secretary-General to
waive unnecessary immunities.
With respect to diplomatic immunities, the right of a sending
state to waive the immunity of its officials constitutes the tradi-
tional method of preventing abuse.t23 When liberally exercised,
the power of waiver hangs "like a permanent threat over the heads
of officials who might otherwise [be] inclined to abuse their posi-
121. See Singer, supra note 1, at 128, 141 (emphasizing that the functional necessity doc-
trine secures only the minimum immunities necessary for international organizations and
does not guarantee them immunity from all routine transactions, much less a "quiet' or
"charmed" existence); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organiza-
tions, supra note 5, at 1190 ("Merely allowing a suit in tort against an intergovernmental
organization seems unlikely to constitute an overly intrusive interference with its core ac-
tivities."). See also Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (New Rochelle City
Ct. 1946) (refusing to believe that every employee of an international organization re-
quires immunity for official acts without regard to the importance of his or her functions);
HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 93 (acknowledging that international organizations do not al-
ways require immunity in order to fulfill their purposes).
122. See Singer, supra note 1, at 84 (concluding that the "General Convention... repre-
sent[s] the view of the member states at that time that the.., functioning of the United
Nations demanded absolute jurisdictional immunity"). See also RESTATEIENT (THIRD),
supra note 9, at § 467 reporters' note 4 (construing Section 2 of the General Convention to
establish absolute immunity and questioning the justification for absolute immunity under
the functional necessity doctrine).
123. See Kwen Chen, The Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 900, 904 (1948) (describing waiver as "the usual method of
counterbalancing... immunities"); Kunz, supra note 19, at 852, 861 (identifying waiver as
the "oldest" and "most favored" counterbalance to immunity). See also SCHERMERS &
BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 1008-09 (describing waiver as a way to mitigate the "injurious
effects" of immunity).
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tion."124 In other words, waiver can provide both a disincentive to
improper behavior and a remedy for victims of abuse."z But even
though waiver has become an increasingly common event,126 it re-
mains a right-and not an obligation-of the sending state.127
Thus, because waivers require the exercise of discretion, they place
no dependable legal restrictions on diplomatic immunities.1 28  For
similar reasons, writers suggest that waiver has no meaningful role
to play in the limitation of international immunities under the
functional necessity doctrine.129 As explained below, these conclu-
sions reflect an inapt comparison between the right of waiver un-
der diplomatic law and the duty of waiver that applies to interna-
tional immunities.
At first blush, one can appreciate comparisons between the dis-
cretionary waiver of diplomatic immunities and the waiver of in-
ternational immunities. Section 2 of the General Convention pro-
vides the United Nations with immunity from "every form of legal
process," subject only to the possibility of express waiver. Fur-
thermore, nothing in Section 2 expressly requires the United Na-
tions to waive its immunity. Sections 20 and 23 of the General
Convention, however, contain two additional waiver provisions:
Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to offi-
cials in the interests of the United Nations and not for the
personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Sec-
retary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive
124. Cf RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 266 (describing the effect of po-
tential waivers of diplomatic immunities on League of Nations officials). Cf also
CROSSWELL, supra note 10 at 24 (describing the threat of waiver as a "very effective
brake" on agents of international organizations who might be inclined to abuse their im-
munities); Liang, supra note 9, at 591 (reaching the same conclusion).
125. See Secretan, supra note 39, at 72 (arguing that "[t]he right to waive immunities,
vested in the authority which appoints the agent in question, is a sufficient guarantee that
cases of denial of justice will not occur").
126. See, e.g., EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAw 286 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that "in re-
cent years waivers of immunity have been more rigorously sought.., and ... more readily
granted").
127. KING, supra note 13, at 123. See also Kunz, supra note 19, at 852 (recognizing the
historical absence of a duty to waive diplomatic immunities).
128. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 561 (stating, in the context of diplomatic im-
munity, that waiver "is more a moral than a legal obligation").
129. See Singer, supra note 1, at 80 ("Finally, it must be stressed that functional neces-
sity doctrine has no application to waiver."). See also Farrugia, supra note 5, at 514 (sug-
gesting that the disparity of bargaining power makes it difficult for private parties to nego-
tiate waivers of immunity by international organizations); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities
of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182 (describing waivers as an unsat-




the immunity of any official in any case where, in his
opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice
and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of
the United Nations. In the case of the Secretary-General,
the Security Council shall have the right to waive immu-
nity.130
Section 23: Privileges and immunities are granted to ex-
perts in the interests of the United Nations and not for
the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The
Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to
waive the immunity of any expert in any case where, in
his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of
justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the in-
terests of the United Nations. 31
The language of Sections 20 and 23 embodies a clear departure
from diplomatic immunity in two respects. The first sentence of
each section confirms that the Organization's personnel enjoy im-
munity only for official acts, which may be imputed to the Organi-
zation.32 More importantly, the second sentence creates an obli-
gation for the Secretary-General to waive the immunities of UN
personnel whenever the assertion of immunity would impede the
course of justice and waiver may be accomplished without preju-
dice to the Organization. As a result, waiver becomes a frequent
duty of the United Nations and, thus, a serious structural limitation
of its immunity."M
In addition to providing a serious limitation on the General
Convention's initial grant of immunity, the duty of waiver also
130. General Convention, supra note 9, at § 20 (emphasis added).
131. Id, § 23 (emphasis added).
132. See Peter H.F. Bekker, Memorandum of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
on Legal Issues Arising from the Case Concerning the Difference Relating to Immunity
from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights at para.
46 (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http//www.lchr.orglfeaturelcumaraswamy/bekkerbrl.htm>. By
contrast, diplomatic personnel generally enjoy immunity for official and private acts. See,
eg., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31(1), 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95 (providing diplomatic agents with absolute immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of receiving states and also providing them with immunity from civil and ad-
ministrative jurisdiction, except in actions relating to private immovable property, actions
relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved, and professional and
commercial activities not falling within the diplomat's official functions).
133. See HILL, supra note 47, at 109-11 (describing the General Convention's manda-
tory waiver as an innovation).
134. See BOwEIr, supra note 18, at 377 (explaining that *waiver is often a duty im-
posed on the organisation").
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supplies the vehicle through which the General Convention main-
tains its fidelity to the functional necessity doctrine. 35 While the
General Convention preliminarily confers a blanket immunity on
the official acts of United Nations personnel, the Convention re-
quires the Secretary-General to waive that immunity whenever he
can do so without prejudice to the interests of the Organization.
In so doing, the General Convention preserves the conceptual
framework of the functional necessity doctrine, but vests the Sec-
retary-General with the primary authority for its application.136
Although the Secretary-General has a duty to waive the immu-
nities of United Nations personnel, the practical significance of
that obligation depends on the possibility of independent review.
Without independent review, the "mandatory" waiver could be-
come reinvested with a discretionary character, which would un-
dermine its restraining effect on assertions of immunity. In this
regard, one must note that the General Convention requires the
Secretary-General to waive immunity only after determining, "in
his opinion," that immunity would impede the course of justice
and that waiver would not prejudice the interests of the Organiza-
tion. 37 While this language is not clear, the reference to the
"opinion" of the Secretary-General might imply a subjective stan-
dard, which could eliminate (or at least minimize) the possibility of
independent review.138 In an authoritative statement to the ICJ,
however, the United Nations Legal Counsel recognized that the
Secretary-General's waiver decisions are subject to review by the
135. See David R. Deener, Some Problems of the Law of Diplomatic Immunity, 50 AM.
J. INT'L L. 115, 119 (1956) (citing a number of treaties that impose mandatory waivers on
international organizations and concluding that such provisions carry "the functional the-
ory ... to its logical extreme"). See also KING, supra note 10, at 129 (concluding that
"[tihe principle of waiver of immunity is an integral part of the idea of granting jurisdic-
tional immunities to international officials"); Henderson, supra note 5, at 492 (implying
that the functional necessity doctrine plays an important role in the decision to waive in-
ternational immunities).
136. See Peter H.F. Bekker, International Decision: Difference Relating to Immunity
from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 913, 921 (1999) (stating that "[t]he object and purpose of [the mandatory
waiver provisions] is to assign a central role to the Secretary-General in the case of immu-
nity questions arising under the Convention").
137. General Convention, supra note 9, at §§ 20,23.
138. See Written Comments of the Government of Costa Rica at 8, Difference Relating
to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, 1999 I.C.J. - (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Written Comments of Costa Rica] (arguing
that the application of a subjective standard rendered the Secretary-General's waiver deci-
sions non-justiciable); BEKKER, supra note 9, at 174 (concluding that although the Gen-
eral Convention creates a "duty" to waive immunity, it vests the Secretary-General with
discretion in deciding whether to exercise that "duty").
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ICJ.39 Because the General Convention both requires the Secre-
tary-General to waive unnecessary immunities and provides for
judicial review of his decisions, it creates a genuine legal restriction
on the immunities of United Nations personnel.
There is, however, substantial confusion regarding the duty of
the United Nations to waive its "own" immunity. Many writers
claim that the General Convention requires the Organization to
waive the immunities of its personnel, but not its own immunity. t40
While this view enjoys popular support, it reflects an incomplete
understanding of the Convention. As explained above, the immu-
nity of UN personnel for official acts and the immunity of the Or-
ganization are inseparable because the former constitutes a mani-
festation of the latter.141 Strictly speaking, when the Organization
waives the immunity of its personnel for official acts, it waives a
manifestation of its own immunity,142 assumes responsibility for
139. See Oral Statement of the United Nations (Dec. 7, 1998) at para. 59, Difference
Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, 1999 I.CJ. - (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Oral Statement of the United Na-
tions (Dec. 7, 1998)]. See also Written Statement of the Government of Federal Republic
of Germany, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.CJ. - (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Written
Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany] (assuming that the ICJ has the authority
to review the Secretary-General's decisions on waiver).
140. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 192 (stating that international organizations have no
legal duty to waive their own immunities and that the decision to waive immunity is usu-
ally left to the discretion of the organization); JENKS, supra note 2, at 45 (stating that there
is "no corresponding 'right and duty' ... of the organisation* to waive its own immunity);
KING, supra note 13, at 230 (describing the waiver as a *competence," but not a 'duty" of
the United Nations).
141. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
142. A few writers have suggested that the waiver of the immunity of agents for official
acts has no logical place in the framework of United Nations immunity. See WHIEMAN,
supra note 91, at 155 (quoting KING, supra note 10, at 139). United Nations personnel
possess immunity for official acts because they constitute the acts of the Organization it-
self. See id.; KING, supra note 13, at 258-59. Therefore, as a technical matter, the officials'
immunity should not be waived; the immunity of the Organization should be waived. See
id.
This view is consistent with the Organization's long-standing position that any breach of
its agents' immunity for official acts constitutes an infringement of the Organization's im-
munity. See supra notes 119-20. It is also consistent with the practice of the Organization
to waive its own immunity when waiving the immunity of its agents for traffic accidents.
See Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Legal Liaison Officer, UNIDO
(Dec. 12, 1977), 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 247, 247, U.N. Doe. STILEG/SERPCI15 (indicating
that the United Nations frequently waives its own immunity - along with that of its
agents-to litigate damages resulting from automobile accidents caused by the official acts
of UN personnel). See also ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 162 (discussing the UN's
policy of waiving its own immunity in cases that involve automobile accidents caused by
the official acts of UN personnel).
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the underlying conduct,1 43 and undertakes to indemnify its agents
against any damage awards.'4 In this sense, the express duty of
waiver indirectly applies to the United Nations's "own" immunity,
at least in cases where the claimants join UN personnel as defen-
dants. Because the United Nations acts (and commits legal
wrongs) only through its personnel, claimants can generally join
them as defendants. 45 Therefore, the Organization's duty of
waiver will become relevant to most disputes.
Arguably, it could be difficult for plaintiffs in some contract ac-
tions to join United Nations personnel as defendants. 146  Without
any UN personnel as defendants, claimants could not invoke the
143. See Oral Statement of the United Nations (Dec. 10, 1998) at para. 14, Difference
Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. - (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Oral Statement of the United Na-
tions (Dec. 10, 1998)] ("By determining that the words spoken by Mr. Cumaraswamy were
performed during the performance of the mission for the United Nations, the words com-
plained of are now the responsibility of the United Nations.").
144. See Written Statement Submitted on Behalf of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations at para. 64, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Spe-
cial Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. - (Apr. 29) [hereinaf-
ter Written Statement of the United Nations] (recognizing that an expert on mission was
"entitled to be reimbursed by the United Nations for any... costs, expenses or damages"
resulting from a defamation suit arising out of his official activities); Oral Statement of the
United Nations (Dec. 10, 1998), supra note 139, at para 46 (reaching the same conclusion).
145. See, e.g., ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 223 n.50 (observing that, in Curran v.
City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1947), the plaintiff effectively joined the
United Nations by suing the Secretary-General in a representative capacity). See also
Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (involving statutory and tort
claims of an International Finance Corporation employee against her supervisor); Donald
v. Orfila, 788 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (involving a tort claim by a former employee against
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States); Askir v. Boutros-Ghali,
933 F. Supp. 368, 370 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving tort and statutory claims by a private
party against United Nations officials, and acknowledging that such claims are effectively
actions against the United Nations itself); De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 F. Supp.
531 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (involving contract, tort, and statutory claims by a former UN em-
ployee against the United Nations and individual UN officers).
Because claimants frequently can name individual United Nations officials as defen-
dants, one may conclude that the duty to apply the mandatory waiver provisions will "of-
ten" be imposed on the Organization by the express terms of the General Convention.
See BOWETT, supra note 18, at 377 (indicating that "waiver is often a duty imposed upon
the organisation") (emphasis added).
146. Nevertheless, it will often be possible to join the chief administrative officer of an
international organization as the defendant to breach-of-contract actions and to accuse
subordinate officials of tortious behavior related to the breach of contract. See Tuck v.
Pan American Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (involving allegations
that the director of an international organization either breached or tortiously interfered
with the plaintiff's contract); De Luca, 841 F. Supp. at 532-35 (apparently involving allega-
tions that the United Nations breached its contract with the plaintiff and that the under-




General Convention's express provisions on mandatory waiver.
Yet, the Organization would still have a moral as well as a legal
obligation to waive any unnecessary immunities.147 To reach this
conclusion, one must apply the ICJ's long-standing view that rights
are encumbered with corresponding duties. 48 For international
organizations, the most important correlative duty is to exercise
their fights with the utmost good faith.4 9 This applies with par-
ticular force to the assertion of immunity.50 In fact, writers have
concluded that the principle of good faith independently requires
the waiver of unnecessary immunities even if not mandated by an
express treaty provision.'5'
147. Some writers cast this obligation in moral terms. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 192
(asserting that an international organization "should feel compelled to waive its immuni-
ties in situations where the immunity is not strictly necessary for the exercise of the or-
ganization's functions in the fulfilment of its purposes"); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra
note 17, at 1004 (stating that international organizations "should' waive immunities when
they are not really necessary). See also Liang, supra note 9, at 591 (arguing that the ques-
tion of waiver should be viewed as one of "policy [rather] than as one of legal rights and
duties"). Other writers define the obligation in legal terms. See infra note 151 and ac-
companying text.
148. See, eg., Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rappor-
teur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.CJ. -, - (para. 50) (discussing both
the "authority" and "responsibility" of the Secretary-General to render functional protec-
tion to United Nations personnel); id. at - (separate opinion of Vice President Weera-
mantry at 5) (stating that any right of a United Nations official to functional protection is
.matched by a correlative duty"); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325,381 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Vice
President Weeramantry) (observing that "a legal right imports a correlative legal duty").
See also BEKKER, supra note 9, at 50 (recognizing the ICJ's adoption, in 1949, of the prin-
ciple that "[tihe entrustment with functions comes with attendant duties and responsibili-
ties").
149. In a 1980 decision, the ICI acknowledged that a "body of mutual obligations of co-
operation and good faith" is "the very essence" of the relationship between a host state
and an international organization. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 be-
tween the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 93 (Dec. 20). A number of writers support the
proposition that the principle of good faith forms the cornerstone of all relationships
within an international organization. See JENKS, supra note 2, at 170; Glenn ct al., supra
note 5, at 268. See also SHAW, supra note 27, at 81 (describing good faith as "the most im-
portant general principle, underpinning many international legal rules").
150. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 183; JENKS, supra note 2, at 169-70.
151. See JENKS, supra note 2, at 170 (arguing that the "primciples [of good faith] include
... the 'right and duty' [of the organization] to waive immunity in any case where... 'the
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the
interests of' the organisation"); MULLER, supra note 14, at 163 n.37 (stating that the obli-
gation to cooperate in good faith with the host state can compel international organiza-
tions to waive their immunity). See also RESTATEIENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467
reporters' note 7 (suggesting that the functional necessity doctrine might require an inter-
national organization to waive its own immunity "wherever it can do so without hamper-
ing the achievement of its purposes").
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Under these circumstances, it is not accurate to say that the pro-
visions of immunities agreements resemble the doctrine of abso-
lute immunity. By introducing a duty to waive unnecessary immu-
nities, the General Convention preserves the substance of the
functional necessity doctrine, but commits its application to the
competence of international organizations. Thus, the chief func-
tion of international immunities is to concentrate responsibility for
questions involving the powers and duties of organizations at the
international-as opposed to the municipal-level."' 2 Any attempt
to expand the jurisdiction of municipal courts would upset the
General Convention's deliberate structure.
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES IN THEIR PRACTICAL CONTEXT:
THE COSTS OF REFORM
A. The Unexplored Costs of Reform
One may safely assume that the expansion of municipal court
jurisdiction would affect the substantive outcomes of immunity de-
terminations. 53 After all, municipal courts have different interests
and perspectives than the international officials and judges who
currently make immunity determinations. 154 Yet, because the pro-
ponents of reform argue that international organizations do not
require immunity, they seem to assume that the expansion of mu-
nicipal court jurisdiction would not produce significant institu-
tional costs. This Part explains that the expansion of municipal
The invocation of good faith constitutes an acceptable method for filling textual gaps in
treaties. For example, Bekker relies on good faith to close another lacuna in the General
Convention. In so doing, he acknowledges that the General Convention expressly re-
quires the United Nations to cooperate with municipal authorities to prevent the abuse of
immunities by officials, but does not expressly require the Organization to settle disputes
regarding the abuse of its own immunities. BEKKER, supra note 9, at 187. Yet, he asserts
that the absence of "any explicit provision ... does not necessarily mean that the United
Nations is not bound on other grounds to settle disputes of this kind. [This obligation may
rest on] the binding legal principle of good faith referred to above." Id. at 187 & n.816.
152. See Wood, supra note 39, at 163.
153. Cf. Charles H. Brower, II, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution
to the Law of State Responsibility, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1578-79 & n. 35 (1998)
(discussing the outcome-determinative consequences of transferring adjudicatory compe-
tence from municipal courts to international tribunals).
154. See KING, supra note 13, at 188 (stating that a municipal court sitting in New
Rochelle, New York is unlikely to have a conception of the public interest that extends
beyond that city or, at most, the United States). See also BEKKER, supra note 9, at 102
(observing that the experiences of municipal judges within a particular legal culture will
give rise to parochial biases); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 837 (explaining




court jurisdiction would impair the capacity of international or-
ganizations to discharge their obligations with respect to peace, se-
curity, human rights, and other controversial issues.
To understand the likely costs of expanded municipal court ju-
risdiction, one must ascertain why member states of international
organizations initially placed the competence for immunity deci-
sions at the international level. By identifying the problems that
they hoped to avoid, one can better predict the costs that would
result from expanded municipal court jurisdiction.
Writing in 1945, the League of Nations's former legal adviser
gave three justifications for international immunities and, implic-
itly, for the concentration of decision-making power at the interna-
tional level.55 First, international organizations must have effec-
tive protection against biased municipal courts.5 Second, they
need effective protection against baseless suits brought by the
"cranks" and "fanatics" of the world.151 Third, international or-
ganizations require effective protection against the possibility that
member states will interpret the legal effect of their acts in differ-
ent, and possibly inconsistent, ways.lss
Each of these three concerns speaks to a different form of
prejudice. The first refers to the prejudice of municipal courts in
its most direct sense. The second relates to a fear that, in times of
stress, municipal courts might encourage (or at least tolerate)
baseless suits to harass international organizations.5 9 While the
155. See Wood, supra note 39, at 143-44. See also FREY & FREY, supra note 11. at 551
(describing Wood as the League's "legal adviser").
156. See Wood, supra note 39, at 143-44.
157. 1& at 144.
158. Id.
159. See WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 64 (quoting JENKS, supra note 2, at 164, who
recognized a "real danger" that people would initiate baseless proceedings against interna-
tional organizations during times of acute tension within the forum state). Historical ex-
perience confirms the prescience of Jenks' warning;, in over fifty years, the United Nations
has only twice commenced advisory proceedings to resolve disputes regarding the immuni-
ties of UN personnel. See Oral Statement of the Government of Costa Rica (Dec. 10,
1998) at para. 24, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. __ (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Oral
Statement of Costa Rica (Dec. 10, 1998)]. In both cases, municipal authorities refused to
recognize the immunities of their own citizens during times of serious domestic turmoil.
Id. at para. 25. The first case involved Romania and occurred shortly before the violent
downfall of the Ceausescu regime. See Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Con-
vention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15). See
also Keith Highet et al., International Decision, 84 AM. J. INT'L L 742, 746 (1990) (de-
scribing the downfall of the Ceausescu regime following the delivery of the ICJ's advisory
opinion). The second case involved Malaysia and occurred contemporaneously with the
arrest and trial of Malaysia's former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. See Differ-
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first two concerns deal with manifestations of bad faith, 60 the third
involves a more subtle form of prejudice.' 6' It recognizes that mu-
nicipal courts have limited national perspectives, which are not
consistent from country to country and which lack the global vi-
sion of international organizations.1 62 In this situation, the fear is
that their limited perspectives will lead municipal courts to diver-
gent and restrictive conclusions regarding the legality of acts fal-
ling within the exclusive competence of international organiza-
tions.163 For example, the United Nations's peacekeeping and
human rights efforts might become crippled if the municipal courts
of each member state had concurrent jurisdiction to test the legal-
ity of force used by peacekeepers or official statements made by
human rights workers.164 Although writers disagree about the
danger posed by these three forms of prejudice, they continue to
shape contemporary debate about the need for international im-
munities.165
Proponents of reform argue that direct prejudice may have
posed a valid concern during the infancy of international organiza-
ence Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. __ (Apr. 29). See also infra notes 199-232 and accompa-
nying text.
160. Because the first two concerns involve manifestations of bad faith, this article re-
fers to them collectively as "direct prejudice."
161. Because the third concern does not involve bad faith, this article refers to it as "in-
direct prejudice."
162. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 101-02 (observing that prejudice need not take the
form of bad faith and explaining that municipal judges have biases that differ from country
to country); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 837 (explaining that the views of
municipal judges will inevitably be shaped by their national legal culture).
163. See MULLER, supra note 14, at 151 (quoting JENKS, supra note 2, at 41, who identi-
fied the likelihood that municipal authorities would interpret the status of international
organizations in unduly restrictive ways). See also Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of In-
tergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1187 (arguing that international organiza-
tions should not have to face municipal regulation when performing their constitutive or
core functions).
164. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 358 (discussing the likely prejudice
to international organizations if municipal authorities could prosecute peacekeepers for
aggression or international officials for submitting insulting reports). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 85 illus. 1, § 92 illus. 1 (recognizing that
people might attempt to sue agents of international organizations in municipal courts for
the submission of reports that describe "corruption," include damaging information, or
discuss the "reprehensible practices" of member states).
165. An examination of the literature reveals that almost all writers assess the need for
international immunities against these standards. See, e.g., AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at
200; BEKKER, supra note 9, at 101-03; BOWETr, supra note 18, at 349; JENKS, supra note 2,
at 40-41; SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 1007-08; WHITEMAN, supra note 91,
at 47 (quoting Liang, supra note 9, at 584); Glenn et al., supra note 5, at 277-78; Lewis, su-
pra note 3, at 683-84.
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tions, but that such fears have become untenable in the modem
world.'66 Specifically, they describe the threat of actual prejudice
as "unrealistic"'6 7 and "exaggerated,"1 68 and argue that interna-
tional immunities only provide a "psychological" benefit to inter-
national organizations.' 69 They argue further that international
organizations can trust municipal courts to dismiss baseless suits
brought by cranks and fanatics. 7 While they agree that divergent
judgments could pose difficulties with respect to the regulatory ac-
tivities entrusted to international organizations, 7  they argue that
such areas are limited' 72 and that the need for increased account-
ability outweighs any inconvenience to organizations tn In short,
they see little justification for maintaining decision-making
authority at the international level and correspondingly few costs
in the expansion of municipal court jurisdiction.
It is tempting to conclude that biased municipal authorities pose
no threat to large international organizations like the United Na-
tions. After all, such organizations have power and prestige that
rival many states and multinational enterprises. From this per-
spective, fears of prejudice indeed seem "unrealistic" or "exagger-
ated."'174 While these perceptions may ring true in the stable envi-
166. Singer, supra note 1, at 66-67, 133.
167. ld. at 128. See also SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 359 (describing the
threat of direct prejudice as "hardly conceivable"); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of In-
ternational Organizations, supra note 5, at 1185 (doubting that there is "reason to fear ju-
dicial bias against an IGO defendant").
168. See Hammerschlag, supra note 22, at 296 (contending that the foreign policy argu-
ments against greater municipal court involvement are "exaggerated'). See also
WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 47 (quoting Liang, supra note 9, at 584, for the proposition
that the danger of bad faith is a "minor and comparatively unimportant* concern).
169. Singer, supra note 1, at 87,132.
170. See id. at 130.
171. Id. at 129-30. See also Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Or-
ganizations, supra note 5, at 1187 (asserting that international organizations should enjoy
immunity when performing their constitutive or core public functions). In such areas, the
issue is not simply a fear of conflicting judgments, but the idea that member states have
committed the regulation of certain matters exclusively to the international level. See
Singer, supra note 1, at 129-30.
172. See eg., Singer, supra note 1, at 129-30 (arguing that international organizations
do not require special protection from conflicting judgments in commercial transactions);
Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1190
("Merely allowing a suit in tort against an intergovernmental organization seems unlikely
to constitute an overly intrusive interference with its core activities.").
173. See Singer, supra note 1, at 154-55, 162 (recognizing that municipal court jurisdic-
tion over employment matters could interfere with the functions of international organiza-
tions, but arguing that a lack of accountability would cause even greater harm to their ef-
fective functioning).
174. See id at 128 (describing the likelihood of prejudice as "unrealistic")- Hammer-
schlag, supra note 22, at 296 (referring to foreign policy concerns as "exaggerated"). See
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ronment of major Western capitals,175 it is not fair to judge the sys-
tem of international immunities by reference to the situations in
which they are needed the least. 76 Rather, we must examine the
system of international immunities by reference to the situations in
which international organizations have their greatest need for ef-
fective protection.1"
We often forget that the twentieth century was "mankind's most
bloody and hateful century. 1 78  In the past 100 years, the world
lost over 87,000,000 souls to war and another 80,000,000 to extra-
judicial killings by the victims' own governments.1 79 Despite their
many weaknesses, international organizations have made impor-
tant contributions to the maintenance of international peace and
security, and to the protection of individual peace and security
from governmental repression."" It may be comforting to think
that organizations can take care of themselves in tense situa-
tions.1 81 But the fact remains that organizations are juridical enti-
ties that respond to international problems only by placing peace-
keepers, mediators, human rights monitors, and aid workers in
situations that pose great risks of personal danger.'8 Practically
also SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 359 (describing retaliation by municipal
authorities as "hardly conceivable"); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental
Organizations, supra note 5, at 1185 (suggesting that there is little reason to fear judicial
bias against international organizations).
175. For example, during the inter-war period, critics asserted that the League of Na-
tions did not require immunities because its seat was located in a "civilized country."
FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 552,593. See also Wood, supra note 39, at 143-44 (recog-
nizing that international organizations have little reason to fear the possibility of bad faith
or prejudice in the municipal courts of countries like Switzerland).
176. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 207 (quoting JENKS, supra note 2, at xxxvi, for the
proposition that "the need for [international] immunities must be gauged not by the extent
to which they are necessary or useful in every day life in a well-ordered capital but by their
potential importance in emergencies").
177. See id. See also FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 553 (quoting RANSHOFEN-
WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 273, for the proposition that "'[i]n troubled times' ...
privileges cease to be 'privileges and become... necessities"').
178. Sharp, supra note 23, at 93 (quoting ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, OUT OF CONTROL:
GLOBAL TURMOIL ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (1993)).
179. Id. See also A Survey of the 20th Century, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999, at 7 (esti-
mating that 207,000,000 civilians perished during the twentieth century as the result of war
or extrajudicial killings by governments).
180. See Sharp, supra note 23, at 93-94 (discussing the contribution of the United Na-
tions to this process).
181. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 359 (suggesting that international
organizations can respond to prejudice by "mov[ing] shop"); Singer, supra note 1, at 129
(recommending that international organizations address prejudice "within [their] own po-
litical organs").
182. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 183 (Apr. 11) (taking judicial notice of the United Nations' need to send agents
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speaking, international organizations often cannot remove their
agents from danger because they serve in their home countries.113
These are the people and the situations by which we must judge
the need for international immunities. As several writers have
cautioned, we must ensure that biased municipal governments do
not prosecute peacekeepers for supposed acts of aggression or per-
secute international officials for submitting unflattering reports.',,
Simply put, when international organizations expose their person-
nel to hazardous conditions, they must provide effective protection
against the responses of unhappy national governments.1'
Viewed from this perspective, fears of prejudice become far
more realistic.18 Moreover, the threat to international officials has
increased and not abated over the past several decades. During
the Cold War, for example, member states of the United Nations
occasionally arrested, detained, or exerted improper pressure on
to disturbed parts of the world and to expose them to "unusual dangers to which ordinary
persons are not exposed"); Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Permanent
Representative of a Member State (Feb. 11, 1976), 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 236, 239, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/14 ("The Organization is frequently operating in areas of tension
and conflict, in which immunity for official acts is essential if United Nations officials are
to function at all."). See also Bekker, supra note 136, at 919 (describing the "ever-
increasing number of UN experts[,] [who] are being asked to conduct their investigations
in countries [where the] authorities are suspected of being responsible for serious human
rights violations and which may lack an independent judiciary"); Sharp, supra note 23, at
95 (emphasizing that the United Nations depends on individuals to conduct military op-
erations).
183. See YVES BEIGBEDER, THREATS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE 124
(1988) (explaining that the United Nations cannot withdraw from countries that violate
the immunities of local staff members because that would leave it without any means of
protecting locally-recruited officials).
184. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
185. To borrow words used twice by the ICJ during the last century.
In order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel that this
protection is assured to him by the Organization, and that he may count on it. To
ensure the independence of the agent, and, consequently, the independent action
of the Organization itself, it is essential that in performing his duties he need not
have to rely on any other protection than that of the Organization.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J.._, (para. 51) (quoting Reparation, 1949
I.CJ. at 183).
186. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 207 (warning that "[w]e have to face the fact that the
danger of interference by sovereign States will constantly be lurking, no matter what stage
the development of world organization has reached"); JENKS, supra note 2, at 119 (re-
minding that "[t]here are circumstances in which the danger of vexatious suits against in-
ternational officials is far from unreal"); MULLER, supra note 14, at 151 (concluding that
warnings about indirect prejudice "still hold true today").
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international officials.' 87 At that time, such incidents were not
widespread. In the past twenty years, however, they have become
a problem of increasing concern to the United Nations. In 1981,
the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies reported the ar-
rest, detention, or abduction of 43 officials."" In 1982, the number
climbed to 203.189 In 1983 and 1984, a total of 84 staff members
were arrested in 28 countries. 1'9 In the next five years, the number
of arrests, detentions, and disappearances climbed again to 89, 95,
123, 168, and 160, respectively. 191 By 1992, attacks on United Na-
tions officials had become so widespread that the General Assem-
bly adopted a resolution, in which it "strongly deplored the un-
precedented and still increasing number of fatalities which had
occurred among United Nations personnel .... "192 These figures
demonstrate that international officials face considerable risks
from the "breakdown of law and order."' 93 They also suggest that
proposals to restrict international immunities "pay too little regard
to the unsettled conditions of the world of today." 194
Most of the incidents described above occurred in areas of mili-
tary strife and repressive political regimes, where the independ-
ence of courts is not sufficiently mature to afford a guarantee of
impartiality in times of strain.' 95 Many of these cases involve states
187. See, e.g., CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 38 (describing how Czechoslovakian
authorities apologized after a security official entered United Nations premises without
permission for the purpose of arresting a UN employee).
188. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 183, at 113.
189. See id. at 114.
190. See id.
191. See id. (providing information for the years 1985 to 1986); FREY & FREY, supra
note 11, at 591 (providing information for the years 1987 to 1989).
192. Respect for the Privileges and Immunities of Officials of the United Nations and the
Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations, 1992 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 258, U.N. Doe.
STILEG/SER.C/23 [hereinafter Respect for the Privileges and Immunities of Officials
(1992)] (emphasis added). See also Respect for the Privileges and Immunities of Officials
of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations, 1986 U.N.
Jurid. Y.B. 145, 14546, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/17 (deploring the growing number of
cases where the functioning, safety and well-being of officials had been endangered by de-
tention or abduction, and concluding that the circumstances "represented a deterioration
of the situation with regard to the observance of... privileges and immunities").
193. FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 591. See also Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note
42, at 8 (observing that "privileges and immunities are being ... eroded by the practice of
certain States, particularly with regard to locally recruited officials who are vulnerable to
arrest and detention").
194. RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 271.
195. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 183, at 114 (describing the countries in which these in-
cidents occurred); FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 590-91 (discussing the regions in which
such incidents occurred). See also JENKS, supra note 2, at 41 (commenting on the insuffi-
cient development of judicial independence in many places); Bekker, supra note 136, at
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that are unwilling to recognize the immunities of their own nation-
als from local control.'96 We often do not hear about such inci-
dents because the United Nations prefers to handle them through
quiet diplomacy.'9 Nonetheless, the United Nations has taken the
position that "disregard for the privileges and immunities of offi-
cials has always constituted one of the main obstacles to the im-
plementation of the missions and programmes assigned to the
United Nations system by Member States." 98 To understand why
this is the case, it may be helpful to examine a recent decision of
the ICJ.
In April 1999, the ICJ issued a binding Advisory Opinion relat-
ing to a difference between the United Nations and Malaysia over
the immunity of a special rapporteur to the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights.'9 The Commission on Human Rights,
which is the only UN body having competence for serious human
rights problems in all member states,2w appointed Dat6 Param
919 (noting the "ever-increasing number of UN experts[,] [whol are being asked to con-
duct [controversial] investigations in countries ... which may lack an independent judici-
ary").
196. See Statement made by the U.N. Legal Counsel (Dec. 1, 1981). supra note 113, at
161-62 (noting the views of some member states that locally-recruited staff members are
not entitled to privileges and immunities in their home states because they are 'first and
foremost" nationals of those states); BEIGBEDER, supra note 183, at 121 (observing that
national authorities often ignore the immunities of locally-recruited staff); BoNvETr, supra
note 18, at 358 (observing that "the discrimination against their own nationals by states is
... the largest problem in relation to the immunities and privileges of officials"); FREY &
FREY, supra note 11, at 569 (explaining that "[g]overnments have not hesitated to arrest
their own nationals, especially in areas of unrest"). See also ILC Study (1985). supra note
119, at 170,199 (describing the recognition of the immunity of locally-recruited officials as
an area in which the United Nations and the ILO have experienced "problems").
197. When an international organization asserts the immunity of an official against his
or her home state, the state may interpret such action as an interference in its internal af-
fairs and as a "veiled ... condemnation of its political, judicial and administrative system."
BEIGBEDER, supra note 183, at 113. Therefore, international organizations prefer to han-
dle such matters with discretion, if not outright secrecy. See id.
198. Respect for the Privileges and Immunities of Officials (1992), supra note 192, at 258;
Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at para. 43. See also Letter from
the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Permanent Representative of a Member State
(Feb. 11, 1976), supra note 182, at 239 (explaining that the "Organization is frequently op-
erating in areas of tension and conflict, in which immunity for official acts is essential if
United Nations officials are to function at all").
199. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. - (Apr. 29). Hereafter, this article will
use Cumaraswamy as the short-form citation of this case.
200. Excellent overviews of the Commission on Human Rights may be found in Louis
HENKIN ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS 685-92 (1999) and KrRGIS, supra note 37, at 969-75.
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Cumaraswamy (a prominent Malaysian jurist),"' as a special rap-
porteur in 1994. Because judges and lawyers provide the first line
of defense against human rights violations and because they had
been subjected to increasing pressure during the 1990s, the Com-
mission instructed Cumaraswamy to investigate and report on at-
tacks against the independence of judges and lawyers throughout
the world.2' Upon accepting his appointment, Cumaraswamy
stated that he viewed his primary mission as that of an educator
and communicator.2 °3
Having previously concentrated his efforts on other countries,
Cumaraswamy announced to the press in August 1995 that he
planned to investigate the Malaysian judicial system.2°4 In so do-
ing, he explained that "[c]omplaints are rife that ... highly placed per-
sonalities ... are manipulating the Malaysian system of justice "... 1205
That same month, Cumaraswamy made a similar statement to the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, who also was a
Malaysian national.2t 6 Cumaraswamy asked the Chairman to
transmit his concerns to Malaysia's Prime Minister.2°
Later, Cumaraswamy gave an interview to a British magazine
called International Commercial Litigation, which was preparing
an article entitled "Malaysian Justice on Trial." This article ap-
peared in the magazine's November 1995 issue and described a
case in which Malaysian courts apparently granted preferential
treatment to an influential law firm. °t In so doing, the article
identified Cumaraswamy as a special rapporteur for the Commis-
sion on Human Rights and quoted him as saying that the case
looked like "a very obvious, perhaps even glaring, example of
judge-choosing," and that "[c]omplaints are rife that certain highly
201. See Ruslaini Abbas, Judiciary Won't Be Dictated to by Anyone, Says Judge, NEW
STRAITS TIMES (MALAYSIA), Oct. 2, 1998, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library (refer-
ring to Cumaraswamy as the "former Bar Council chairman and the chief executive part-
ner of... Shook Lin & Bok"); Branko Milinkovic, Rights-United Nations/Malaysia: U.N.
Official Defends Immunity, INTER PRESS SERV., Dec. 30, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library (describing Cumaraswamy as the "former president of the Malaysian Bar Coun-
cil").
202. See United Nations Department of Public Information, Independence of the Judiciary:
A Human Rights Priority (visited Apr. 27,1999) <http/lwww.un.org/rights/dpil837e.htm>.
203. See id.
204. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
Dat6 Param Cumaraswamy, Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 8, at
para. 160, U.N. Doc. EICN.411996137 (1996) [hereinafter Second Cumaraswamy Report].
205. Id.
206. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at para. 10.
207. See id.
208. David Samuels, Malaysian Justice on Trial, INT'L COM. LITIG., Nov. 1995, at 10-13.
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placed personalities ... are able to manipulate the Malaysian sys-
tem of justice." m
In December 1995, several of the people mentioned in the arti-
cle threatened to sue Cumaraswamy for defamation.1 0  Cuma-
raswamy referred their inquiries to the United Nations Legal
Counsel, who informed the Government of Malaysia that Cuma-
raswamy gave the interview in his official capacity and, therefore,
would enjoy immunity from the threatened lawsuits.2 1 For almost
a year, the claimants did not pursue their threat to take legal ac-
tion.
During that time, Cumaraswamy continued his investigation of
the Malaysian legal system. In 1996, for example, he received in-
formation that the Attorney General intended to restructure Ma-
laysia's bar,212 which consists of private attorneys and which
rountinely criticizes Malaysian authorities. Essentially, the pro-
posal would have increased the government's influence by admit-
ting government lawyers to the bar, appointing the Attorney Gen-
eral as President of the bar, and authorizing the Attorney General
to select the members of Malaysia's Bar Council.21 3 As part of his
investigation, Cumaraswamy requested Malaysia's Foreign Minis-
ter to comment on the proposal.2 4
At roughly the same time, the Attorney General delivered a
speech, in which he described the government's complaints
about-and plans for-the existing Bar Council:
Because the Bar Council comprises only private practi-
tioners ... [i]t does not.., seek to understand the various
sensitive issues facing the Government. I have always
reminded the leaders of the Bar Council that it can...
have meaningful dialogues with the Attorney General's
Chambers ... away from the glare of media attention. If
the leaders of the Bar Council can bring themselves to
talk with genuine respect for judges ... instead of taking
positions by ... open criticisms ... then and only then
209. Id. at 12,13.
210. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
Mr. Param Cumaraswamy, Commission on Human Rights, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 8, at
para. 125, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/32 (1997) [hereinafter Third Cumaraswamy Report].
211. See Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 107, at para. 6. See also Third Cu-
maraswamy Report, supra note 210, at para. 125.
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can there be a truly useful forum.... I have in my previ-
ous meetings with the President and leaders of the Bar
Council stated that if the Bar Council does not take
medication to cure itself, then it may have to undergo
surgery [for] its malignant illness.... They have not lis-
tened to my advice.... My Chambers are presently pre-
paring ... recommendations to the Government to re-
form the legal profession and, hopefully, with proper
medication, a few minor surgeries, implantations and
transplantations here and there, the legal body will be
cured of its many ills and live a long and healthy life.21 5
Against this background and the subsequent downfall of Anwar
Ibrahim, the following chain of events should come as no sur-
prise.216 Beginning in December 1996, Cumaraswamy became the
defendant in a series of four defamation suits based on statements
attributed to him by International Commercial Litigation.217 All
told, the lawsuits sought $112,000,000 in damages and an injunc-
tion prohibiting Cumaraswamy from making similar statements in
the future.21 8
Acting on behalf of the Secretary-General, the United Nations
Legal Counsel requested the Malaysian Government to advise its
courts of Cumaraswamy's immunity. 219 Thereafter, the Secretary-
General personally issued a certificate confirming the determina-
tion of immunity, which Cumaraswamy filed with the Malaysian
High Court.22°
215. Id. at para. 131.
216. A concise description of the politically motivated trial of Anwar Ibrahim (Malay-
sia's former Deputy Prime Minister) and subsequent attacks on his defense lawyers may
be found in Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Justice on Trial: Malaysia's Assault on
Lawyers (Apr. 1999) <http:llwww.lchr.orglfeature/malaysia/JusticeOnTrial.htm>.
217. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. -, - (para. 10) (Apr. 29) (quoting
Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 107, at paras. 5, 11, 12 and describing the initia-
tion of four civil suits against Cumaraswamy in December 1996, July 1997, October 1997,
and November 1997).
218. See id. (describing the damages claimed in the four lawsuits). See also MBf Capital
Bhd & Anor v. Cumaraswamy, 1997 MLJ LEXIS 328, at *12 (Kuala Lumpur High Ct.
June 28, 1997) (stating that the "plaintiffs also claim for an order of injunction to restrain
[Cumaraswamy] whether by himself, his servant or agent or otherwise howsoever from
further speaking or publishing or causing to be published, the said or any similar words
defamatory of the plaintiffs").
219. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. at - (para. 10) (quoting Request for Advisory




The Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs filed his own certifi-
cate with the High Court. In contrast to the Secretary-General's
certificate, the Minister's certificate ominously stated that Cuma-
raswamy possessed immunity "only in respect of words spoken or
written ... in the course of the performance of his mission." 2zt
Moreover, the Minister's certificate did not refer to the Secretary-
General's determination of immunity or to the Secretary-
General's contention that his certificates of immunity have binding
effect in municipal courts.m Despite repeated requests by the
United Nations Legal Counsel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs re-
fused to amend his certificate m
At the very least, this behavior signaled that the High Court
had the authority independently to decide whether Cumaraswamy
had spoken in his official capacity.? 4 Taking that cue, the High
Court declined to give any effect to the Secretary-General's cer-
tificate. To the contrary, it described the Secretary-General's cer-
tificate as a mere "opinion" entitled to scant probative value and
no binding force.? As a result, the High Court ruled that the case
would proceed to trial. 26 Only after completion of the trial would
the court determine if Cumaraswamy spoke in his official capacity
and whether he enjoyed immunity from the proceedings, which-
by that time-would have come to an end.m In subsequent pro-
ceedings, the Malaysian Court of Appeals and the Malaysian Fed-
eral Court affirmed the High Court's rulings. 8
221. See id (quoting Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 107, at para. 7).
222. See id
223. See id.
224. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at para. 60 (describ-
ing Malaysia's behavior as an invitation for its national courts "to conclude that it was for
them to decide whether or not the Special Rapporteur spoke the words complained of in
his official capacity").
225. Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.CJ. at - (para. 10) (quoting Request for Advisory Opin-
ion, supra note 107, at para. 8). See also MBf Capital Bhd & Anor v. Cumaraswamy, 1997
ML LEXIS 328, at *27 (Kuala Lumpur High Ct. June 28, 1997) (describing the Secretary-
General's certificate as "an opinion [that] has no more probative value than a document
which appears wanting in material particulars').
226. See MBf Capital Bhd & Anor, 1997 MU LEXIS 328, at *38-39.
227. See id.
228. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.CJ. at - (paras. 10 (quoting Request for Advisory
Opinion, supra note 107, at para. 8), 13). The Malaysian Federal Court affirmed in an oral
opinion delivered from the bench. Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note
144, at para. 25. The oral statement of the presiding judge mocked Cumaraswamy's claim
to immunity by observing that he was not a "sovereign or a full-fledged diplomat [but]
someone called a Rapporteur who has to act... within a mandate of... an unpaid, part-
time provider of information." Id.
2000]
46 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Due to the proceedings against him, Cumaraswamy suspended
his investigation of the Malaysian judicial system.129 Thus, the
High Court accomplished exactly what the General Convention
sought to avoid. It claimed for municipal courts the primary
authority to regulate international immunities,130 as well as the
power to suspend an unpopular human rights investigation. 31
With good reason, the special rapporteurs of the Commission on
Human Rights described the situation as "an attack" on the
United Nations human rights system. 2
229. See Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Deten-
tion or Imprisonment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, Mr. Param Cumaraswamy, Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda
Item 8, at 31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/39 (1998) (explaining that in light of the proceedings
against him, Cumaraswamy was not "in a position to effectively follow-up his investiga-
tions" regarding the independence of the Malaysian judiciary during 1997); Third Cuma-
raswamy Report, supra note 210, at para. 134 (stating that in light of the proceedings
against him, Cumaraswamy "decided to postpone reporting.., on his findings" regarding
the independence and impartiality of the Malaysian judiciary).
230. See Note, Privileges and Immunities Accorded by the United States to the United
Nations Organization, supra note 62, at 459 (observing that "[a]pplication of the functional
[immunity] test requires in each case a determination of the fact question whether the act
was performed in an official capacity").
231. See Milinkovic, supra note 201 (suggesting that Malaysia's true aim was to "rein in
UN officials who question its rights record"). The first oral statement of Malaysia's Solici-
tor General to the ICJ confirms the suspicion that Malaysia hoped to use municipal juris-
diction over UN personnel to inhibit their zealous protection of human rights:
I feel bound to observe that ... the origin of the present problem lies in the rela-
tively undeveloped state of the procedures and devices which the United Nations
has come to utilize in its ... notable zeal for methods of ensuring compliance
with human rights standards. Malaysia has not complained of the unexpected
selection of one of its nationals as a Special Rapporteur. Nor, in principle would
the Malaysian Government complain if continued observations were made about
... its Government if they were indeed true and fair. But Malaysia does suggest
that there seems to be very little guidance, at any rate of a public nature, given to
Special Rapporteurs as to the suitable limits of their comments on various as-
pects of governmental behaviour or the appropriate means by which they give
currency to such comments. There is, it seems, no properly established code of
conduct to govern their practices and procedures. I make these observations
only to suggest that, if there had been, the events which have given rise to this
whole controversy might well have been avoided; and I would urge that whatever
else may come out of this case, the opening of discussions on this subject should
no longer be delayed.
Oral Statement of Dat6 Heliliah Yusof, Solicitor General of Malaysia (Dec. 8, 1998) at
para. 18, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. __ (Apr. 29).
232. Written Statement of Government of the Republic of Costa Rica at 20 & n.47,
Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. - [hereinafter Written Statement of Costa Rica] (quoting
Special Rapporteurs Concerned About Malaysia's Disregard of ECOSOC's Decision, U.N.
Press Release HR/98/66, Sept. 4, 1998, as available on <http://www.unhchr.ch>).
[Vol. 41:1
INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES
Following a series of unsuccessful negotiations, the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) invoked the
General Convention's dispute resolution provisions. In accor-
dance with Section 30, ECOSOC requested the ICJ to issue a
binding Advisory Opinion to resolve the dispute between the
United Nations and Malaysia. As is customary, several member
states joined the United Nations and Malaysia in the advisory pro-
ceedings. While the participants raised a number of issues, two
questions received particular attention during the proceedings and
in the Court's Advisory Opinion. First, the case required the ICJ
to decide whether Cumaraswamy had given the interview to Inter-
national Commercial Litigation in his official capacity and, there-
fore, whether the Secretary-General properly asserted immunity
on his behalf. 3  Second, the case required the ICJ to decide
whether Malaysia had a legal obligation to give special weight to
the Secretary-General's characterization of the acts of UN person-
nel as official or unofficial.'
The latter question raised an issue of particular importance be-
cause the General Convention does not specifically give the Secre-
tary-General the authority to make conclusive determinations
about the nature of acts performed by UN personnel. In the ab-
sence of textual guidance, the issue had become a matter of con-
tentious international debate.235 For decades, Secretaries-General
claimed the exclusive authority to make such determinations, sub-
ject to review by the ICJ. 6 Municipal courts, particularly in the
233. See, eg., Written Statement of Costa Rica, supra note 232, at 10-17; Written State-
ment of the Government of Greece, Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. ... Written Statement
Submitted by the United States of America at paras. 1941, Cumarasvamy, 1999 I.C.J.
[hereinafter Written Statement of the United States].
234. See, eg., Written Statement of Costa Rica, supra note 232, at 18-22; Written State-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 139; Written Statement of the Gov-
ernment of Sweden at 3, Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.CJ. _ [hereinafter Written Statement of
Sweden]; Written Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom at para. 6, Cuma-
raswamy, 1999 I.C.J. - [hereinafter Written Statement of the United Kingdom]; Written
Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at paras. 38-51; Written Comments of
the Government of the United States at 1-4, Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.CJ. - [hereinafter
Written Comments of the United States].
235. See eg., AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 109 (indicating that this question has gen-
erated "some controversy"). See also KING, supra note 10, at 51 (observing, as a general
matter, that "[c]onflict is certain to arise between the organization and ... territorial
authorities ... unless a clear understanding on the areas of competence has been reached
in the beginning").
236. See Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Permanent Representative
of a Member State (May 22, 1985), 1985 U.N. lurid. Y.B. 154, 154-55, U.N. Doc.
STILEG/SER.C123; Statement made by the U.N. Legal Counsel (Dec. 1, 1981), supra note
113, at 161; Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Legal Liaison Officer,
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United States, took the opposite view and refused to concede any
decision-making authority to the international level.137 For exam-
ple, in one case, a New York municipal judge declared that "the
question of immunity [for official acts] should be entrusted not to
the whim or caprice of any individual or committee that might
speak for the United Nations Organization."" 8
Similar divisions appeared within the academy. Several writers
identified the General Convention's failure to resolve the alloca-
tion of decision-making authority, but proposed no clear solu-
tion.239 Although they provided no textual support, a second
group of writers argued that the Secretary-General should have
primary authority to characterize the activities of United Nations
personnel as official or unofficial.20  A third group claimed that
municipal courts had the superior textual argument.2 41 In their
UNIDO (Dec. 12, 1977), supra note 142, at 247; Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Af-
fairs to the Permanent Representative of a Member State (Feb. 11, 1976), supra note 182,
at 237-38; Memorandum from the General Counsel of UNRWA (May 15, 1968), supra
note 119, at 213; BEIGBEDER, supra note 183, at 122; CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 23, at 1142. See also ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 172, 199
(setting forth the Secretary-General's traditional position and noting that the Specialized
Agencies had adopted the same position).
237. See People v. Weiner, 378 N.Y.S.2d 966, 975 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1976) (conclud-
ing that it was not "for the United Nations" to decide whether a UN security officer ex-
ceeded the scope of his authority in detaining a suspected vandal); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 9, at § 469 cmt. c (concluding that municipal courts must make an in-
dependent determination regarding the official or unofficial nature of acts performed by
international civil servants); KING, supra note 10, at 57, 98, 190 (describing the "strong
tendency" of municipal courts to assume this competence). See also ILC Study (1985),
supra note 119, at 200 (describing the practices of some municipal authorities to make in-
dependent determinations regarding the nature of acts performed by staff members of the
FAO and WHO).
238. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31,35 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1946).
239. See BOWETT, supra note 18, at 355 (identifying the problem, but finding "no clear
solution"); KELSEN, supra note 89, at 346 (suggesting that the General Convention could
be interpreted to allocate authority either to municipal courts or to the Secretary-
General).
240. See AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 111; BEKKER, supra note 9, at 174, 177-78;
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 1142; KING, supra note 10, at 98-
99.
241. See FREY & FREY, supra note 11, at 565; Kunz, supra note 19, at 862. See also
Liang, supra note 9, at 590-91 (indicating that municipal courts have primary jurisdiction
to make such determinations, subject to review by the ICJ); Preuss, supra note 67, at 569,
574 (concluding that municipal judges have the authority to the determine the official or
unofficial nature of acts performed by international civil servants); Note, The United Na-
tions Under American Municipal Law: A Preliminary Assessment, supra note 56, at 787
n.50 (presuming that courts would decide whether international civil servants acted in
their official capacities). But see JENKS, supra note 2, at 118 (proposing three possible
ways to resolve the matter, none of which would permit municipal courts to decide
whether international civil servants acted in their official capacities); Singer, supra note 1,
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opinion, the General Convention could have granted the Secre-
tary-General the power to characterize the nature of activities if it
had conferred absolute immunity on U.N. personnel, but then re-
quired the Secretary-General to waive immunity for acts per-
formed in a private capacity. Because the Convention creates im-
munity only for official acts and only permits the Secretary-
General to waive immunity for official acts, they concluded that
the General Convention left municipal courts with the power to
characterize the acts of UN personnel.242 Almost all writers, how-
ever, agreed on one point: the allocation of decision-making
authority to municipal courts would pose a serious threat to the
independence of international organizations.24 3
In assisting the ICJ to find the proper allocation of authority,
participants in the advisory proceedings adopted three basic posi-
tions. While Malaysia did not raise the issue in its written plead-
ings, its oral statement urged the ICJ to interpret the General
Convention against the background of state immunity.2" Survey-
ing that doctrine, Malaysia demonstrated that the overwhelming
approach is for municipal courts of "receiving states" to make in-
dependent determinations regarding the nature of acts performed
by representatives of "sending states." According to Malaysia,
there was no reason for the Court to apply a different rule to in-
ternational immunities.245 Malaysia also cited the practice of
at 80, 102 (arguing that municipal courts should not attempt to decide whether an interna-
tional organization has acted within its competence).
242. See Kunz, supra note 19, at 862. See also WHrrEMAN, supra note 91, at 154 (quot-
ing KING, supra note 10, at 95-96, who attributed his argument to Kunz).
243. See AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 111-12; CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
supra note 23, at 1142; JENKs, supra note 2, at 117-19; WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 154
(quoting KING, supra note 10, at 95-96); Kunz, supra note 19, at 862; Liang, supra note 9,
at 589.
244. See Oral Statement of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht (Dec. 8, 1998) at paras. 31-59, Differ-
ence Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, 1999 I.CJ. __ (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Oral Statement of Sir Elihu Lau-
terpacht]. Malaysia was not alone in urging the Court to draw on state-immunity princi-
ples. In its written submissions to the Court, the United States likewise urged the Court to
refer to consular immunity as a source of precedent. See Vritten Statement of the United
States, supra note 233, at para. 21. See also Preuss, supra note 67, at 576 (arguing that
analogies to consular immunity provide courts with guidance in addressing the novel legal
problems of international immunities). But see Written Statement of Costa Rica, supra
note 232, at 21 (insisting that "issues of immunity under the General Convention clearly
are, and must be, treated differently than.., issues of immunity of bilaterally accredited
... consular officers").
245. Malaysia's argument was not entirely correct. In its written and oral statements,
Costa Rica anticipated this argument and explained that the distinctions between states
and international organizations militate against comparisons between state immunity and
international immunities. Written Statement of Costa Rica, supra note 232, at 20-22 Oral
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United States courts which, it will be recalled, have claimed the
power to characterize the acts of UN personnel as official or unof-
ficial.246
Joined by Costa Rica,247 Germany,248 and Sweden, 249 the United
Nations advanced its traditional position that the Secretary-
General's characterization of an act enjoys conclusive effect in
municipal courts, subject to review by the ICJ.25° The proponents
of this view, however, never reached consensus about the basis for
their shared conclusion. The United Nations relied heavily on the
practice of Secretaries-General2 1 Joined by Sweden, the United
Nations also argued that the authority to characterize acts arose by
necessary implication from the Secretary-General's power to
waive immunity. 2  Costa Rica, on the other hand, placed greater
Statement of the Government of Costa Rica (Dec. 10, 1998), supra note 159, at paras. 16-
17.
246. See Oral Statement of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, supra note 244, at paras. 75-79.
247. See Written Statement of Costa Rica, supra note 232, at 19; Written Comments of
Costa Rica, supra note 138, at 12.
248. See Written Statement of Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 139, at 1-2.
249. See Written Statement of Sweden, supra note 234, at 2.
250. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at paras. 42, 44, 46,
54, 56; Written Comments Submitted on Behalf of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations at para. 4, Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. - [hereinafter Written Comments of the
United Nations].
251. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at paras. 42-49; Writ-
ten Comments of the United Nations, supra note 250, at para. 4.
252. Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at paras. 41-46; Written
Statement of Sweden, supra note 234, at 2-3. See also KING, supra note 13, at 262 (stating
that an "indispensable part of the right of waiver is the right to decide if the nature of the
act requires exercise of waiver"); Bekker, supra note 136, at 921 (suggesting that the
power to waive immunity necessarily implies the power to assert immunity).
In some respects, the United Nations' argument makes sense. One can draft an immu-
nities agreement to make waiver the vehicle for conclusive assertions of immunity. As
noted above, the General Convention does this with respect to determinations regarding
the functional necessity of immunity for official activities. See supra notes 133-36 and ac-
companying text. Structurally speaking, the General Convention accomplishes this by
granting a blanket immunity to the United Nations for official activities, but then requiring
the Secretary-General to waive any unnecessary immunities. See supra notes 135-36 and
accompanying text. Under these circumstances, mandatory waiver effectively becomes
the vehicle by which the Secretary-General makes conclusive determinations regarding
the functional necessity of immunity for official activities.
As also noted above, the General Convention could have been drafted to make waiver
the vehicle for conclusive determinations regarding the official or unofficial character of
an act. It could have done this, for example, by imposing a blanket immunity on all activi-
ties of UN personnel, but then requiring the Secretary-General to waive their immunity
for private acts. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. Because the drafters of
the General Convention did not adopt this structure, the power to waive official immunity
does not itself establish the Secretary-General's authority to make conclusive determina-
tions regarding the official or unofficial nature of acts performed by UN personnel. See
Kunz, supra note 19, at 862 (adopting this view). See also Written Comments of the
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emphasis on the Organization's need to control its internal affairs
and on the absurdity of committing international immunity deci-
sions to the very courts whose independence the United Nations
had placed under investigation 5 3
Taking the middle ground, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the
United States rejected the notion that the Secretary-General's
immunity determinations enjoy conclusive weight at the municipal
level5 4  Yet, they recognized that the Secretary-General is
"uniquely qualified to indicate the actual scope and nature of [an
agent's] responsibilities, and to indicate the [O]rganization's own
acceptance of the relevant conduct as [an] official act['."11 There-
fore, they argued that the Secretary-General's characterizations of
activities are entitled to "great weight" and deference,256 enjoy a
strong presumption of correctness,2 and could be rejected by mu-
nicipal authorities only under the most compelling circum-
stancesP s While Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United
United States, supra note 234, at para. 6 & n.2 (quoting the Written Statement of the Gov-
ernment of Italy and agreeing that the "[a]uthority to waive immunity is relevant only af-
ter the right to immunity is established[;] [sluch authority has no bearing on the prelimi-
nary... entitlement to immunity"). But see Written Statement of Sweden, supra note 234,
at 2-3 (explaining that the Secretary-General cannot waive immunity unless the Secretary-
General has already decided that a dispute involves an official activity for which an agent
of the Organization would otherwise enjoy immunity).
253. See Written Statement of Costa Rica, supra note 232, at 20; Written Comments of
Costa Rica, supra note 138, at 13-15. See also Bekker, supra note 136, at 920 (observing
that Malaysian courts had a particularly weak claim to second-guess the Secretary-
General's findings because they represented the object of Cumaraswamy's investigation).
254. See Written Statement of the United Kingdom, supra note 234, at para. 6; Written
Statement of the United States, supra note 233, at para. 22; Written Comments of the
United States, supra note 234, at paras. 3-8; Oral Statement of the Government of Italy
(Dec. 8, 1998) at para. 3, Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.CJ. - [hereinafter Oral Statement of
Italy].
255. Written Statement of the United States, supra note 233, at para. 22. See also Writ-
ten Statement of the United Kingdom, supra note 234, at para. 6 (recognizing that the Sec-
retary-General has a superior institutional understanding of the scope of an agent's mis-
sion and, therefore, can provide an "authoritative" view regarding the official or unofficial
nature of particular activities).
256. Written Statement of the United States, supra note 233, at para. 22 (recognizing
that the Secretary-General's opinions are entitled to "great weight"). See also Written
Statement of the United Kingdom, supra note 234, at para. 6 (counseling national courts
to give "all due weight" to the Secretary-General's views); Oral Statement of Italy, supra
note 254, at para. 3 (recognizing that "decisions of the Secretary-General ... carry special
weight").
257. See Written Statement of the United States, supra note 233, at para. 24 (adopting a
strong presumption of correctness); Written Statement of the United Kingdom, supra note
234, at para. 6 (giving "crucial" weight to the Secretary-General's views).
258. See Written Statement of the United States, supra note 233, at para. 24 (acknowl-
edging that the Secretary-General's certificates of immunity raise *a presumption in favor
of immunity rebuttable only if there is powerful contrary evidence"); Written Statement of
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States did not cast their arguments in these terms, other partici-
pants construed their positions as giving "nearly" conclusive effect
to the Secretary-General's determinations. 259
Thus, all participants identified the Secretary-General's power
to characterize the nature of activities as a key issue in Cuma-
raswamy.2 6° In rendering its decision, however, the Court held that
it need not resolve that particular question. Because ECOSOC's
Request for an Advisory Opinion only asked the Court to decide
whether Cumaraswamy was entitled to immunity and, if so, to de-
fine Malaysia's legal obligations, the Court implied that the case
did not require it to address the Secretary-General's legal pow-
ers.261 Whatever its logical appeal, this distinction appears to have
been a face-saving device that allowed the Court to require defer-
ence to the Secretary-General without approving his claim to
make conclusive immunity determinations.262
Having thus recast the issues, the Court first examined whether
the Secretary-General correctly decided that Cumaraswamy spoke
to International Commercial Litigation in his official capacity and,
therefore, enjoyed immunity from legal process of every kind.263
In so doing, the Court recognized that, as the United Nations'
chief administrative officer, the Secretary-General has the right
and the duty to protect UN personnel and the missions they under-
take.2' The Secretary-General thus plays a "pivotal role" in any
immunity determination.265  After recognizing the significance of
the Secretary-General's role, the Court itself deferred to his re-
peated statements that Cumaraswamy spoke to International
the United Kingdom, supra note 234, at para. 6 (arguing that municipal courts should re-
ject the Secretary-General's decisions only for "the most compelling reasons"); Oral
Statement of Italy, supra note 254, at para. 3 (arguing that municipal authorities may
challenge the Secretary-General's decisions "only if [they are] in clear contradiction with
the letter and spirit of the provision[s] conferring immunity"). See also Written Comments
of Costa Rica, supra note 138, at 17-18 (adopting the presumption of correctness as an al-
ternative argument).
259. Written Comments of Costa Rica, supra note 138, at 18.
260. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. -, (paras. 32-34) (Apr. 29) (noting
the range of views expressed by member states with respect to the Secretary-General's
decision-making authority).
261. See id. at - (paras. 31, 36-37).
262. See Bekker, supra note 136, at 919 (describing the Court's "half-hearted" analysis
as an "effort to please all the parties").
263. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. at - (paras. 49-56).
264. See id. at (paras. 50-51).
265. Id. at __ (para. 50).
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Commercial Litigation in his official capacity. O As further sup-
port of that determination, the Court also observed that media
contacts had become standard practice for special rapporteurs; the
article identified Cumaraswamy as a special rapporteur for the
Commission on Human Rights; Cumaraswamy reported his media
contacts and the ensuing litigation to the Commission; and the
Commission subsequently extended Cumaraswamy's mandate for
another three years.267 Under these circumstances, the Court held
that "the Secretary-General correctly found that Mr. Cuma-
raswamy ... act[ed] in the course of the performance of his mis-
sion ... [and, therefore, enjoyed] immunity from legal process of
every kind." I
The Court then turned its attention to "the legal obligations of
Malaysia in this case."269 Here, the Court elaborated on its conclu-
sion that the Secretary-General has the primary responsibility to
safeguard the interests of the United Nations." Specifically, the
Secretary-General must determine whether the Organization's
agents have acted within the scope of their missions and, if so,
whether to protect their independence by asserting immunity from
national control.2 71 As a result, the Secretary-General has the cor-
responding power and duty to inform member states' governments
of his findings and to request that they bring his findings to the at-
tention of their courts.' Moreover, the ICJ held that municipal
courts cannot properly apply the General Convention without
giving due regard to information provided by the Secretary-
General.273 The Court thus concluded that the Secretary-
General's findings with respect to immunity create a presumption,
which municipal courts must accord "the greatest weight" and may
set aside only "for the most compelling reasons. "274
While the Advisory Opinion identifies the General Convention
and Article 105 of the Charter as the sources of Malaysia's obliga-
tions, it does not explain why they require municipal courts to de-
266. See id. at - (para. 52). See also id. at - (paras. 9-10) (separate opinion of
Judge Oda) (questioning why the Court gave such deference to the Secretary-General's
views).
267. See id. at - (paras. 53-55) (majority opinion).
268. Id. at__ (para. 56).
269. Id. at__ (para. 57).
270. See id. at - (para. 60).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id. at - (para. 61).
274. Id.
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fer to the Secretary-General. 75 The Advisory Opinion's structure,
however, suggests that the presumption of correctness rests on two
grounds. First, the principle of good faith plays an obvious role. If
member states confer immunities on the United Nations and re-
quire the Secretary-General to protect the Organization and its
personnel, good faith also requires them to endow the Secretary-
General with the capacity to exercise effective protection. 76 The
Court's reliance on good faith lends a particular significance to the
Advisory Opinion because member states of all international or-
ganizations have a duty of good faith.277 Therefore, the Court's
reasoning should apply to other international organizations-even
if their activities are less significant or salient than those of the
United Nations. 7 8
In addition to principles of good faith, the Court also relied on
an efficiency argument, in which it noted that the "proper applica-
tion of the Convention by [municipal courts] is dependent on ...
information [provided by the Secretary-General]. '"279 While the
conclusion might not be as self-evident as the Court suggests, the
separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry expands on this
275. See id. at - (para. 62) (indicating the General Convention and Article 105 of the
Charter provide the source of Malaysia's legal obligations). The Court's apparent reliance
on Article 105 of the Charter as an alternative ground constitutes a vindication of the
United Nations' historical claim that the Charter severely limits the discretion of munici-
pal courts to formulate their own interpretations of the functional necessity doctrine.
Compare ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 265 (recounting the Secretariat's position
that the immunity of UN personnel for all official acts "arises directly under Article 105 of
the Charter and constitutes an essential condition for the conduct of all United Nations
activities"), with KELSEN, supra note 89, at 342 (stating that, in the absence of the General
Convention, one could not impose a definitive interpretation of Article 105 on member
states), and KING, supra note 13, at 161 (arguing that in the absence of the General Con-
vention, each member state could unilaterally determine how to apply Article 105).
Thus, the Advisory Opinion suggests that municipal authorities must defer to the Secre-
tary-General's immunity determinations even in the 51 member states that are not parties
to the General Convention. As a result, the General Convention's allocation of decision-
making authority to international officials for immunity determinations is neither unique
nor aberrant. To the contrary, its allocation of authority constitutes an inherent feature of
the functional necessity doctrine.
276. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.CJ. at - (para. 51) (quoting Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 183 (Apr. 11)).
277. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 93 (Dec. 20) (acknowledging that a "body of mutual obligations of
co-operation and good faith" is "the very essence" of the relationship between a member
state and an international organization).
278. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. at - (separate opinion of Judge Rezek) (implying
that the Court's reasoning applies even to organizations "whose objectives are less essen-
tial than those of the United Nations, and in fields less salient than that of human rights").
279. Id. at __ (para. 61) (majority opinion).
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point.2 In his separate opinion, Judge Weeramantry acknowl-
edged the strength of Malaysia's argument that, in the context of
state immunity, municipal courts have "strongly and successfully
asserted their authority" to resolve immunity questions, including
the official or unofficial nature of acts performed by agents of for-
eign states.2s8 However, Judge Weeramantry identified several
factors which "lift[ed] the matter [of international immunities] into
a different frame of reference."m According to Judge Weeraman-
try, international officials occupy a unique position because their
duties
are not restricted to the service of any particular State,
but are owed to the community of States as represented
by the United Nations. The limits of their functions are
not determined by any particular State, but are defined
on behalf of the international community by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations. Their protections
are claimed, not on behalf of any particular State, but on
behalf of the international community whom such func-
tionaries serve.3
Judge Weeramantry concluded that these factors rendered Malay-
sia's analogies to state immunity untenable.28 In contrast to state
immunity, international immunities raise issues that are "not justi-
ciable within the limited perspectives of the States involved, but
engage[] the global interests of the United Nations. "M In par-
ticular, Judge Weeramantry suggested that municipal courts
should not exercise primary decision-making authority for interna-
tional immunities because they might allow "[l]ocally sensitive is-
sues [to] crowd out perspectives regarding the global norms appli-
cable to such situations. "286
280. In ICJ jurisprudence, discussion tends to develop more fully in separate opinions.
MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 194 (1996). Moreo-
ver, the separate opinions of ICI judges constitute a particularly strong subsidiary source
of law under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJs Statute because they are written by the most
highly qualified jurists sitting as judges in cases that have been carefully argued and pre-
sented by expert counsel. Id. at 199-200.
281. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. at - (separate opinion of Vice President Weera-
mantry at 2).
282. Id. at (2-3).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. IL at (2).
286. Id. at __ (3). Much of the academy seems to share the ICJ's concern about the
limited perspectives of municipal judges. One writer, for example, notes that municipal
judges "are not adequately equipped to deal with the novel and complex legal problems"
2000]
56 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Having identified the handicaps of municipal courts, Judge
Weeramantry then described the Secretary-General's comparative
advantages in making immunity determinations. First, "[t]he Sec-
retary-General is better informed than" municipal authorities re-
garding "the limits of a given agent's functions... and the needs of
the United Nations in relation to any particular inquiry."2" Sec-
ond, the Secretary-General has a unique perspective on "the entire
scheme of United Nations operations" and, "more than any other
authority, can assess a given agent's functions within the overall
context of the rationale, traditions and operational framework of
United Nations activities as a whole. "2 Given these advantages,
any attempt by municipal courts to determine the scope of an
agent's privileges and immunities "without reference to the opin-
ion of the Secretary-General would fail to take into account an
important part of the material essential to an informed deci-
surrounding the activities of the United Nations. Preuss, supra note 67, at 574. For similar
reasons, perhaps, another writer predicted that municipal courts would encounter "con-
siderable confusion" in trying to draw the line between official and unofficial acts of U.N.
personnel. Note, Privileges and Immunities Accorded by the United States to the United
Nations Organization, Its Property, and Its Personnel, supra note 62, at 460.
When they have attempted to define the scope of international immunities, municipal
courts have reinforced concerns about their limited perspectives. For example, in West-
chester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1946), a municipal
court refused to accept the UN Legal Counsel's assertion of immunity on behalf of a UN
chauffeur who was caught speeding while driving the Secretary-General to an official func-
tion. In so doing, the court suggested that the driver did not perform an important organ-
izational function, but merely "serve[d] the personal comfort, convenience, [and] luxury"
of the Secretary-General. Id. at 33-35. Apparently, the court never considered the fact
that the host state's exercise of jurisdiction over the driver might interfere with the Secre-
tary-General's freedom of movement.
Moreover, the Ranallo court stridently rejected the entrustment of immunity decisions
to the "whim or caprice" of the United Nations. Id. at 35. Yet, the court tacitly admitted
that it was incapable of determining whether the Organization required immunity in any
given case. In fact, the court suggested that it would defer to the State Department's certi-
fication as to whether the assertion of immunity "was in the public interest." Id.
The Ranollo court's parochial decision and its reliance on the State Department for
guidance "clearly demonstrate[ that national courts are not in a position to appreciate
fully the problems or needs of international organizations." AHLUWALIA, supra note 10,
at 111. See also KING, supra note 13 at 186-88 (concluding that the Ranollo court's limited
perspective rendered it unable to appreciate the needs of the United Nations). This criti-
cism dovetails with the popular view that United States courts are ill-equipped to define
the foreign relations interests of the United States. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1414-18
(1999). If municipal courts cannot define the needs and interests of their own countries,
we should not expect them to perform the more difficult task of defining the needs and
interests of international organizations.





sion." 9 As a result, the Secretary-General's determinations re-
garding the official or unofficial nature of an agent's activities will
bind domestic tribunals "unless compelling reasons can be estab-
lished for displacing that weighty presumption." 29,
All told, Cumaraswamy provides a serious response to those
who would expand municipal court jurisdiction for international
immunities. Contrary to their suggestions, Cumaraswamy demon-
strates that the fear of prejudice is neither "unrealistic" nor "exag-
gerated. " 291 Rather, the limited perspectives of municipal courts
are likely to produce rulings that consistently underestimate the
legitimate scope of an organization's activities and its need for
immunity.292 Consequently, they are likely to make decisions that
impair the capacity of international organizations to achieve their
objectives, 293 particularly in controversial areas such as peace, se-
curity, and human rights. Having granted immunities to interna-
tional organizations on the basis of functional necessity, member
states should leave immunity determinations to the international
officials and judges who best understand the needs and functions
of those organizations.
B. Application of the Functional Necessity Doctrine by
International Officials: Some Unwarranted Criticisms
Even if international officials theoretically have the capacity to
make superior immunity decisions on the basis of functional neces-
sity, one cannot dismiss calls for reform without determining
whether their decisions are, in fact, consistent wvith the functional
necessity doctrine. In this regard, one must address contentions
that international organizations unnecessarily maintain their im-
munity in routine contract disputes, intentional tort actions, and
employment matters. This Subpart examines the practice of the
289. Id.
290. Id. This ruling may reflect the latest installment in a pattern of decisions, in which
the Court has concluded that "the Organization is the best judge of what circumstances
require." See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 175 n.772 (quoting Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, The De-
velopment of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of International Tri-
bunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of International Law) 377, 428-30
(1976-B'), which identified this trend).
291. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
292. JENKS, supra note 2, at 41.
293. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at para. 43 (citing
several General Assembly Resolutions for the proposition that "disregard for the privi-
leges and immunities of officials has always constituted one of the main obstacles to the
implementation of the missions and programmes assigned to the organizations of the
United Nations system by Member States").
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United Nations and concludes that the functional necessity doc-
trine generally supports the Secretary-General's hesitance to waive
immunity for such disputes.
As Cumaraswamy indicates, the direct and indirect prejudices of
municipal courts still pose serious threats to the work of interna-
tional organizations. Yet, one must take care not to overstate the
problem. For example, one can safely assume that the risk of di-
rect prejudice is imperceptible in many of the countries where in-
ternational organizations operate.294 This assumption is particu-
larly strong with respect to routine civil and commercial disputes
in the host countries of international organizations. 295  For such
matters, the threat of indirect prejudice may also seem fairly re-
mote. Because municipal law arguably governs routine contract
and tort claims,296 the "limited" perspectives of municipal courts
could actually give them an advantage in applying the governing
law. Therefore, one might conclude that because threats of preju-
dice disappear in most civil and commercial claims, the functional
necessity doctrine should require international organizations to
waive their immunities on a regular basis.297 To support their calls
294. See, e.g., JENKS, supra note 2, at 40 (quoting Wood, supra note 39, at 143-44, for
the proposition that the threat of direct prejudice provides little justification for immuni-
ties in countries "like Switzerland"); Singer, supra note 1, at 128 (recognizing that "[a]
prejudiced court could certainly prove troublesome to an international organization," but
claiming that "the concern seems unrealistic"); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Inter-
governmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1185 (doubting that there is "reason to fear
judicial bias against an IGO defendant").
295. See Wood, supra note 39, at 162 (recognizing that prejudice would not normally
support the assertion of immunity with respect to "ordinary legal claims"). See also
JENKS, supra note 2, at 119 (acknowledging that when "relations with ... the host State
are good it should in normal times be unnecessary[] and... undesirable" for international
organizations to maintain their immunity from routine claims).
296. See Wood, supra note 39, at 162 (stating that "[iun all the normal transactions of
normal times, [international organizations] will operate under the ordinary law"). See also
AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 227-28 (stating that certain contracts of international
organizations may be governed by municipal law and that the principle of lex loci delicti
commissi should generally govern the tort liability of international organizations); SHAW,
supra note 27, at 918 (explaining that municipal law may govern some commercial con-
tracts of international organizations and that the tort liability of international organiza-
tions will generally be subject to municipal law).
297. See KING, supra note 10, at 135 (construing Section 20 of the General Convention
and concluding that its purpose is "to make the exercise of waiver the rule rather than the
exception"); Singer, supra note 1, at 124, 129, 141, 144 (arguing that international organi-
zations have no need for jurisdictional immunity from claims involving routine business
transactions); Wood, supra note 39, at 162 (arguing that the waiver of jurisdictional immu-
nities should become the rule for ordinary legal claims against international organiza-
tions). Cf. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, reprinted in HILL,
supra note 47, at 208 (stating that the "Secretary-General both can waive immunity and
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for reform, several writers claim that international organizations
have failed to do so.
Because the literature reaches divergent conclusions, it is diffi-
cult to assess the frequency with which international organizations
waive their immunities.29 8 By its own admission, however, the
United Nations does not generally waive immunity for disputes in-
volving commercial contracts.29 While this might initially provide
reason for concern,3 °° one should not conclude that the United Na-
tions relies on its immunity to prevent the adjudication of liability
in commercial disputes. Like many private parties, the United Na-
tions generally provides for arbitration of commercial disputes un-
der the UNCITRAL arbitration rules and has also agreed to arbi-
tration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Association
(ICAA), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).0 t
will in fact do so in every case where such a course is consistent with the interests of the
United Nations").
298. Compare CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 1140 (asserting
that the United Nations has always made conscientious use of waiver), and SCHERMERS &
BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 360 (suggesting that international organizations will 'often*
waive immunity when requested), and Felice Morgenstern, The Law Applicable to Inter-
national Officials, 18 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 739, 739 (1969) (indicating that international
organizations have "waived the[ir] immunity as a matter of course whenever it constituted
an obstacle to the normal course of justice'), and Liang, supra note 9, at 592 (stating that
the policy of waiver was usually followed by the League of Nations and that United Na-
tions has made an even more generous use of waiver), with BEKKER, supra note 9, at 193
(concluding that international organizations waive their immunity only in exceptional
cases), and CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 23 (suggesting that the Secretary-General has
not frequently exercised the power to waive immunity).
To fully understand the practices of international organizations with respect to waiver,
one cannot simply count the number of cases in which international organizations have
waived their immunity and, then, describe the practice as "frequent' or 'exceptional.'
One must also examine the relative frequency of waiver as compared to number of cases in
which claimants have requested international organizations to waive their immunity. In
this regard, it is worth noting that some international organizations do not frequently re-
ceive requests for waiver, but generally grant the requests that they do receive. See, e.g.,
ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 317, 321 (reporting that the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations had received "few or no requests to waive the immunity of... their
officials," but adding that "very few, if any, requests for waiver have been refused').
299. See Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Professor (Dec. 27, 1987),
1987 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 203, 203, U.N. Doc. ST/LEGISER.CI25 (explaining that the United
Nations typically does not submit to municipal court adjudication of contract claims). See
also BEKKER, supra note 9, at 204-05 (observing that, with the exception of automobile
accidents and other cases that are covered by third-party insurance, the United Nations
has submitted to arbitration instead of waiving immunity).
300. See Singer, supra note 1, at 124, 129, 141-44 (questioning the need of international
organizations for jurisdictional immunity against commercial contract claims).
301. See infra notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the United Nations's practice corresponds to the overall
preference for arbitration in international business transactions.
Notwithstanding the popularity of arbitration, one writer argues
that the "[O]rganization would probably not find it ... more bur-
densome to waive its immunity and submit to the jurisdiction of
... local courts in ... day-to-day matters." 302 The argument does
not, however, adequately consider the functional interests of the
United Nations in declining to waive its immunity for commercial
disputes. Even in the absence of direct and indirect prejudice, the
unique nature of international organizations generates conflicts-of-
law issues that compel them to maintain their immunity from mu-
nicipal court jurisdiction and to rely, instead, on arbitration of
commercial disputes.
In commercial transactions having an international dimension,
the failure to designate the appropriate forum and governing law
creates major uncertainty costs. 30 3  Commercial enterprises with
multi-jurisdictional operations overcome these costs by inserting
standard choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses into their
business agreements. 304 Although commercial enterprises typically
302. Singer, supra note 1, at 85. In making this argument, Singer relies on the fact that
the United Nations has, in the past, agreed to different arbitration rules depending on its
suppliers' places of residence. See id. Specifically, Singer argues that the United Nations
already bears the cost of tailoring arbitration to local conditions and, therefore, would not
experience substantially greater inconvenience if it agreed to litigation in the municipal
courts of different member states. See id. On its face, the argument seems implausible.
Submission to the local procedures of numerous countries seems significantly more oner-
ous than submission to arbitration under four different sets of arbitration rules. See supra
note 301 and accompanying text (listing the four sets of arbitration rules that the United
Nations formerly incorporated in its contracts). In addition, the argument relies on the
outdated perception that the United Nations tailors its choice of arbitration rules to the
location of its suppliers. Singer, supra note 1, at 85. While that was true in the past, the
current practice of the United Nations is to standardize its arbitration agreements by in-
corporating the UNCITRAL rules, which are designed to be acceptable to a variety of le-
gal cultures. See infra note 395.
303. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2455 (1974)
(commenting that "uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws
rules"). See also W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2 (1997) (referring to the "serious[] and even calamitous" consequences of
failing to provide for dispute resolution procedures in international commercial agree-
ments).
304. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516, 94 S. Ct. at 2455 (concluding that "[a] contractual pro-
vision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to
be applied is... an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business transaction").
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choose arbitration,3 5 they may alternatively select a familiar court
and governing law.306
To the extent that they resemble multinational enterprises, in-
ternational organizations face similar pressures to standardize the
procedures by which they resolve commercial disputes. °' Because
the United Nations possesses a high degree of familiarity with New
York law, it theoretically could standardize its commercial con-
tracts by incorporating New York law.308 In practice, however, the
Organization lacks that option. Because the United Nations must
exhibit independence and neutrality with respect to each of its
member states, it cannot standardize its commercial agreements by
adopting New York law as the commercial law of the Organiza-
tion. Consequently, the United Nations prefers not to designate
any municipal law and interprets its contracts according to general
principles of law.' 9
305. See TIBOR VARADY ET AL, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at v
(1999) (observing that arbitration "has become the dominant method of settling interna-
tional trade disputes").
306. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (recogniz-
ing that parties may use forum selection and choice-of-law clauses to "eliminate uncer-
tainty in international commerce").
307. Cf Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Questionnaire from the Institut
de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 159, 163, U.N. Doc.
STILEG/SER.C/14 (stating that the United Nations tries to avoid laws with which it is not
familiar).
308. See id. (explaining that the United Nations has a familiarity with New York law
that would make it relatively easy to agree to its incorporation into particular contracts).
309. See Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Legal Counsel, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (July 16, 1986), 1986 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 324,
324, U.N. Doec. ST/LEG/SERIC/24; Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Ques-
tionnaire from the Institut de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307, at 161;
MORGENSTERN, supra note 23, at 38. See also JENKS, supra note 14, at 153 (stating that it
is "not uncommon" for international organizations to require that contracts be governed
by general principles of law). For those not part of the cognoscenti, the term 'general
principles of law" refers to a set of legal rules shared in substance by the world's major le-
gal traditions. Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development
Agreements, 29 HARV. INT'L LJ. 317, 332 (1988). Sometimes referred to as "lex mercato-
r/a," general principles of law occupy an intermediate ground between municipal law and
public international law. Id.
International organizations "widely" assume that general principles of law will govern
their contractual relations with private parties even in the absence of an express contrac-
tual stipulation. MORGENSTERN, supra note 23, at 40. The United Nations and the Spe-
cialized Agencies, for example, take this position. See Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal
Affairs to a Questionnaire from the Institute de Droit International, supra note 307, at
162, 165 (discussing the practice of the United Nations). See also ILC Study (1985), supra
note 119, at 182 (describing the practices of the Specialized Agencies).
Scholars have debated whether it is reasonable to conclude that private parties contem-
plate the application of general principles of law in the absence of an express contractual
stipulation. Compare JENKS, supra note 14, at 153-54 (seriously entertaining this proposi-
2000]
62 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41:1
Having made the decision to interpret its contracts according to
general principles of law, the United Nations must choose arbitra-
tion of commercial disputes instead of litigation in municipal
courts. While international arbitral tribunals often apply general
principles of law to commercial disputes, municipal courts refuse
to decide cases without reference to a particular body of municipal
law.310 Moreover, even if municipal courts agreed to resolve dis-
putes based on general principles of law, a municipal judge sitting
by herself would find it difficult to step out of her own legal tradi-
tion and to identify the general principles that are common to
major legal systems.311 A panel of three experienced arbitrators
from different countries would be better suited to the task. In
short, because municipal courts would not (and arguably could
not) apply general principles of law as a means of standardizing
the United Nations's commercial contracts, the functional neces-
tion), with MORGENSTERN, supra note 23, at 40-41 (seriously questioning this proposi-
tion). With respect to international arbitration, several leading writers now treat the ab-
sence of a governing law clause as an indication that the parties could not agree to the ap-
plication of a particular municipal law and, therefore, as a negative choice in favor of lex
mercatoria. See, e.g., REISMAN ET AL., supra note 303, at 228 (quoting W. LAURENCE
CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 615 (2d ed.
1990)). Thus, while the position of international organizations may not be beyond ques-
tion, its basic premise has gained acceptance among international arbitrators.
310. See Curtis, supra note 309, at 333 (recognizing that arbitrators have applied general
principles of law, but that municipal courts have not); Alejandro M. Garro, The Contribu-
tion of the UNIDROIT Principles to the Advancement of International Commercial Arbi-
tration, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 104 (1995) (explaining that most national courts
strive to avoid the application of lex mercatoria even if the parties have stipulated to its
use). See also JENKS, supra note 14, at 152 (recognizing the existence of controversy re-
garding the ability of parties to adopt "general principles of law" as the governing law for
contracts).
Some writers argue that municipal courts dislike general principles of law because they
are vague and indeterminate. See Garro, supra, at 104. However, the aversion of munici-
pal courts seems to be more deeply rooted in the positivist view that "any contract which is
not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based
upon the municipal law of some country." Serbian Loans (France v. Serbia), 1929 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 20, at 41 (July 12). See also F.A. Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts Con-
cluded by International Persons, 1960 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 44 (arguing that general
principles "are not a law or a legal system"). Because arbitration takes place largely out-
side the realm of state power, it is not surprising that arbitrators have been more receptive
to the non-positivist body of lex mercatoria.
311. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 1002 (doubting that municipal
judges have sufficiently broad experience with multiple legal systems to apply general
principles of law, and suggesting that mixed international tribunals can do a more effective
job). See also Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Friendly, J.) (" [T]ry as we may to apply.., foreign law... there is an inevitable hazard
that ... our labors, moulded by our own habits of mind as they necessarily must be, may
produce a result whose conformity with that of the foreign court may be greater in theory
that it is in fact.").
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sity doctrine supports the Secretary-General's practice of not
waiving immunity for such disputes and of providing, instead, for
arbitration.
With respect to tort actions brought by non-employees, auto-
mobile accidents provide the most common source of dispute-
and the one area in which the United Nations consistently waives
its immunity.312 To the extent that it carries third-party insurance,
the United Nations has also waived its immunity for other tort
claims.313 The United Nations seems unwilling, however, to waive
immunity for cases in which claimants accuse the Organization's
personnel of committing intentional torts in their official capaci-
ties.314
One writer suggests that the failure to waive immunity for inten-
tional torts is unwarranted because international organizations
never require immunity "in cases alleging that they have inten-
tionally caused death, personal injury, or damage to ... property
within the forum state. '315  At an intuitive level, the argument
makes sense because the principle of lex loci delicti commissi often
governs the tort liability of international organizations.1 6 When
municipal law governs a tort claim, international organizations
312. See ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 162; ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at
225-26,283; Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Permanent Representative
of a Member State (May 22, 1985), supra note 236, at 155; Memorandum from the U.N.
Office of Legal Affairs to the Assistant Secretary-General for General Services (Apr. 5,
1983), 1983 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 214, 215, U.N. Doc. STILEGISER.Cr21; Internal Memoran-
dum of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs (Nov. 3, 1964), 1964 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 263. 263,
U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.C2; BEKKER, supra note 9, at 204; CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 23, at 1142; WHITFMAN, supra note 91, at 62 (quoting Ehrenfeld,
supra note 84, at 93). See also CROSSWELL, supra note 10, at 24-25, 57 (discussing the
United Nations's practice of waiving immunity for suits arising out of automobile acci-
dents and stating that "a similar view... is taken by... other international organiza-
tions").
313. ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 162; Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs
to a Questionnaire from the Institut de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307,
at 172, 176; BEKKER, supra note 9, at 204; WHrITFIAN, supra note 91, at 62 (quoting
Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 93); Singer, supra note 1, at 85. See also RESTATEMEENT
(THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 reporters' note 7 (describing the practice of the United
Nations and the Specialized Agencies to waive immunity in such cases); RESTATEMIENT
(SECOND), supra note 27, at § 84 reporters' note (describing the practice of the United
Nations).
314. See Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Questionnaire from the Institut
de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307, at 172, 176 (explaining that the
United Nations does not generally waive immunity except in cases of third-party liability
that is covered by insurance). Most insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional
torts. See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 76,81 (1996).
315. Singer, supra note 1, at 151.
316. See AMERAsINGHE, supra note 27, at 228; SHAW, supra note 27, at 918.
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cannot cite the limited perspectives of municipal courts or the pos-
sibility of conflicting judgments to justify the assertion of immu-
nity. In fact, the application of municipal law presupposes the
likelihood of differing perspectives and conflicting rules.317 In
these tort cases, municipal courts may be in the best position to
apply the governing law.318
Still, a blanket rule against immunity fails to consider the nature
of the situations in which international officials are likely to com-
mit intentional torts in an official capacity. These cases do not in-
volve mistakes; they involve purposeful activities that international
organizations have determined to be part of their official work. In
other words, intentional tort claims usually involve circumstances
in which organizations conclude that they have a right under inter-
national law to perform acts that would otherwise be actionable
under municipal law.319 In these situations, it is not clear that mu-
nicipal courts should adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the or-
ganizations and their personnel.
For example, when the Security Council supervises military en-
forcement actions in accordance with Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, members of the participating forces should not
be exposed to municipal court jurisdiction for claims of personal
injury and property damage that might otherwise lie under mu-
nicipal law. 320 At a more basic level, when member states require
the United Nations to issue reports on particular topics, their
authors should not have to face municipal court jurisdiction for
defamation claims that might arise under national laws.321 Like-
wise, if the Organization exercises its right to protect the inviola-
317. See Singer, supra note 1, at 130 (explaining that the need to cope with differences
in municipal law "is a routine cost of functioning internationally").
318. See Wood, supra note 39, at 162 (concluding that municipal courts provide the best
and the natural forum for cases arising under municipal law).
319. Cf. AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 226 (noting that the tortious activities of in-
ternational officials may sometimes be governed by international law); SHAW, supra note
27, at 918 (also recognizing that the tort liability of international organizations may, in
some circumstances, be governed by international law).
320. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 358 (suggesting that participants in
the United Nations operation in Somalia should not have to stand trial before local courts
on charges of aggression).
321. See JENKS, supra note 14, at 213 (suggesting that municipal laws prohibiting defa-
mation could not be applied to the dissemination of information that international organi-
zations are required to publish). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 85
illus. 1, § 92 illus. 1 (suggesting that international officials should not have to answer to
municipal authorities for the issuance of objectionable reports); SCHERMERS &
BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 358 (arguing that international officials should not have to
stand trial in municipal courts for drafting unflattering reports).
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bility of its premises and archives by detaining suspected thieves
and vandals, it is not clear that its security agents should account
for their conduct before municipal tribunals in accordance with
municipal standards.3 2
In short, international officials are not likely to commit inten-
tional violations of municipal tort law in the absence of a colorable
claim that they have a right to do so under international law.m2
While such claims may not always be justified, one may be even
more suspicious of attempts by municipal courts to resolve con-
flicts between international law and municipal tort law. 3 4 In fact,
when international civil servants intentionally violate a member
state's public policy, the threat of direct and indirect prejudice be-
comes a paramount concern.32 Under these circumstances, the as-
sertion of immunity represents a legitimate effort by international
organizations to transfer the adjudication of liability to an interna-
322. Under the General Convention, United Nations premises and archives are *invio-
lable." General Convention, supra note 9, at §§ 3, 4. In a few cases, plaintiffs have
claimed that the personnel of international organizations used excessive force in prevent-
ing the theft of records and in apprehending vandals. See Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107
F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (involving the attempted theft of files); People v. Weiner, 378
N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1976) (involving the apprehension of a suspected van-
dal). In the first case, the international organization maintained that its official complied
with the organization's policy regarding the protection of archives. Rendall-Speranza, 107
F.3d at 915. In the second case, the United Nations claimed that municipal courts lacked
the competence to determine whether a UN security officer exceeded his authority to pro-
tect the inviolability of UN premises. Weiner, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 970,974. See also Letter to
the Permanent Representative of a Member State (Feb. 11, 1976), supra note 182, at 237,
238. Because municipal law may not give adequate protection to the archives and prem-
ises of international organizations, because municipal authorities may not have the incen-
tive to protect the archives and premises of international organizations, and because inter-
national law must prevail over domestic tort law, one cannot assume that an international
organization's efforts to protect the inviolability of its archives and premises should be ad-
dressed by municipal judges in accordance with municipal tort law. See Applicability of
the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, 34 (Apr. 26) (recalling the 'fundamental prin-
ciple" that "international law prevails over domestic law*). Cf. BoWETr, supra note 18, at
370 (doubting whether municipal law should necessarily apply to torts committed by offi-
cials in the headquarters district of an international organization).
323. See JENKS, supra note 14, at 212-13 (recognizing that there may be questions about
the capacity of states to bind international organizations regarding particular matters).
324. See JENKS, supra note 117, at 40 (arguing that the municipal authorities of one
state do not have the capacity to nullify the official acts of international institutions, in part
because municipal courts "are not in a position to weigh the different factors involved").
325. Cf Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 90 (describing the possibility of local prejudice
against some activities of international organizations, or at least the possibility that mu-
nicipal courts would not recognize the inapplicability of certain municipal laws to the ac-
tivities of international organizations).
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tional tribunal and, thus, to ensure the primacy of international
law.3
26
With respect to employment disputes, critics have suggested that
international organizations cannot justify the assertion of immu-
nity on functional necessity grounds.327 In making this argument,
they observe that multinational enterprises employ thousands of
individuals in scores of locations across the globe, but manage to
function without the benefit of immunity.32 While this may be
true, it ignores some fundamental differences between interna-
tional organizations and multinational enterprises.329
As a rule, some municipal law governs employment relations be-
tween multinational enterprises and their employees. 330 There is,
however, a broad consensus for the proposition that the internal
laws of international organizations govern their employment rela-
tions to the exclusion of municipal law.331 The constituent docu-
ments of a few international organizations expressly recognize this
point.332 It is also deemed to be a feature of customary interna-
326. See Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note
5, at 1190-91 (recognizing that international organizations should enjoy immunity from the
jurisdiction of municipal courts for torts performed in the pursuit of core public functions
because municipal court jurisdiction would open the door to intervention in the work of
international organizations).
327. See Singer, supra note 1, at 160-61.
328. See id. at 161.
329. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (recognizing
important distinctions between international organizations and multinational companies).
Cf. JENKS, supra note 14, at xxxi (warning that the tendency of private international law-
yers to analyze international organizations according to normal conflicts-of-law rules is not
"well founded").
330. See YvES BEIGBEDER, THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATIONS 181 (1997).
331. See Opinion of the Legal Counsel of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (Sept. 4, 1970), 1970 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 188, 190-91, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.C/8; Owen Letter, supra note 26, at 920 (quoting JENKS, supra note 14, at
63); C.F. AMERASINGHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE 46 (1988);
AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 331; BEIGBEDER, supra note 330, at 181; BOWETr, st-
pra note 18, at 317, 367; JENKS, supra note 14, at 43-44; MORGENSTERN, supra note 23, at
37 n.105; SHAW, supra note 27, at 918-19; Morgenstern, supra note 298, at 740; Finn Seyer-
sted, Jurisdiction over Organs and Officials of States, the Holy See and Intergovernmental
Organizations, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 493 passim (1965); Seyersted, supra note 84, at 58-
59, 67-68. But see KELSEN, supra note 89, at 314 (concluding that municipal law applies to
employment contracts between international organizations and staff members).
332. For example, Article 101(1) of the United Nations Charter establishes the power
of the General Assembly to regulate staff relations. See Effect of Awards of Compensa-
tion Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 58 (July 13);
Seyersted, supra note 84, at 54. Likewise, Article V(5) of the World Bank's Articles of
Agreement gives the Bank's President responsibility for "the organization, appointment
and dismissal of the officers and staff." Owen Letter, supra note 26, at 919. The State
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tional law333 on the theory that entities having international legal
personality also possess exclusive legislative and adjudicative ju-
risdiction over their internal affairs.3
Although the internal laws of international organizations govern
employment contracts, they are not a form of private law.Y5 To
the contrary, they resemble the public law that governs employ-
ment relations between states and their civil servants.36 While in-
ternational organizations establish much of this public law by
regulations and rules, they depend on general principles of law to
fill the gaps.3 37
Viewed in this context, it becomes clear that the employment
contracts of international organizations enjoy a level of autonomy
Department's Legal Adviser has construed Article V(5) to indicate that the world Bank is
not subject to municipal employment law. See id.
333. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 223 reporters' note 1: Seyersted,
supra note 331, at 522; Seyersted, supra note 84, at 57.
334. See RESTATE ENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 223 cmt. a & reporters' note 1. See
also AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 324 (explaining that it is a "characteristic" of inter-
national organizations to operate outside of national law with respect to "internal organi-
zation and functioning"); Seyersted, supra note 331, at 522-23 (explaining that interna-
tional organizations have exclusive jurisdiction to govern their internal affairs).
335. See Effect of Awards of Compensation, 1954 I.CJ. at 82 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Hackworth); SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 280, at 194-95 (explaining that the dis-
senting opinions of ICJ judges have been cited as authoritative statements of law with re-
spect to points that are consistent with majority opinions of the ICJ). See also Opinion of
the Legal Counsel of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Sept.
4, 1970), supra note 331, at 190, (quoting Opinion of Committee of Jurists, LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OJ. Special Supp. 107, at 206-08 (1932), for the proposition that the employ-
ment relationship between international organizations and staff "is not a legal relationship
of private law within the meaning of the civil law of any country"). Cf. Broadbent v. Or-
ganization of American States, 628 F.2d 27, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that the
employment of international civil servants would not be a "commercial activity" even if
the doctrine of restricted sovereign immunity applied to international immunities). But
see KELSEN, supra note 89, at 317 (asserting that international organizations lack legisla-
tive power and, therefore, doubting that their employment contracts have the characteris-
tics of public law); Ivor L.M. Richardson, The Legal Relation Between an International Or-
ganization and Its Personnel, 2 WAYNE L REV. 75, 90 (1956) (doubting that the internal
law of international organizations constitutes a form of public law).
336. See BowETT, supra note 18, at 371 (describing the public-law character of relations
between international organizations and their staff). See also RANSHOFEN-
WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 257-58 (describing the conclusion of a committee of ju-
rists that employment relations between the League of Nations and its staff were governed
chiefly by considerations of public law).
337. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 177; BOWET, supra note 18, at 325; Mor-
genstern, supra note 298, at 741; Richardson, supra note 335, at 97; Seyersted, supra note
331, at 510. The reliance on general principles of law inures to the benefit of international
officials because organizations tend to define them in a way that gives officials "the great-
est possible protection which can be derived from the various systems of law." Morgen-
stern, supra note 298, at 742-43,746.
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that transcends the boundaries of international immunities."8 Be-
cause the internal laws of organizations govern their employment
relations, municipal courts would have to apply those laws to dis-
putes between international organizations and their personnel.339
It is, however, fairly well established that even courts of general ju-
risdiction have no competence to apply the public laws of another
jurisdiction.31 1 Thus, while courts often dismiss employment claims
against international organizations on the basis of immunity,
courts have also dismissed such claims on the more fundamental
ground that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 341 Even if pro-
ponents of reform could demonstrate that international organiza-
tions are not entitled to immunity for employment claims on func-
tional necessity grounds, it is not clear that municipal courts would
exercise jurisdiction over such cases. 42
338. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 324 (stating that matters falling within an in-
ternational organization's internal law are completely "outside the jurisdiction of national
law").
339. See Seyersted, supra note 331, at 506.
340. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 35 n.27 (quoting M.B. AKEHURST, THE LAW
GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 12 (1967)); Seyersted,
supra note 331, at 523 (explaining that "external courts are incompetent in the sense that
they do not have subject matter jurisdiction over disputes falling within the organic juris-
diction of international organizations"). See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 630 (3d ed. 1996) (noting the traditional rule
that the courts of one country will not enforce foreign public rights).
341. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 35 n.27 (quoting AKEHURST, supra note 340, at 12, for
the proposition that municipal courts are "totally unsuited" to apply the internal employ-
ment law of international organizations and recognizing that a number of municipal courts
have dismissed employment law claims not on the grounds of immunity, but on the
grounds of the "special law applicable"); Owen Letter, supra note 26, at 919-20 (noting the
"widespread practice among States not to exercise jurisdiction over internal employment
disputes in international organizations, regardless of whether national law specifically pro-
vides for immunity from jurisdiction"); AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 42 (explaining
that most legal systems recognize that international organizations either enjoy immunity
for employment matters or that such matters lie outside the subject matter jurisdiction of
local courts); Seyersted, supra note 331, at 509 (describing cases in which the municipal
court dismissed an employment claim against an international organization not on the
grounds of immunity, but for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
342. Nevertheless, a municipal court might erroneously exercise subject matter jurisdic-
tion over employment claims against an international organization in the absence of inter-
national immunities. For example, in one case, the EEOC dismissed a claim against the
United Nations because it concluded that Title VII does not apply to the United Nations.
See Boimah v. United Nations Gen. Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Later, a federal district court disagreed and held that, in the absence of a clearly worded
exception, Title VII applies to the United Nations. See id.
While the court ultimately dismissed the case on immunity grounds, see id. at 70-71, its
holding with respect to the applicability of Title VII is incorrect. It is true that Title VII
does not explicitly exclude the United Nations from its scope of application. On the other
hand, nothing in Title VII expressly requires its application to international organizations.
Under these circumstances, the court should have applied the presumption that Congress
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Moreover, one can justify the assertion of immunity for em-
ployment claims on functional necessity grounds. While the com-
parison may not be obvious, international organizations resemble
armed services in the sense that they require their employees to
adhere to strict codes of conduct not imposed on the general
population.34 3 Because such codes of conduct are vital to the sur-
vival of international organizations and armed forces, they both
require separate legal systems for employment matters.34 Fur-
thermore, to reinforce the independence and neutrality of interna-
tional organizations, staff members must see the law of the organi-
zation, and not a particular state, as the source of their rights and
duties.345 Likewise, member states must understand that the civil
services of international organizations do not operate within the
value systems of particular member states, but reflect common
values.346 To achieve these goals, the internal laws of international
organizations must constitute the exclusive source of rules for their
employment relations; however, because municipal courts will not
apply the written public laws of international organizations (or the
general principles of law that fill their gaps), international organi-
zations must use their immunity to force adjudication of employ-
ment disputes by international tribunals.
intends domestic laws to comply with international law. See Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Because the United Nations Charter
and customary international law give the United Nations exclusive jurisdiction over its in-
ternal affairs, the Court should have held that Congress did not intend that Title VII apply
to the United Nations. Cf Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Posner, J.) (recognizing that a 1953 treaty permitted Japanese companies to discriminate
in favor of their citizens, stating that "[t]he exercise of a treaty right may not be made the
basis for inferring a violation of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]. and refusing
to interpret Title VII to "tak[e] back from the Japanese ... what the treaty had given
them").
343. See AKEHURST, supra note 340, at 10. See also Richardson, supra note 335, at 88-
89 & nf. 47-48 (remarking about the "severe restrictions" imposed by the United Nations
Staff Regulations on the extra-office behavior of staff).
344. It is possible to characterize the independent legal systems of international organi-
zations as having a psychological dimension in the sense that they create the esprit de
corps necessary for the survival of the institutions. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at
330 (speaking in these terms). It would be unfair, however, to characterize the legal inde-
pendence of international organizations as conferring no more than a psychological bene-
fit. See Singer, supra note 1, at 132 (rejecting the need for immunities that defend the
"psychological well-being" of international organizations).
345. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 329 (describing the need to create uniform
conditions of service for international officials and to preserve their independence from
national pressures).
346. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 103 (emphasizing an organization's need to convince
member states of its impartiality).
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In short, the Secretary-General's practices are broadly consis-
tent with the obligation, under the functional necessity doctrine, to
waive unnecessary immunities. Granted, the Secretary-General
often decides not to waive immunity in cases involving commercial
contracts, intentional torts, and employment disputes - even in the
absence of direct and indirect prejudice. Yet, the Secretary-
General's reluctance to waive immunity appears to rest firmly on
considerations of functional necessity and to represent an effort to
secure the effective functioning of the Organization.
C. A Legitimate Concern
While the Secretary-General's immunity decisions generally
comply with the functional necessity doctrine, the United Nations
adopted a position in Cumaraswamy that creates a potential ten-
sion between waivers of immunity and the functional necessity
doctrine. As noted above, Sections 20 and 23 of the General Con-
vention require the Secretary-General to waive the immunity of
United Nations personnel whenever (a) the assertion of immunity
would impede the course of justice; and (2) waiver may be accom-
plished without prejudice to the interests of the Organization. 7
In Cumaraswamy, the United Nations correctly claimed that it
need not waive immunity because the exercise of jurisdiction by
Malaysian courts would prejudice the interests of the Organiza-
tion.3" Given the effect of the Malaysian judicial proceedings on
Cumaraswamy's work and on the work of other special rappor-
teurs, the United Nations had a strong argument for not waiving
immunity. 49
The United Nations, however, gave a second reason for not
waiving immunity. Here, the Organization claimed that it need
not waive immunity because immunity would not impede the
course of justice. To justify this position, the United Nations relied
on Section 29 of the General Convention, which provides that
The United Nations shall make provisions for appropri-
ate modes of settlement of:
347. General Convention, supra note 9, at §§ 20,23.
348. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at paras. 54-55.
349. See id. (explaining that the Malaysian judicial proceedings caused the postpone-
ment of Cumaraswamy's investigations, predicting that a waiver of his immunity would
deter other human rights workers from speaking candidly about their efforts, and con-




(a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other dis-
putes of a private law character to which the United
Nations is a party;
(b) Disputes involving any official of the United
Nations who by reason of his official position enjoys
immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the
Secretary-General.
According to the United Nations, the assertion of immunity on
Cumaraswamy's behalf could not possibly impede the course of
justice because Section 29 would still require the United Nations
to arbitrate the claims against Cumaraswamy.50
In the narrow context of Cumaraswamy, the United Nations's
analysis seems tenable. The United Nations has long required
claimants to make affirmative requests for waivers and to provide
a "motivated statement of reasoning" indicating how the assertion
of immunity would impede the course of justice.351 Following the
commencement of proceedings against Cumaraswamy, however,
the Malaysian plaintiffs and the Malaysian government neither re-
quested a waiver of immunity,352 nor did they clearly explain how
immunity would impede the course of justice.3 53 At most, the Ma-
laysian government implied that the assertion of immunity would
deprive the plaintiffs of any legal redress and would, therefore,
constitute a denial of justice.3- That suggestion, however, invited
350. See id. at para. 52 (arguing that immunity would not impede the course of justice
because the United Nations would still have an obligation under Section 29 to provide an
appropriate remedy); Oral Statement of the United Nations (Dec. 10, 1998). supra note
143, at para. 14 (explaining that, in accordance with Section 29, the United Nations would
agree to arbitrate the claims against Cumaraswamy under the UNCITRAL rules).
351. See ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 283 (describing a 1963 incident in which
the United Nations declined to waive immunity on the basis of a "bare statement" by the
requesting government and, instead, requested a "motivated statement of reasoning indi-
cating that manner in which the course of justice" might be impeded). See also Cable from
the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to Resident Representative, United Nations Development
Program (Feb. 15, 1984), 1984 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 186, 187, U.N. Doc. STILEGISER.C/22 (ex-
plaining that waiver must be "in response to a formal request").
352. See Written Comments of the United Nations, supra note 250, at para. 9.
353. See Written Comments of Costa Rica, supra note 138, at 9.
354. See Written Statement of the Government of Malaysia at para. 9.7, Difference
Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, 1999 I.CJ. - (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Written Statement of Malaysia]
(suggesting that the Malaysian plaintiffs had no recourse to an alternative mode of settle-
ment); Written Comments of the Government of Malaysia at para. 7.11, Cumaraswamy,
1999 I.CJ. - [hereinafter Written Comments of Malaysia] (suggesting that the mainte-
nance of immunity would "result in the extinguishment of individual rights").
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the United Nations's rejoinder that the claimants would have ac-
cess to an independent arbitral tribunal under Section 29.
While adequate to meet the situation in Cumaraswamy, the
United Nations's argument bears the seeds of a disturbing process
by which its duties under the functional necessity doctrine might
collapse into a less demanding obligation to prevent the denial of
justice. Structurally speaking, the General Convention requires
the United Nations to waive any immunity that would interrupt
the normal judicial processes of member states unless it can justify
the assertion of immunity on functional necessity grounds.356 Only
after the Organization justifies the refusal to waive immunity on
functional necessity grounds does Section 29 mandate the provi-
sion of alternative remedies to prevent the denial of justice.357 Yet,
the United Nations's argument in Cumaraswamy suggested that
the Organization could short-circuit the first step and could decline
to waive the immunity of its personnel whenever it provides an al-
ternative forum.
According to that reasoning, however, the United Nations's ob-
ligation to perform a functional necessity analysis would disappear
because the Organization could assert unnecessary immunities if it
provided alternatives to municipal court litigation. This would, in
effect, give the United Nations a unilateral right to select, ex post,
355. See Written Statement of the United Nations, supra note 144, at para. 52; Written
Comments of the United Nations, supra note 250, at paras. 13, 15; Oral Statement of the
United Nations (Dec. 10, 1998), supra note 143, at para. 14.
356. See General Convention, supra note 9, at §§ 20,23 (obliging the Secretary-General
to waive the immunities of UN personnel when "immunity would impede the course of
justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations") (em-
phasis added). See also Cable Prepared by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs for the Liaison
Office of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Dec. 2, 1975), 1975 U.N. Jurid. Y.B.
192, 192, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.C/13 (stating that the policy of the United Nations is to
"waive ... immunity so as not to impede normal governmental processes but only if it
deems it in its own interest to do so") (emphasis added); Morgenstern, supra note 298, at
739 (observing that international organizations have "waived... immunity as a matter of
course whenever it constituted an obstacle to the normal course of justice") (emphasis
added).
Of course, if the parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes, the assertion of immu-
nity against municipal court jurisdiction would not impede the normal course of justice
because the normal procedure would be to submit disputes to arbitration. See ILC Study
(1985), supra note 119, at 208 (describing a case in which the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (FAO) argued that its assertion of immunity did not impede the course of jus-
tice because the claimant could bring an arbitration against the FAO in accordance with
the underlying agreement).
357. See General Convention, supra note 9, at § 29(b) (requiring provision of an appro-
priate mode of settling claims involving UN officials "if immunity has not been waived by
the Secretary-General") (emphasis added).
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the forum in which it preferred to be sued. While the United Na-
tions should have the right to override a plaintiff's initial choice of
forum when necessary to ensure the integrity of its operations, it is
difficult to see why the Organization should have the same right
for slip-and-fall claims or similar disputes that raise no functional
necessity concerns.
In addition to raising issues of fairness to plaintiffs, the United
Nations's apparent reliance on Section 29 gives inadequate consid-
eration to the interests of municipal courts. As noted above, the
General Convention's mandatory waiver provisions represent a
commitment by the Organization not to interfere with the normal
judicial processes of member states unless necessary to maintain
the integrity of its operations. In other words, the General Con-
vention requires the Secretary-General to balance the interests of
the Organization against the interests of municipal courts in exer-
cising jurisdiction.38 By suggesting that Section 29 always justifies
a refusal to waive immunity, however, the United Nations seems
to have lost sight of its duty to consider the interests of municipal
courts.
3 5 9
To be fair, the United Nations and other international organiza-
tions have, in the past, recognized their obligation not to interfere
With the judicial processes of member states except on the grounds
of functional necessity.360  Therefore, one may hope that the
United Nations will not extend beyond the narrow facts of Cuma-
raswamy its suggestion that the alternative remedies required by
358. Cf ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 269 (explaining that, in making waiver de-
terminations, the Secretary-General had weighed "the claims of the municipal court to
exercise jurisdiction ... against the interests of the Organization").
359. While Malaysia never clearly explained how the Secretary-General's assertion of
immunity would impede the course of justice, its written submissions generally referred to
the assertion of immunity as a "gross attempt to impose limitations' on Malaysia's sover-
eignty and a sign of "disrespect" for its courts. See Written Statement of Malaysia, supra
note 354, at paras. 7.4, 7.12, 8.1; Written Comments of Malaysia, supra note 354, at para.
7.10. While the United Nations unquestionably had the right to maintain Cumaraswamy's
immunity to protect the integrity of its human rights mandate, Malaysia's reaction illus-
trates why the United Nations should consider the interests of municipal courts and should
not interrupt the normal course of judicial proceedings except on the grounds of func-
tional necessity.
360. See Cable Prepared by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs for the Liaison Office of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (Dec. 2, 1975), supra note 356, at 192 (stating
that the policy of the United Nations is to "waive ... immunity so as not to impede normal
governmental processes but only if it deems it in its own interest to do so") (emphasis
added); Morgenstern, supra note 298, at 739 (indicating that international organizations
have "waived the immunity as a matter of course whenever it constituted an obstacle to
the normal course of justice") (emphasis added).
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Section 29 constitute a sufficient justification for the failure to
waive immunity.361
Finally, to the extent that the Secretary-General's immunity de-
cisions leave any room for criticism, it bears repeating that the
General Convention provides for review by the ICJ.362 Therefore,
some writers have concluded that the Secretary-General only has
the authority to make "prima facie" determinations of immu-
nity.363 This characterization may be somewhat understated be-
cause the United Nations has the sole authority to seek review by
the ICJ and because the ICJ may itself defer to the Secretary-
General in close cases.3 4 Nonetheless, the Secretary-General can
be called to account if he takes unreasonable positions regarding
the scope (or waiver) of international immunities.365
On balance, it appears that proponents of reform have underes-
timated the costs that would result from the expansion of munici-
pal court jurisdiction for international immunities. Recent experi-
ences demonstrate that direct and indirect prejudice still threaten
the capacity of international organizations to perform their obliga-
tions with respect to peace, security, human rights, and other con-
troversial matters. Moreover, the ICJ has rendered an authorita-
tive opinion that explains why international officials are better
situated than municipal courts to decide immunity questions based
361. One writer agrees that international organizations may be excused from answering
claims in municipal courts whenever they offer alternative remedies that guarantee a level
of transparency, independence, and fairness comparable to that established by the proce-
dures of United States federal courts. Singer, supra note 1, at 100-01, 146, 163. While the
writer does not significantly develop the point, he acknowledges that the availability of an
alternative forum does not require the grant of immunity to international organizations.
Id. at 101. Rather, the availability of an alternative forum forces claimants to explain why
the adjudication should take place in municipal courts as opposed to the alternative forum.
Id.
In other words, the creation of alternative fora has nothing to do with immunity per se.
To the contrary, it implicates traditional doctrines (such as forum non conveniens and pro-
rogation clauses) that allow defendants to overcome a plaintiff's initial choice of forum by
identifying an alternative forum. The effect of these doctrines may be similar to immunity
in the sense that they allow defendants to escape an undesirable municipal court. How-
ever, the conceptual basis for these doctrines differs from that of immunity, and their con-
flation invites confusion.
362. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
363. Memorandum from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Assistant Secretary-
General for General Services (Apr. 5, 1983), supra note 312, at 215; MULLER, supra note
14, at 162.
364. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 175 (describing ICJ's role in terms of a "marginal re-
view of the reasonableness of the [O]rganization's decision").
365. See JENKS, supra note 2, at 26 (emphasizing that "an immunity... disagreement
[that] is justiciable ... cannot be fairly represented... as lawlessness").
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on the functional necessity doctrine. Finally, while some writers
argue that international organizations cannot be trusted to make
appropriate immunity decisions, UN practice suggests otherwise.
There may be room for improvement, but adjustment of the ex-
isting system seems likely to generate fewer institutional costs than
a substantial expansion of municipal court jurisdiction
V. INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES IN THEIR PRACTICAL CONTEXT.
ALLEGED BENEFITS OF REFORM
Notwithstanding the likely institutional costs, an expansion of
municipal court jurisdiction might be warranted if it generated
large countervailing benefits. Here, the proponents of reform
make one final argument: the expansion of municipal court
authority would force international organizations to adopt signifi-
cantly higher standards of accountability. 6 According to these
writers, international organizations currently lack incentives to
limit their immunities.367 Consequently, they argue that the reten-
tion of decision-making authority by international organizations
will lead to the creation of "several hundred" entities that possess
the "illegitimate but effective [power] to act lawlessly without fear
of immediate sanction."368 As proof of this phenomenon, various
writers cite the absence of permanent tribunals having compulsory
jurisdiction over international organizations.369 To remedy this
perceived deficiency, they suggest that the expansion of municipal
court authority-or the mere threat of municipal court jurisdic-
tion-would cause international organizations to behave more re-
sponsibly.37 This Part explains that international organizations
initiated the movement towards enhanced accountability. As a re-
sult of their efforts, international law already incorporates re-
quirements that ensure a high level of responsibility. Therefore,
this Part concludes that writers have overestimated the capacity of
municipal courts to increase the accountability of international or-
ganizations.
While international organizations often find it necessary to es-
cape municipal regulation, they do not have a similar need to
366. See eg., Singer supra note 1, at 164 (arguing that judicial proceedings will ensure
the public accountability that international organizations must display if they are to con-
tribute to world peace and enhanced social welfare).
367. See id. at 54-55.
368. Id. at 64.
369. See O'Toole, supra note 12, at 5 & n.15; Singer, supra note 1, at 64 & n.39; Note,
Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182.
370. See Singer, supra note 1, at 163.
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avoid responsibility for legitimate claims.3 71 The ILO recognized
this principle in a 1945 memorandum, which explained that the
"immunities accorded to the Organisation... carry with them cor-
responding responsibilities."3 72 As the necessary "counterpart" to
immunity, the memorandum proposed to require the ILO to
"make provision for the determination by an appropriate interna-
tional tribunal" of private-law and staff disputes to which its im-
munities applied. 73 Thus, the thrust of the ILO's proposal was to
place "the rule of law ... in an international setting in which an
equilibrium of all the factors ... [could] be reached rather than in
a ... national setting in which purely local influences [might]...
distort the outcome." 374 Although the requirement of alternative
remedies for private-law disputes was unknown to the law of in-
ternational immunities in 1945,375 it has become a matter of com-
mon form in immunities and headquarters agreements.376 Thus, in
assessing the criticisms of international immunities, it is important
to remember that international organizations initiated the move-
ment towards increased accountability.3 "
Because international organizations have a legal obligation to
provide claimants with appropriate remedies for private-law dis-
putes, their immunities supply less protection than meets the
eye.378 At most, they provide international organizations with a
procedural immunity that secures the transfer of private-law dis-
putes from municipal tribunals to international fora when neces-
sary to protect the organizations' independent and effective func-
tioning.379
371. See MULLER, supra note 14, at 183. See also JENKS, supra note 117, at 52 (arguing
that there are "overriding objections to making international officials subject to national
jurisdiction," but acknowledging that the same objections do not apply to the jurisdiction
of international tribunals).
372. ILO Memorandum, supra note 120, at 197.
373. Id. at 219. See also JENKS, supra note 2, at 17, 42-43 (describing the ILO Memo-
randum and its enduring influence on the law of international immunities).
374. JENKS, supra note 2, at 26 (describing the effect of international immunities).
375. Id. at 42. See also HILL, supra note 47, at 111 (explaining that the League of Na-
tions's immunity agreements did not expressly provide for the settlement of disputes of a
private law character).
376. See JENKS, supra note 2, at 19.
377. See id. at 42.
378. See Szasz, supra note 13, at 739.
379. JENKS, supra note 2, at 26; Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 93. See also MULLER, supra
note 14, at 177 (explaining that international organizations "cannot use [their] jurisdic-
tional immunity to hide from [their] responsibilities" because they are "under an obliga-
tion to create alternative and adequate means of redress"). In other words, one cannot
assume that international organizations will avoid the costs of adjudication or liability by
invoking their jurisdictional immunities. Memorandum from the U.N. Office of Legal Af-
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Although proponents of reform acknowledge this to be the
theoretical function of international immunities, they worry that
claimants may not, in fact, have access to remedies at the interna-
tional level.38 For example, they observe that private parties lack
standing to initiate proceedings before the ICJ and most interna-
tional tribunals 8' Moreover, they contend that international or-
ganizations have not created permanent tribunals to resolve pri-
vate-law disputes.382 Finally, they argue that arbitration does not
constitute a viable alternative because international organizations
have complete discretion in deciding whether to submit to arbitra-
tion and because their tort victims lack the opportunity to negoti-
ate arbitration agreements ex post.3 3
While it is true that international organizations have the discre-
tion to decide what remedy to offer claimants following the asser-
tion of immunity, the fact remains that most international organi-
zations have an express treaty obligation to provide claimants with
some meaningful form of relief.- Even where the obligation is
fairs to the Chief, Salaries and Allowances, Office of Financial Services (Mar. 18, 1975),
1975 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 160, 160-61, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.CI13. After invoking immu-
nity, most international organizations submit to arbitration of private-law disputes. See
infra notes 393-95 and accompanying text. The costs of arbitration can be quite substan-
tial. Memorandum from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Chief, Salaries and Al-
lowances, Office of Financial Services (Mar. 18,1975), supra, at 160-61.
380. See e.g., BEKKER, supra note 9, at 184 (recognizing the danger that international
immunities could leave claimants without a forum for the enforcement of legitimate
claims).
381. See O'Toole, supra note 12, at 5 & n.15; Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Inter-
governmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182; Note, The United Nations Under
American Municipal Law: A Preliminary Assessment, supra note 56, at 785 n.37. See also
AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 465 (observing that private parties generally lack
standing before international courts).
382. See O'Toole, supra note 12, at 5 & n.15; Singer, supra note 1, at 64 & n.39; Note,
Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182.
383. See Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note
5, at 1182.
384. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 191, 196-97 (observing that treaties require most in-
ternational organizations to establish appropriate modes of settling disputes with private
parties); JENKS, supra note 2, at 19, 43-44 (indicating that such requirements have "be-
come a matter of common form in all immunities and headquarters agreements," includ-
ing the General Convention and the Specialized Agencies Convention, as well as the rele-
vant agreements for NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Council
of Europe); MULLER, supra note 14, at 177, 183 (explaining that most bilateral host
agreements and multilateral immunity agreements provide for the settlement of private-
law disputes). See also AHLUWALIA, supra note 10, at 70 (describing Article 21 of the
General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, which
requires the Council of Europe to provide for the settlement of private-law disputes);
Chen, supra note 123, at 904 (explaining that the Specialized Agencies Convention re-
quires the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations to make appropriate provision for
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not expressly established by treaty, it may be found in the obliga-
tion of international organizations to cooperate with member
states in good faith.385  Thus, the choice between appropriate
remedies may be discretionary, but the basic obligation to provide
them is not.3
Notwithstanding the legal obligations of international organiza-
tions, critics respond that most international organizations have
not in fact established permanent tribunals to handle private-law
disputes.387 Although one must concede the point,38 international
organizations have a legitimate reason for not establishing their
own claims courts. One notable attempt to create such a tribunal
proved a complete failure. For decades, the ILO Administrative
Tribunal (ILOAT) has possessed the jurisdiction to hear contract
claims brought by non-employees.389 Yet, the ILOAT has never
exercised that jurisdiction g.3 ° The fact is that private parties prefer
to avoid the ILOAT because they are unfamiliar with its proce-
dures and because they question its impartiality as an "in-house"
tribunal.391 Under these circumstances, it seems unfair to criticize
international organizations for not creating standing international
tribunals for which private parties would have no demand.3 2
In the absence of such tribunals, the overwhelming practice of
international organizations has been to provide for arbitration ex
settlement of private-law disputes in which they assert immunity); Kunz, supra note 19, at
861 (discussing the identical obligation imposed on the United Nations by Section 29 of
the General Convention); Lewis, supra note 3, at 689 (describing Article 12(a) of the OAS
Convention, which imposes a similar obligation).
385. See MULLER, supra note 14, at 177.
386. See id. (emphasizing that international organizations have an obligation to provide
adequate means of redress for cases in which they maintain their immunity).
387. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
388. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 205 (noting that international organizations have not
responded to calls for the establishment of permanent claims courts); JENKS, supra note 2,
at 44 (observing that international organizations provide for the resolution of private-law
claims on an ad hoc basis "rather than by arrangements with any firm institutional con-
tent"); Kunz, supra note 19, at 852 (explaining that writers during the inter-war period
proposed the creation of permanent claims courts for international organizations, but ac-
knowledging that international organizations failed to establish such institutions).
389. BOWETr, supra note 18, at 375; JENKS, supra note 2, at 44, 162; Ehrenfeld, supra
note 84, at 94.
390. Id.
391. See JENKS, supra note 2, at 44 (recognizing that third parties may perceive interna-
tional administrative tribunals as being subject to the influence of international organiza-
tions); Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 93-94 (concluding that outside contractors prefer arbi-
tration to adjudication by in-house, international administrative tribunals).
392. See Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 93 (explaining that the lack of a permanent claims




ante in contracts 39 3 and ex post in tort cases where the organiza-
tions decline to waive immunity. In these cases, international
organizations typically select arbitration under the rules of the
AAA, the ICAA, the ICC, or UNCITRAL, all of which are ex-
tremely well known to-and respected by-the international arbi-
tration bar.3 95 Thus, it seems unfair to suggest that international
393. See ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 183, 189; ILC Study (1967), supra note
103, at 209, 296; Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Professor (Dec. 27,
1987), supra note 299, at 204; Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Legal
Counsel, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (July 16, 1986), supra
note 309, at 324; Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Questionnaire from the
Institut de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307, at 162-63, 168-69; Memo-
randum from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Chief of the Purchase and Standards
Section, Office of General Services (Oct. 9, 1964), 1964 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 223, 223, U.N.
Doe. ST/LEG/SER.C/2. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, at § 467 report-
ers' note 7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, at § 84 reporters' note;
AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 466 n.131; BEKKER, supra note 9, at 197-98; BoWETr,
supra note 18, at 376; JENKS, supra note 2, at 44; MULLER, supra note 14, at 178-80,
SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 1009; WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 62
(quoting Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 93); Glenn et al., supra note 5, at 268; Singer. supra
note 1, at 85; Lewis, supra note 3, at 689 n.109.
394. See Starways Ltd. v. United Nations, reported in 1969 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 233, 233.
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SERC7 (involving a tort claim in which the United Nations agreed to
arbitration after the dispute arose); Oral Statement of the United Nations (Dec. 10, 1998),
supra note 143, at para. 14 (offering to submit defamation claims to arbitration under the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules). See also ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 283 (recog-
nizing that, as an alternative to waiver, the United Nations could submit automobile tort
claims to arbitration), 321 (describing a case in which one of the Specialized Agencies
submitted a slip-and-fall claim to arbitration); Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to
a Questionnaire from the Institut de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307, at
172 (explaining that when a claim is not covered by third-party liability insurance, the
United Nations submits to arbitration instead of waiving immunity); Internal Memoran-
dum of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs (Nov. 3, 1964), supra note 312, at 263 (discussing
the possibility of arbitrating automobile tort claims); MULLER, supra note 14, at 178 &
n.76 (referring to the Starways case and describing arbitration as the proper way to resolve
disputes involving the non-contractual liability of international organizations).
395. See ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 183 (describing the practice of Specialized
Agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International
Telecommunication Union, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization to pro-
vide for ICC arbitration); ILC Study (1967), supra note 103, at 209 (describing the United
Nations's practice to provide for AAA, ICAA, or ICC arbitration); Letter from the U.N.
Office of Legal Affairs to a Professor (Dec. 27, 1987), supra note 299, at 204 (explaining
that the United Nations's standard arbitration clause now provides for arbitration under
the UNCITRAL rules); Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the Legal Counsel,
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (July 16, 1986), supra note 309,
at 324 (discussing the United Nations's practice of providing in its contracts for arbitration
under the AAA, ICC, or UNCITRAL rules); Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to
a Questionnaire from the Institut de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307. at
162-63, 169 (describing the United Nations's practice of providing for AAA, ICAA, or
ICC arbitration in its contracts); Memorandum from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to
the Chief of the Purchase and Standards Section, Office of General Services (Oct. 9, 1964),
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organizations lack accountability when they provide non-employee
claimants with access to the most popular and widely accepted
method of resolving transnational disputes. Moreover, because
the United Nations resolves most claims by negotiation, criticisms
of its accountability seem particularly misplaced.396
A more sophisticated criticism acknowledges that international
organizations submit to arbitration of private-law disputes, but
condemns the way in which they handle employee claims. 397 To
better understand this argument, one must appreciate the context
in which employment claims arise and in which they are resolved.
Although their constituent documents require international or-
ganizations to provide adequate remedies for private-law claims
supra note 393, at 223 (explaining that the standard bid form for United Nations contracts
provides for AAA, ICAA, or ICC arbitration depending on the residence of the other
party); AMERASINGHE, supra note 27, at 466 n.131 (observing that United Nations con-
tracts have provided for arbitration under the AAA rules); BEKKER, supra note 9, at 197
n.858 (describing the United Nations's practice of providing for AAA, ICAA, or ICC ar-
bitration depending on the geographical location of the supplier); BOwErr, supra note 18,
at 376 & n.68 (describing the United Nations's practice of providing either for AAA or
ICC arbitration depending on the residence of a person); MULLER, supra note 14, at 180
(describing the host agreement between the OAS and the United States, which provides
for AAA or ICAA arbitration of private-law disputes); WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 62-
63 (quoting Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 93 and describing the practice of the United Na-
tions to provide for AAA, ICAA, or ICC arbitration in its contracts with private parties).
As the foregoing materials indicate, the United Nations formerly tailored its arbitration
clauses to local conditions by selecting arbitral institutions and rules that were geographi-
cally and culturally familiar to the particular supplier. The foregoing materials also estab-
lish, however, that the United Nations recently adopted a more standardized approach.
Under current practice, the United Nations submits to arbitration under the UNCITRAL
rules, which were drafted to appeal to the widest variety of legal cultures and which, there-
fore, suit the United Nations's global operations. See Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal
Affairs to a Professor (Dec. 27, 1987), supra note 299, at 205. See also Oral Statement of
the United Nations (Dec. 10, 1998), supra note 143, at paras. 8-9 (describing the United
Nations' current practice of providing for arbitration of private-law disputes under the
UNCITRAL rules).
396. In fact, very few of the United Nations's private-law disputes have gone to arbitra-
tion. See ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 152; Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Af-
fairs to a Questionnaire from the Institut de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra
note 307, at 170, 172; BEKKER, supra note 9, at 198. This reflects the United Nations's
diligent performance of contracts and, when disputes arise, concerted efforts to achieve a
negotiated settlement. See ILC Study (1985), supra note 119, at 152 (stating that the
"overwhelming majority of commercial contracts which have been entered into by the
United Nations have been performed without the occurrence of any serious difficulties");
Letter from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Professor (Dec. 27, 1987), supra note
299, at 204-05 (explaining that the United Nations settles most claims through negotia-
tions).
397. See Singer, supra note 1, at 85-87, 154-62 (recognizing that the United Nations pro-
vides for arbitration of commercial disputes, but criticizing the procedures used by inter-
national organizations for resolving employment disputes). See also Griffith, supra note 4,
at 1026-27 (criticizing the employee grievance procedures of international organizations).
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following the assertion of immunity, that express obligation usually
does not extend to the employment claims of staff membersY
Nonetheless, most international organizations have established in-
ternal grievance procedures and, in addition, have created (or se-
cured access to) international administrative tribunals for the ad-
judication of staff disputes.3 9 In response to a challenge of the
398. See eg., Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 82 (July 13) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth) (ex-
plaining that Section 29 of the General Convention obliges the United Nations to make
appropriate provisions for the settlement of private-law disputes, but does not apply to
staff disputes); JENKS, supra note 2, at 45 (reaching a similar conclusion). See also
BEKKER, supra note 9, at 196 (recognizing that the General Convention "does not deal
with the settlement of [staff] disputes").
399. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 194 (explaining that most international organizations
"have their own systems of administration of justice" for resolving staff disputes);
BowErr, supra note 18, at 317-18 (describing the administrative tribunals established by
the United Nations, the ILO, the World Bank, the Council of Europe, and NATO);
Singer, supra note 1, at 155 (recognizing that "almost every international organization now
has a quasi-judicial forum where an employee may appeal an adverse decision"); Farrugia,
supra note 5, at 521 (noting that "many international organizations have created their own
forums for hearing employee grievances"); Mark Gordon, Recent Development, 21
HARV. J. INT'L L 552,560 nA9 (1980) (explaining that "[m] ost international organizations
have intricate internal administrative mechanisms" for resolving staff disputes); Hammer-
schlag, supra note 22, at 295 (observing that most international organizations have estab-
lished internal administrative tribunals). See also Opinion of the Legal Counsel of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Sept. 4, 1970), supra note 331,
at 189 (describing the FAO's acceptance of the ILOAT's jurisdiction for staff disputes);
BOWETr, supra note 18, at 318 (observing that a number of international organizations
submit their staff disputes to the ILOAT); JENKS, supra note 2, at 161 (explaining that the
ILOAT has jurisdiction over the staff disputes of the Food and Agriculture Organization;
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; the International Atomic Energy Agency;,
the International Telecommunication Union; the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization; the World Health Organization; and the World Meteorological
Organization).
Although there are exceptions, most international administrative tribunals only have ju-
risdiction over disputes involving full-time staff members. See BOvETT, supra note 18, at
321 (discussing the limited jurisdiction of international administrative tribunals). But see
C.F. Amerasinghe, The World Bank Administrative Tribunal, 31 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 748,
756 (1982) (explaining that the World Bank Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction over
claims brought by temporary employees); Theodor Meron & Betty Elder, The New Ad-
ministrative Tribunal of the World Bank, 14 N.Y.U. J. INTL L & POL 1, 19 (1981) (ex-
plaining that the World Bank Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction over claims brought
by part-time and temporary employees). The limited jurisdiction of most international
administrative tribunals has led to concerns that they do not provide any remedies to tem-
porary employees. See Frank Gutteridge, The ILO Administrative Tribunal, in
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, at V.2111-12 (Chris de Cooker ed., 1990). The
United Nations, however, has resolved this problem by including arbitration clauses in
most contracts of employees who are not subject to UNAT's jurisdiction. See Letter from
the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Professor (Dec. 27,1987), supra note 299, at 205. See
also BOWET, supra note 18, at 321 (explaining that temporary employees generally do
not fall within the jurisdiction of international administrative tribunals and, therefore, may
have to rely on arbitration of employment disputes).
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United Nations's authority to create such a tribunal, the ICJ held
that its establishment was "essential" to the effective work of the
Organization.4" In other words, the functional necessity doctrine
authorized the creation of a permanent administrative tribunal for
staff disputes.40 ' Because functional necessity establishes both the
rights and duties of international organizations,4° one may also
conclude international organizations have an affirmative obliga-
tion to provide full-time staff members with access to administra-
tive tribunals for employment matters.0 3
Practice demonstrates, however, that international organizations
retain considerable discretion in selecting the structure of their
administrative tribunals. For example, the United Nations Ad-
ministrative Tribunal (UNAT) consists of seven members, who are
appointed by the General Assembly to renewable, three-year
terms of office. 4°4 Because the General Assembly usually does not
appoint eminent jurists to the UNAT, its members do not receive
the title of "judge. "405 However, the members of UNAT typically
have served on delegations to the United Nations41 and, therefore,
have substantial experience with the Organization. By contrast,
the ILOAT consists of three judges and three deputy judges, who
are appointed to renewable, three-year terms of office.407 While
the ILOAT Statute does not require the appointment of eminent
jurists, the ILOAT has developed a long tradition of service by dis-
tinguished judges and lawyers.4 8  Like UNAT, the World Bank
Administrative Tribunal (WBAT) consists of seven members who
serve for renewable, three-year terms .4  The WBAT's Statute,
however, requires the appointment of eminent jurists to its
400. Effect of Awards of Compensation, 1954 I.C.J. at 57.
401. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 159-60 (discussing the Effect of
Awards of Compensation case in terms of the functional necessity doctrine).
402. See BEKKER, supra note 9, at 48-50.
403. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 330, at 181 (concluding that international organiza-
tions have a moral and a legal duty to establish administrative and judicial systems for re-
solving staff disputes). See also Owen Letter, supra note 26, at 920 (concluding that the
privileges and immunities enjoyed by international organizations "impose a special re-
sponsibility ... to ensure that internal procedures provide effective methods of addressing
and resolving 'labor-management' disputes")
404. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 64.
405. Id. at 66-67.
406. See id at 67.
407. See id. at 64.
408. See id. at 67; YvEs BEIGBEDER, MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATIONS 118 (1987); Meron & Elder, supra note 399, at 17.
409. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 64.
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bench.41° The Organization of American States, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Council of Europe, and NATO
all have similar administrative tribunals.4
Notwithstanding the creation of these international administra-
tive tribunals, one critic argues that most do not "offer procedures
meeting the[] basic standards necessary to assure adequate protec-
tion of human rights."4"' According to that writer, international
administrative tribunals manifest three fundamental deficiencies.
First, they escape outside critique by failing to make timely publi-
cation of decisions.413 Second, they lack sufficient independence
because their members serve brief, renewable terms of office.4 14
Third, they violate due process by not granting employees a right
to oral hearings. 5 Until international organizations correct these
perceived shortcomings, the writer suggests that municipal courts
should withhold immunity in employment suits. 41 6
The least convincing of these arguments involves the timely
publication of opinions by international administrative tribunals.
While it is essential that their opinions be made public and sub-
jected to outside evaluation,417 critics seem to want more. In fact,
their chief grievance is that "the decisions of some tribunals be-
come readily available only when published in collected volumes,
often a year or more after the last opinion in the volume was
handed down. Until such publication, finding individual opinions
may require skilled and intensive research. " 418  This complaint
proves too much because it demonstrates that the opinions of in-
ternational administrative tribunals do not escape outside critique.
From a systemic perspective, the delay of a year presents few con-
410. See id. at 67; Amerasinghe, supra note 399, at 757-58; Meron & Elder, supra note
399, at 16.
411. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 66-67 (discussing the administrative tribu-
nals of the Inter-American Development Bank, the Council of Europe, and NATO);
Glenn et al., supra note 5, at 268 n.113 (describing the Organization of American States
Administrative Tribunal (OASAT)).
412. Singer, supra note 1, at 163.
413. See id. at 159-60.
414. See id. at 155.
415. See id. at 156-57. See also Farrugia, supra note 5, at 522 (recognizing complaints
that international administrative tribunals provide inadequate procedures); Hammer-
schlag, supra note 22, at 295 (arguing that international administrative tribunals do not
provide an effective means of redress); Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovern-
mental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182 (questioning the independence and sufficiency
of procedures offered by international administrative tribunals).
416. See Singer, supra note 1, at 154,163.
417. See id. at 159.
418. Id. at 159-60 (emphasis added).
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cerns because the opinions will inevitably come under the harsh
light of criticism. Moreover, the delay in publishing raises few
concerns for individual cases, since unpublished opinions can be
obtained through "skilled and intensive research.1419 In fact, the
complaints in this area seem chiefly directed to the inconvenience
of counsel.420
The independence of tribunal members raises a more legitimate
concern. To be sure, the use of short, renewable terms theoreti-
cally detracts from tribunals' structural independence.42' Practi-
cally speaking, however, the threat to independence seems more
imagined than real. The members of international administrative
tribunals serve only part time and do not rely on the tribunals for
their livelihood.422 Therefore, they are unlikely to experience fi-
nancial pressures to decide cases based on political expediency.4 3
Moreover, the members of international administrative tribunals
are prominent individuals who have already achieved strong pro-
fessional reputations. For example, UNAT members have consid-
erable expertise in the operation and administration of interna-
tional organizations. 24 The ILOAT has an even stronger pedigree
and counts Lord Devlin and Justice Thurgood Marshall among the
alumni of its bench.425 Similarly impressive, the WBAT bench has
included two Presidents of the ICJ, a Vice President of the ICJ, a
Judge of the ICJ, jurists who have argued cases before the ICJ, and
the chief judge of a municipal supreme court.426 It is difficult to
believe that such individuals would endanger their professional
reputations by excessive pandering to the organizations.427 In fact,
reviews of their jurisprudence suggest that the organizations criti-
cize international administrative tribunals for being "over-
generous or biased in favor of the [staffj" while employees com-
419. Id.
420. See id. at 159 (lamenting the fact that "[r]esearchers in this area are all too aware"
of publication delays).
421. See id. at 155 & n.411. See also Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovern-
mental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182 (stating that international administrative tri-
bunals "have been accused of succumbing to bias in practice").
422. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 71.
423. See id. (emphasizing that members of international administrative tribunals do not
rely financially on their appointments).
424. Meron & Elder, supra note 399, at 17.
425. See AKEHURST, supra note 340, at 25 n.2.
426. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 67.
427. See id. at 71 (questioning the degree to which short terms of office affect the inde-




plain that they award too little compensation 4 s This mutual dis-
satisfaction suggests that international administrative tribunals are
doing a fair and impartial job 29
The most troublesome critique of international administrative
tribunals involves the lack of an affirmative right to oral proceed-
ings4 30 The statutes of most international administrative tribunals
give their members the discretion to decide whether to hold oral
proceedings in any given case.4 31 The practice with respect to oral
hearings has varied both over time and from organization to or-
ganization. For example, between 1971 and 1982, the OASAT de-
nied oral hearings in only one case.432 The Inter-American Devel-
428. BEIGBEDER, supra note 408, at 122-23 (emphasis added). Between 1978 and 1982,
the UNAT delivered 70 judgments. See &L at 122; Farrugia, supra note 5, at 522. It re-
jected 42 claims and granted at least partial relief in the remaining 28 claims. See id.
During the same period, the ILOAT delivered 198 judgments. See BEIGBEDER, supra
note 408, at 122. It rejected 146 claims and granted at least partial relief in the remaining
52 claims. See id. Thus, employees prevailed about 40 percent of time before UNAT and
about 25 percent of the time before the ILOAT. See id. at 121. These figures indicate, at
least, that UNAT and ILOAT are not unduly biased in favor of international organiza-
tions and that their procedures give claimants a substantial prospect of success.
429. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 408, at 123. See also JENKS, supra note 2, at 44 (argu-
ing that the experience of international administrative tribunals shows fears of bias to be
"unjustified"); Meron & Elder, supra note 399, at 17 (emphasizing that UNAT and
ILOATjudges have shown "competence and independence'). In fact, the ICJ has already
considered and rejected arguments that UNAT is not an independent body. Compare Ef-
fect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
1954 I.CJ. 47, 53 (July 13) (describing UNAT as an "independent and truly judicial
body"), with id. at 95 (dissenting opinion of Judge Carneiro) (concluding that UNAT lacks
the qualities of an independent and judicial body). Likewise, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights recently held that adjudication of staff disputes by the European Space
Agency's internal appeals board satisfied the right to an independent and impartial tribu-
nal. Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083194, at paras. 39-40, 47, 68-69, 72 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 18,1999), available at <http://www.dhcour.coe.frlhudoc>.
430. See Singer, supra note 1, at 156 (stating that "[tjhe procedures in many tribunals
are not adequate for [a judicial] function"). See also Farrugia, supra note 5, at 522 (recog-
nizing the existence of complaints about the adequacy of procedures provided by interna-
tional administrative tribunals); Hammerschlag, supra note 22, at 295 (arguing that inter-
national administrative tribunals are ill-equipped to handle employment claims); Note,
Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 5, at 1182
(claiming that proceedings before international administrative tribunals often 'present the
appearance of the denial of justice").
431. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 624; Singer, supra note 1, at 156-57. See
also C.F. Amerasinghe, The World Bank Administrative Tribunal Its Establishment and Its
Work, in INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, at V.315 (Chris de Cooker ed., 1990) (ex-
plaining that the UNAT, ILOAT, and WBAT statutes do not grant parties the right to
oral hearings).
432. AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 625. See also Glenn et al., supra note 5. at 268
n.113 (describing the procedures of the OASAT and emphasizing the rights of claimants
to oral hearings, at which they may present and cross-examine witnesses); Singer, supra
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opment Bank Administrative Tribunal has also granted oral hear-
ings on a liberal basis.433 Overall, UNAT has granted significantly
more oral hearings than it has denied, although it grants oral
hearings less frequently than in past years. 4  In the past, the
ILOAT regularly granted oral hearings, but has become exceed-
ingly stingy in recent years.435 As of 1992, the WBAT granted only
two oral hearings.436 Thus, while the specific practices of interna-
tional administrative tribunals show considerable variance, the
general trend seems to be an increasing emphasis on written pro-
ceedings.437
One critic describes this state of affairs as "utterly inadequate,"
especially when compared to the due process rights that individu-
als could expect in United States federal courts.438 According to
that writer, claimants in United States federal courts would have
the due process right to an oral hearing and the cross-examination
of witnesses.439 The writer further suggests that international pro-
cedural norms require no less."0 The first response to this argu-
ment is that staff members of international organizations agree, as
a condition of appointment, to the adjudication of employment
disputes without the right to an oral hearing. 41 In the context of
note 1, at 157 (recognizing that the OASAT "virtually always grant[s] oral proceedings
upon [the] request of either party").
433. See Singer, supra note 1, at 157. See also AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 625
(explaining that the IDBAT held oral hearings in nine out of twelve cases decided before
the end of 1986).
434. Prior to 1969, UNAT granted oral hearings in 69 cases and denied them in 8 cases
out of a total of 132 cases. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 625. Up to 1984,
UNAT granted oral hearings in 105 cases and denied them in 49 cases out of a total of 341
cases. See id.
435. Up to 1967, the ILOAT denied oral hearings in only 13 of the 96 cases that it de-
cided. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 625. Between 1967 and 1985, the ILOAT
granted oral hearings in only 18 cases and denied them in 153 cases out of a total of 549
cases. See id. During the last twelve years of that period, the ILOAT granted oral hear-
ings in three cases and denied them in 107 cases. See id.; Singer, supra note 1, at 156-57.
436. See Singer, supra note 1, at 157. See also AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 625
(stating, as of 1986, that the WBAT had received "several requests" for oral hearings, but
granted only one request).
437. Gutteridge, supra note 399, at 18.
438. Singer, supra note 1, at 158.
439. See id.
440. See id. (contending that "the standard of due process offered by several adminis-
trative tribunals falls unacceptably below that expected within a developed legal system").
441. In international organizations, letters of appointment generally provide that ap-
pointments are subject to staff regulations and staff rules. See, e.g., Effect of Awards of
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 57
(July 13); Reply by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a Questionnaire from the Institut
de Droit International (Feb. 26, 1976), supra note 307, at 164 n.24; Opinion of the Legal
Counsel of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Sept. 4, 1970),
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international arbitration, courts have recognized that such parties
"relinquish] [their] courtroom rights ... in favor [of the alterna-
tive procedure] 'with all of its well known advantages and draw-
backs."'" 2
More fundamentally, it is incorrect to suggest that U.S. concep-
tions of due process constitute the minimum international stan-
dard of fair procedure. 43 Presently, the requirements of proce-
dural fairness "var[y] from legal system to legal system according
to [prevailing] political [and] cultural ... influences."'" Given the
diversity of municipal due process standards, one may identify
only two commonly accepted requirements of procedural justice at
the international level: impartiality of the tribunal and equal
treatment of parties.445
However, while audi alteram partem may be characterized as a
fundamental tenet of international procedural justice, it does not
necessarily require the opportunity to make an oral statement.446
supra note 331, at 189; JENKS, supra note 14, at 37; Richardson, supra note 335, at 85, 88.
See also KELSEN, supra note 89, at 313 (asserting that an organization's staff regulations
and staff rules must be implied in employment contracts between international organiza-
tions and their staff); RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, supra note 51, at 316 (explaining that
the League of Nations expressly conditioned staff appointments on the appointees' written
acceptance of the staff regulations). Staff regulations, in turn, generally require adjudica-
tion of employment disputes by an international administrative tribunal. See, eg., Effect
of Awards, 1954 I.C.J. at 60 (quoting United Nations Staff Regulation No. 11.2). As noted
above, however, the statutes of most international administrative tribunals do not provide
a right to oral hearings. See supra text accompanying note 431.
442. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v.
Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). See also HOvARD M.
HOLTzMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 672 (1989) (explaining that the
UNCITRAL Model Law permits enforcement of agreements to arbitrate without oral
hearings). Cf DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d
1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.) (concluding that parties may agree to simplified
proceedings and may waive the right to present oral testimony).
443. See JENKS, supra note 14, at 70 (reminding us to *be on our guard against import-
ing... undertones of American constitutional law which have no immediate international
application"); John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need
for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT'L L REv. 1173,
1175-77 (1999) (explaining that "due process is a predominantly American concept" and
that "the concept ... is an unfamiliar and difficult one for non-American lawyers to un-
derstand").
444. Gaffney, supra note 443, at 1178.
445. See id at 1179,1195.
446. See JENKS, supra note 14, at 52 (recognizing the concept of audi alteram partem as
a general principle of law, but arguing that "[ain opportunity to make an oral statement is
not necessarily required"). See also V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 164
(1980) (explaining that "[i]nternational practice tends to regard oral proceedings as some-
what exceptional").
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For example, the reliance of international administrative tribunals
on written submissions corresponds to the practice of respected
and developed civil law institutions, such as the French Conseil
d'Etat."7 In the context of international arbitration, United States
federal courts have repeatedly held that the "lack of oral hearings
does not [necessarily] amount to the 'denial of fundamental fair-
ness' required to warrant vacating an award."448 Furthermore, the
United Nations Compensation Commission, which has processed
claims against Iraq since the end of the Gulf War, is expected to
render the vast majority of its awards on the basis of written sub-
missions.449 Under these circumstances, we should not assume that
international procedural law requires oral proceedings in every
case. Nor should we hasten to condemn international administra-
tive tribunals for their "failure" to implement procedures that re-
flect U.S. standards of fairness.
Even if we were to approach the matter from a domestic per-
spective, one would immediately recognize that due process does
not necessarily require oral proceedings.450 For example, federal
447. See Gutteridge, supra note 399, at 18 (observing that the restrictive procedures of
UNAT and ILOAT were "doubtless strongly influenced by the customs of the Conseil
d'Etat"). See also BowEr', supra note 18, at 320 (explaining that the procedures of inter-
national administrative tribunals are "predominantly modelled on the French system and
[are] based ... on written briefs lodged by the parties"). Cf Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co.,
941 F. Supp. 1512, 1527 (D. Minn. 1996) (quoting Bolanos v. Gulf Oil Corp., 502 F. Supp.
689, 693 (W.D. Pa. 1980), affd, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982), for the proposition that "[w]e
must be careful not to let our justifiable pride in the English common law system ... ob-
scure the fact that much of Western Europe and . . . South American countries ... are
firmly grounded in the Civil Law tradition [which relies on written submission of evidence,
restricts cross-examination, and does not provide a jury trial]").
448. In re Griffin Indus., 58 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Transit Cas.
Co. v. Trenwick Reins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 841 F.2d 1117
(2d Cir. 1988)). See also In re Intercarbon Bermuda, Ltd., 146 F.R.D. 64, 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("The arbitrator's conclusion that no live hearings were necessary to resolve the
contract issue in this case was not fundamentally unfair to Intercarbon, and will not be dis-
turbed by this Court."); Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under
the ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 209 (1995-96)
("The vast majority of U.S. cases.., have rejected allegations of due process violations by
arbitral tribunals. For example, U.S. courts have enforced arbitral awards where the arbi-
trators decided issues on the basis of affidavits, as opposed to live testimony.")
449. See Roger P. Alford & Peter H.F. Bekker, International Courts and Tribunals, 32
INT'L LAW. 499, 502 (1998). See also Robert C. O'Brien, The Challenge of Verifying Cor-
porate and Government Claims at the United Nations Compensation Commission, 31
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 21 (1998) (warning that when the United Nations Compensation
Commission agrees to hold oral proceedings, "claimants.. . should not equate [them] with
a full hearing on the merits at which [the parties] will have the right to present their views
and arguments on the claims").
450. See Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that it was "un-
questionably constitutional" for the district court to deny an oral hearing on a motion to
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district courts often resolve motions without oral argument.45'
Likewise, federal courts rarely permit evidentiary hearings when
reviewing agency decisions. To the contrary, they review such de-
cisions on the basis the administrative record.452 Similarly, staff
disputes come to international administrative tribunals With the
benefit of a record generated by the quasi-judicial, internal griev-
ance procedures of international organizations.4  In reviewing
those records, international administrative tribunals frequently
lack the authority to make independent determinations of fact and
must limit themselves examining the record for an abuse of discre-
tion.454 As many U.S. courts have found, one may perform that
task Without the benefit of additional evidentiary hearings.4 55
dismiss); Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (recognizing that
"due process does not include the right to oral argument on a motion"); Morrow v. Top-
ping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971) (concluding that a local rule calling for motions
without oral hearings complied with the requirements of due process); Lewis, Lewis &
Van Etten v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 138 F.R.D. 25, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that
the courts "have repeatedly held that there is no constitutional right to present oral argu-
ment on motions"); Butterman v. Walston & Co., 50 F.R.D. 189, 190 (E.D. Wis. 1970)
(recognizing that "[d]ue process does not always require... an oral argument." and that
oral argument is not always "helpful or desirable"); Hilton v. W.T. Grant Co., 212 F. Supp.
126, 128 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (holding that "oral argument is not required in order to consti-
tute due process").
451. See FED. R. Civ. P. 78 (authorizing federal district courts to decide motions with-
out oral argument). See also FED. R. APP. P. 34(a) (allowing appellate panels to dispense
with oral argument in certain cases, particularly when "the facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be
significantly aided by oral argument").
452. See, eg., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S. CL 1241, 1244 (1973) ("In applying
[the] standard [of review under the Administrative Procedure Act], the focal point for ju-
dicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new rec-
ord made initially in the reviewing court."); Newton County Wildlife Assoc. v. Rogers, 141
F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1998) ("APA review of agency action is normally confined to the
agency's administrative record."); First Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Department of Treasury, 63
F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Generally, judicial review of an agency decision is limited
to the administrative record."); McDougall v. Widnall, 20 F. Supp. 2d 78,82 (D.D.C. 1998)
("This Court must review the decision of the [agency] through an examination of the ad-
ministrative record of the proceedings before the [agency], rather than a de novo review of
Plaintiff's claims.").
453. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Problems of Evidence Before International Administrative
Tribunals, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 205, 206-07 (Richard
B. Lillich ed., 1992) (explaining that international administrative tribunals "have the bene-
fit of findings of fact by internal quasi-judicial bodies such as joint appeals boards (UN) or
appeals committees (World Bank)"). As one author explains, internal appeals boards
"verif[y] the facts, obtain[] and reviewi] relevant documentation, hear[] both parties and
may call witnesses." BEIGBEDER, supra note 408, at 115. Thus, when staff members seek
review by the relevant administrative tribunal, the board's report provides comprehensive
documentation and analysis of the case. See id.
454. The abuse-of-discretion standard applies to disputes about salary awards, disability
compensation, termination of employment for unsatisfactory service, confirmation of pro-
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Given these facts, the procedures of international administrative
tribunals seem adequate to the task. 6  There is, in fact, no evi-
dence to suggest that international administrative tribunals over-
look important points in the cases that they decide without oral
proceedings. 457  To the contrary, the frequency with which claim-
ants prevail demonstrates that international administrative tribu-
nals provide a sufficient opportunity for redress.
Because international administrative tribunals already provide
claimants with adequate procedures, one must finally weigh the
consequences of permitting oral hearings as a matter of right. It
remains an inescapable fact that international administrative tri-
bunals consist of few members, who serve on a part-time basis.459
Moreover, they do not sit in close proximity to the duty stations of
many staff members. If these tribunals required oral proceedings
in every case, many claimants, attorneys, and witnesses would face
the expense of travel over long distances.46 Furthermore, all
claimants would experience significant delays in the scheduling of
hearings and, thus, in the ultimate award of relief. 461 International
bationary employment, transfers, promotions, and the classification or grading of posi-
tions. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 256-59. In these cases, international admin-
istrative tribunals do not find facts; they only look for procedural defects that suggest arbi-
trary conduct. See id. at 265-68 (describing the standards of review employed by
international administrative tribunals).
In cases that require determinations of completely objective facts, such as the award of
travel allowances based on distance or the payment of a death benefit, international ad-
ministrative tribunals exercise de novo review. See id. at 255-56. Likewise, administrative
tribunals exercise de novo review in disciplinary matters. See id. at 261. Even in these
cases, however, the need for oral hearings should arise only if the internal grievance proc-
ess fails to produce an adequate record or the dispute raises questions of credibility.
455. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
456. See, e.g., AMERASINGHE, supra note 331, at 268 (concluding that the review exer-
cised by international administrative tribunals protects the interests of staff members
while avoiding undue interference with the internal governance of international organiza-
tions); Amerasinghe, supra note 453, at 232 (stating that international administrative tri-
bunals "have rules of procedure and other means of dealing with documentary and oral
evidence that seem in general to be effective").
457. See Gutteridge, supra note 399, at 19.
458. See supra note 428. See also Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, at paras. 39-40,
47, 68-69, 72 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 1999) (involving the European Space Agency and
holding that access to its internal appeals board satisfied the right to an impartial and in-
dependent tribunal), available at <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc>.
459. See supra notes 404-11,422 and accompanying text.
460. See Gutteridge, supra note 399, at 19 (describing the logistical problems created by
the decentralization of international organizations and concluding that "it would be quite
unfair if distance from the place of the hearing of a complaint were to play a role in the




practice has already shown that extended delays can result in the
denial of justice.462
In short, international administrative tribunals offer procedures
that are sufficiently transparent, independent, and fair to ensure
that international organizations will conduct their employment ac-
tivities with a high degree of accountability. 1 While there may be
room for improvement, it is not clear that the expansion of mu-
nicipal court authority would produce a significant increase in the
accountability of international organizations. In fact, an expansion
of municipal court authority could have the opposite effect. While
the procedures of international administrative tribunals may not
comport with every aspect of American due process, they compare
favorably with the procedural rights available in many of the
courts that would benefit from proposals to expand municipal ju-
risdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several writers claim that treaties have implemented the func-
tional necessity doctrine through expansive provisions that resem-
ble the doctrine of absolute state immunity. They contend that in-
ternational organizations and their personnel have little need for
jurisdictional immunities. To the contrary, they argue that interna-
tional immunities encourage international organizations to behave
irresponsibly. Building on these premises, they urge us to draw on
state-immunity principles and to expand the authority of municipal
courts to make immunity determinations based on principles of re-
stricted sovereign immunity or the functional necessity doctrine.
Implicit in such proposals lies the assumption that the expansion of
462. See Charles N. Brower, Comment, The Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunak How May They Be Applied in the Case of Iraq?, 32 VA. J. INT'L L 421, 427
(1992) (describing the delays encountered by wrongful expulsion claims before the Iran-
United States Tribunal and concluding that claimants were "forced to wait beyond the pe-
riod in which actual recovery would [have been] of any immediate help'). See also
Brower, supra note 153, at 1592 (implying that significant delays in the resolution of indi-
vidual claims before international tribunals may result in the denial of justice).
463. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 330, at 198 (acknowledging that the UNAT and
ILOAT have played a "vital," if uneven, role in protecting staff from arbitrary and unfair
employment actions); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 17, at 366 (stating that an
early comparative study concluded that the UNAT and ILOAT generally "provide effec-
tive protection for the interests of international officials'); Farrugia, supra note 5, at 522
(noting that the UNAT "has been commended for promoting 'the independence and secu-
rity of the international civil service'").
464. See Glenn et al., supra note 5, at 269 (asserting that "the OAS Tribunal and those
of other international organizations embody due process safeguards equal or superior to
those of the member nations").
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municipal court jurisdiction would not produce substantial institu-
tional costs and would generate significant benefits in the form of
increased accountability.
This article has challenged the misguided premises of proposals
to expand municipal court jurisdiction. To this end, it first ex-
plained that international immunities have experienced a signifi-
cant diminution over the course of the twentieth century. Second,
the provisions of immunities agreements do not resemble the doc-
trine of absolute state immunity. Rather, they permit the mainte-
nance of international immunities only on the basis of functional
necessity, but give international officials the primary authority to
apply the functional necessity doctrine. Third, drawing on a recent
decision by the ICJ, this article argued that national prejudices still
threaten the work of international organizations. These prejudices
justify the continued existence of international immunities and the
maintenance of decision-making authority at the international
level. In fact, an expansion of municipal court authority would
impair the capacity of international organizations to perform their
obligations with respect to peace, security, and human rights.
Fourth, and finally, international organizations initiated the
movement towards accountability. As a result, they have created
alternatives to municipal court litigation that promote a high de-
gree of responsibility. Under these circumstances, it seems un-
likely that an expansion of municipal court jurisdiction would en-
hance the accountability of international organizations.
In short, the reallocation of competence for international immu-
nities seems unnecessary at best and harmful at worst. The princi-
pal effect would be to impede the controversial-but important-
work of international organizations.
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